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Abstract
According to Argonne National Laboratories, “Resilience is the ability of an 
entity to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance.”  
Resilience in a system is important because it allows a system to adapt its operations to 
unknown and altered operational environments.  Presidential Policy Directive 21 states 
that increasing resilience of critical infrastructures is not only desired, but United States 
policy.  Communications infrastructures are one such critical infrastructure. 
The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology for measuring resilience 
in satellite communication systems for use as a key criterion in the selection and 
acquisition of new satellite architectures, in accordance with the National Security Space 
Strategy.  The base methodology utilized in this thesis is Extreme Event Modeling 
implemented through the use of Bi-Level Programming with monotonically nonlinear 
continuous and mixed integer variables.  This model differs from previous efforts applied 
to other critical infrastructures in that it captures the temporal component associated with 
multiple events, as well as the repairs, or reconstitution, of infrastructure components.  
Furthermore, a heuristic based upon a ratio of impact to cost and local searches is 
developed to solve the resulting continuous bi-level problem.  
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1
A METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING RESILIENCE IN A SATELLITE-BASED 
COMMUNICATION NETWORK 
 
 
I. The Problem 
Why Resilience Matters 
 
In 2010, Washington D.C. was struck by a blizzard which forecasters watched 
build with the aid of satellite data.  It was considered to be one of the largest winter 
storms that the Mid-Atlantic region had seen in nearly 90 years.  As a result of this storm, 
roads, hospitals, and railways were closed, and three hundred-thousand citizens were 
without electricity the following day.  That was with the aid of the satellites to make 
preparations.  Experiments show that the size of that storm, without the aid of satellites, 
would have been predicted at less than half of its size and intensity, a prediction that 
would have left many Americans out in the cold (Cushman).
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On July 15, 1996, then-President William J. Clinton signed Executive Order 
13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection.  The very first section was to establish the 
"President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection." 
The purpose of this commission was to identify vulnerabilities, both physical and 
cyber, as well as to provide "expert guidance to critical infrastructures to detect, prevent, 
halt, or confine an attack and to recover and restore service" (EO 13010 sect. 7.5.1).  
What the President was demanding nearly two decades ago is still being worked as a 
critical issue. 
In PPD-21, 16 critical infrastructure sectors are designated, three more than 
denoted in 2002, but two fewer than in 2009.  Those sectors are:  Chemical, Commercial 
Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Defense Industrial Base, 
Emergency Services, Energy, Banking and Finance, Food and Agriculture, Government 
Facilities, Public Health, Information Technology, Nuclear, Transportation, and Water.  
Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, and Nuclear are four new sectors, 
with the former Postal sector being absorbed into Transportation.  These new sectors 
were added in 2009 along with National Monuments and Icons, which, like Postal and 
Shipping, was absorbed into other sectors in 2013.  
On January 11, 2013, the president’s National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee (NSTAC) released a report on its most recent endeavors, which are 
focused on increasing “the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of Governmental 
unclassified communications” (NSTAC 2013 p2).  In that report, one area of their 
examinations includes “the interdependencies of networked systems, resulting in higher 
potential consequences from successful events” (NSTAC 2013 p1).    One such network 
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is the satellite communications network (NSTAC 2013).  To eliminate confusion of 
terms, the mathematical definition of network, which is “a set of objects (called nodes or 
vertices) that are interconnected”, is used throughout.  The connections between the 
nodes are called edges or links” (Nykamp Network Definition). 
More recently, in February 2013 a new Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) was 
released on the subject of "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience", PPD-21.  It 
states that "it is the policy of the United States to strengthen the security and resilience of 
its critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats" (PPD-21 p. 2).  Much 
like in 1996, the goal is to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the consequences of 
events (PPD-21).  Accompanying that PPD was EO 13636, Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity.  In EO 13636, a major threat to critical infrastructure was 
outlined, the cyber threat.  As infrastructures become more and more complex, 
dependence upon computers to aid in daily operations grows as well.  The less vulnerable 
infrastructures are to this threat, like any other, the more resilient they become.   
“It is the policy of the United States to enhance the security and 
resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a 
cyber environment … while promoting safety, security, business 
confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.”  (EO 13636 Section 1) 
 
On April 9th, 2013, at the 29th National Space Symposium, General William 
Shelton, Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command, stated (Moskowitz p1)  : 
 “Shrinking government budgets, combined with a growing 
reliance on space assets by the United States - especially by its 
military - are putting the country in an undefended position.”  
During his speech, Gen. Shelton “advocated reaching a sweet spot 
between ‘capability, affordability, and resilience’.”   
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Despite many misconceptions, space systems are not safe.  Accidental collisions 
with other satellites, debris, or meteors are just a small portion of the threats these space 
assets face.  Every satellite must be able to transmit information to and from a terrestrial 
station, whether directly or indirectly, if they are to be useful to their operators.  This 
means that anything which might interrupt or distort that transmission is also a threat to 
the capabilities the space assets provide.  This can include radio frequency interference 
(RFI), cyber attacks, and even weather.  Recently, a rise in the potential threat of an 
attack on space assets from kinetic weapons has occurred, as seen by the rise in the 
technology related to anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry (NSTAC p. 12).   
Resilience is important because it allows a system to adjust and adapt to the 
unknown, to survive, and to either regain its former status, or to adapt in a useful way of 
operating in the altered conditions.  As the world changes, the preference for 
infrastructures plans have shifted from resistant plans which focus on withstanding the 
effects of known threats, to designs that focus more on building systems that can handle 
an unknown disruptive event. 
As we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in 
current capabilities, we will include resilience as a key criterion in 
evaluating alternative architectures. 
National Security Space Strategy  
(Fact Sheet:  Resilience of Space Capabilities) 
 
Defining Resilience 
Over the years, an array of definitions of resilience have been proposed, each 
geared towards the user’s purpose for a specific system and type of disruption.  In 2000, 
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Luthar and Cicchetti defined resiliency as a "positive adaption" and that it was 
"considered a demonstration of manifested behavior on social competence or success at 
meeting any particular tasks at a specific life stage" (Luthar p. 110).  Clearly, their focus 
was not on critical infrastructure; much of the earliest work in resilience dealt with 
psychology.   
Collins English Dictionary defines resiliency for ecology as "the ability of an 
ecosystem to return to its original state after being disturbed".  In physics, the same term 
is defined as "the amount of potential energy stored in an elastic material when 
deformed" (Dictionary.com).  In 2010, Hill, et al, utilized data from United States history 
to derive a method for measuring regional economic stability based upon not only 
employment/unemployment rates, but also a variety of components which include, but 
are not limited to, laws, reaction to previous shocks, or abrupt reduction of system 
performance. 
In this section, existing definitions are reviewed in order to determine the key 
components that many current definitions, if not all, deem to be pieces to the resilience 
puzzle.  At the conclusion of this section, the definition is to be used in this thesis is 
specified.   
Regardless of how the definition has varied over fields of study and time, they all 
center on the same root concept.  Merriam-Webster defines resilience as "an ability to 
recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change".  Resilience originated from a 
Latin word, resiliens, which means "to spring back, or recoil".  However, the focus of this 
thesis is not to universally defining resilience.  Rather, what is needed is to consider 
resilience in the context of a critical infrastructure. 
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In Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, C.S. Holling, considered to be 
the first to provide a system level definition for resilience, defines resilience as follows: 
(Holling p. 14)   
 
Resilience is a measure of the persistence of systems and of their 
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the 
same relationships between populations or state variables. 
 
In A Framework for Assessing the Resilience of Infrastructure and Economic 
Systems, definitions from multiple other works on resilience are provided; however there 
is one group that best demonstrates the evolution of the definition of resilience (Vugrin p. 
84).  In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defined resiliency as "the 
capability of an asset, system, or network to maintain its function during or to recover 
from a terrorist attack or other incident"  (DHS NIPP p. 104). Two years later, their 
definition had evolved to "the ability to resist, absorb, recover from or successfully adapt 
to adversity or a change in conditions" (DHS Risk Lexicon p. 23). 
A change in the most recent version of the definition may already be seen as a 
new strategic goal of resilience is "enhanced preparedness". (Keil)  Argonne National 
Laboratory, a leading research laboratory for Department of Energy, has altered its 
definition to "the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization, community, region- to 
anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance."(Carlson 
p. 7)  They go on to break resilience down into three main components:  "Reduced failure 
probabilities, reduced consequences from failures…, and reduced time to recovery." 
(Carlson p. 16)    Their belief is that, while many confuse resistance with resilience, 
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resistance should be considered as a subcomponent of resilience, and thus included in the 
definition.  Doing so allows the definition, as well as the resulting measure, to not only 
measure how efficiently the system "bounces back" from a disturbance, but also takes 
into account proactive measures taken to protect the system.  Hence the addition of 
anticipate and resist to the definition.   
Mathematically, a measure, μ, on a set, A, is a function from A to the set of real 
numbers, R, which possesses, at a minimum, the properties of monotonicity and 
subadditivity.  Monotonicity is a property stating that if E1 and E2 are two subsets of A 
where, 1 2E E A , then 1 2( ) ( )μ E μ E .  The subadditive property states that for a 
countable sequence of sets, Ei,
11
i i
ii
μ E μ E  (Royden p. 31).   
For the purposes of this research, the parent set A is the complete set of nodes in 
the network, all operating at optimal capacity.  Each subset Ei, which is referred to 
henceforth as states of the network, is then a state in which one or more of the nodes in 
the network have been degraded below optimal operational capability, either partially or 
fully.  Given two sets Ei and Ej, i jE E if and only if every node in the network at state i 
is at or below the operational capability level of the exact same node in state j. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) also has their own definition of resilience 
(Fact Sheet:  Resilience of Space Capabilities)    .   
Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions 
necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse 
conditions.  An architecture is “more resilient” if it can provide 
these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced 
capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and 
threats.   Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative 
government, commercial, or international capabilities. 
 
In this definition, four main components are intended (Fact Sheet:  Resilience of Space 
Capabilities). 
Avoidance: countermeasures against potential adversaries, 
proactive and reactive defensive measures taken to diminish the 
likelihood and consequence of hostile acts or adverse conditions  
Robustness: architectural properties and system of systems design 
features to enhance survivability and resist functional degradation  
Reconstitution: plans and operations to replenish lost or 
diminished functions to an acceptable level for a particular 
mission, operation, or contingency  
Recovery: program execution and space support operations to re-
establish full operational capability and capacity for the full range 
of missions, operations, or contingencies  
 
It should be noted this definition has much in common with the stated Argonne National 
Laboratory definition.  While this indicates a move towards a common definition across 
infrastructure, a commonly accepted one has yet to be attained.  Avoidance and 
robustness are directly related to the concept of resistance and their breakdown, “to 
anticipate, resist, absorb”.  The definition of avoidance given by the DoD Fact Sheet 
introduce a concept that, while included in the realm of resist, was not formally stated, 
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and that is the use of countermeasures to diminish the impact of an event.  Reconstitution 
is the act of replenishing functions in the near future, or to “respond to, adapt to”.  
Finally, Recovery is the easiest to compare as the final piece of the Argonne definition is 
“and recover from a disturbance." 
It is evident that, though no one definition has yet to become the standard for 
resilience, the more work done with the concept, the closer definitions converge to a 
similar idea of what resilience must be.  While the DoD definition did say what they 
wanted a resilient architecture or system, it does not directly address the subject of what 
resilience is.  However, the intended components illuminated that piece very well.  Those 
components were imbedded in the reviewed definition from Argonne Laboratory, an 
expansion of the most recent DHS definition available and one that captures all of their 
desired attributes of the word.  Therefore, this thesis will progress with the following 
resilience definition (Carlson p. 7): 
 
Resilience is the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization, 
community, region- to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt 
to, and recover from a disturbance.   
   Argonne National Laboratory 
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Key Components of Resilience 
In this section, the key components of the DoD definition and the Argonne 
National Laboratory definition is decomposed in order to describe to the reader the 
aspects of a network that must be included while measuring resilience.  Recall that from 
the DoD definition, four main components of resilience exist:  Avoidance, Robustness, 
Reconstitution, and Recovery.  In this section, a review the necessary nature of resilience 
measures in order to capture these components is conducted. 
Avoidance consists of the steps taken to lessen the likelihood and consequences 
of an event.  Each step taken to reduce the impact of an event generally increases the cost 
in some other aspect of financial or operational burden.  These expenditures need not be 
on material objects.  For example, funds spent to increase friendly relations with an 
adversary will lessen the likelihood of a negative event occurring from that adversary.   
Unfortunately, a network operator cannot and will not always know who the 
network’s potential foes are or may be over the life of a system.  Another option is 
material countermeasures.  These could come in the form of missile interceptors, 
eliminating the threat at its location before the interdiction can be completed, employing 
additional cyber security assets to an imminent threat, or any other actions which may be 
taken to deter a diminishing of network capabilities. 
Interdiction is defined by the DoD as: (Joint Publication 3-3 p. vii) 
1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s 
military surface capability before it can be used effectively 
against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives.  
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2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, 
disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as 
appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo. 
The purpose of interdiction operations is to prevent the adversary 
from using assets at the time and place of his choosing. 
 
Robustness is the ability of the design to survive and resist degradation.  For 
systems of systems, this can be effectively broken into two distinct pieces, the larger 
system and then sub-systems.  To avoid confusion, in this thesis these levels are referred 
to as the network and the node respectively, however this process of viewing hierarchical 
levels separately can be applied to any level of the system with varying levels of 
difficulty.  
In a node, the robustness may be increased by providing more effective inherent 
components.  These could be things such as the antivirus software installed, on-board 
redundancies for critical components, shielding from radiation, or increased fuel for 
maneuvering out of danger and readjusting configuration after an event.   
In a satellite network, the robustness may be increased by the sheer quantity of 
ground stations and satellites incorporated as well as on-orbit spares.  Moreover, the 
robustness of the network relies upon the robustness of each satellite in said network.  For 
example, if each satellite in a network is shielded against radiation and electromagnetic 
pulses, then the network is robust against such anomalies.  Regardless of the level at 
which these protections are implemented, as well as the amount of protection offered by 
each feature, each comes with its own requirement of resources, both initial and enduring.  
Reconstitution is determined by the set of plans and operations needed to restore 
the network to an acceptable level of operation.  What is considered acceptable may be 
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dependent upon the time and nature of the event.  From a DoD perspective, it is first 
essential to regain sufficient capacity in the network to proceed with a mission or critical 
function.  However, after an initial phase, the network must also be able to be 
reconstituted to acceptably support its original function.  As before, reconstitution of 
assets requires time, money, and potential operational tradeoffs, but the level of 
reconstitution needed is time dependent.
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to provide a measure for network level resilience 
of Satellite Communications for use as a key criterion in evaluating the implementation 
of alternative satellite architectures.  This measure is divided into multiple distinct time 
periods, and includes the probability of maintaining mission essential functions, as well 
as the costs and times associated with maintaining and reconstituting the system, for an 
assumed level of adversity and a set of individually evaluated intelligent adversary 
objectives. 
In the following chapter, previous work done on measuring resilience in critical 
infrastructures is reviewed.  Particular attention is granted to their measures, how those 
measures were derived, and how the authors calculated those measures.  Those measures 
and infrastructures will then be related to a satellite communications network to ensure 
the validity of any translation of methodologies. 
13
 In Chapter III a bi-level model is formulated as the primary method for measuring 
resilience.  A heuristic for solving the resulting problem is developed, as well as the 
method for analyzing the output to achieve the resilience measure.   
 In Chapter IV a case study is included, which utilizes variations on a satellite 
network to demonstrate how changes to a network can affect resilience.  The results of 
the case study are analyzed, as well as how the model, measure, and heuristic behaved in 
regards to the variations.  Furthermore, the shortcomings of the method and potential 
restrictions on its use are investigated. 
Chapter V provides a summary of the findings of this research, both respect to 
developing a resilience measure, as well as the methodology utilized to calculate that 
measure.   
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
  This chapter is a review of relevant literature to include existing methods for 
measuring resilience, as well as the comparison of a satellite network to other critical 
infrastructures with existing resilience measures.  It compares the methods previously 
used for strengths, weaknesses, and adaptability.  The chapter concludes with establishing 
a baseline minimum measurement of resilience for a notional network. 
Threats and Vulnerabilities 
 
A key paper dealing with threats and vulnerabilities is the National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) Report to the President on 
Commercial Satellite Communications Mission Assurance  (November 2009) (NSTAC 
2009). 
In 2005, a Multiple Path Beyond Line of Sight Communications (MUBLCOM), 
digital communications satellite from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), collided with Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology 
(DART), a NASA sponsored project intended to demonstrate automated navigation 
abilities.  In 2009, Iridium 33, a former satellite in the Iridium constellation, collided with 
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Cosmos 2251, a retired Russian satellite, obliterating both.  In January of 2013, a piece of 
debris from a Chinese missile test collided with a Russian satellite, rendering it unusable.   
Accidental collisions are not the only threat.  “On January 11, 2007, China 
conducted its first successful test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile to purposely destroy 
the aging Fengyun-1C meteorological satellite that had been in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
since May 10, 1999.”  (NSTAC 2009 p. 12)  Shortly after in 2008, the US Navy utilized a 
modified Standard Missile-3 to shoot down a malfunctioning National Reconnaissance 
Office satellite.  The purpose of this US mission was to protect civilians from potentially 
toxic fuel (Galdorisi p. 1). 
In NSTAC’s Report to the President on Commercial Satellite Communications 
Mission Assurance, three main categories of threats are outlined (NSTAC 2009 p. 11).  
Physical Threats: Destruction of physical network infrastructure, 
or physical threats to operational personnel. Examples include 
explosions, cable cuts, hostage-taking at control centers, natural 
disasters, power failures, satellite collisions, and space-based 
attacks.  
 
Access and Control Threats: Unauthorized access, control, or 
prevention of the operator’s control of its network, underlying 
devices, control links, and physical plants. Examples include 
unauthorized commanding of or preventing control of routers, 
switches, servers, databases, or satellite buses used to control the 
network; distributed denial of service attacks against network 
control infrastructure; compromise of network security protocols; 
and actions by malicious insiders. 
  
User Segment Threats: Events, such as denial of service attacks, 
that occur on user traffic paths of the network that degrade or deny 
service to users by exhausting or preventing customer access to 
network resources. Examples include botnets, denial of service 
attacks, route hijacking, viruses, worms, and RFI.  
16
 
NSTAC determined that SATCOM networks “often contain the same subsystems 
as their terrestrial counterparts that are vulnerable to malicious and inadvertent 
disruption.”  (NSTAC 2009 p. 11)  As a result, any vulnerability that is determined as 
existing in a terrestrial station also likely exists in the corresponding SATCOM.  This 
permits the relation of common ground threats to both the terrestrial stations and the 
SATCOM network. 
Since it is assumed to be easier to disrupt a ground station’s functions, NSTAC 
determined that the ground stations are much more likely to experience an attack.  
However, these satellite stations generally are not necessarily at any greater risk than 
those of other communication providers (NSTAC 2009 p. 11).  This is due in part to the 
large number of redundancies that the commercial operators employ.   
While terrestrial stations remain unprotected against a variety of intelligent 
strikes, they often have many geographically diverse redundant stations from which to 
operate their satellites (NSTAC 2009 p. "ES-2").  Furthermore, each ground station 
“generally maintains 24-hour guarded access, security fencing, external lighting, 
registration and clearance of visitors, and security cameras” (NSTAC 2009 p. 17)  In 
addition, 100% of those who participated in NSTAC’s questionnaire reported that all of 
their ground sites were connected by “multiple communication links that provide 
redundancy and physical path diversity” (NSTAC 2009 p. 17). 
In the cyber realm, most satellite operators were in compliance with the National 
Security Agency’s (NSA) approved encryptions for transmissions, and more continue to 
meet compliance as new satellites are placed in orbit.  Along with the encryptions, many 
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satellite operators utilize “deaf satellites”, which require very large transmission antennas 
in order for the satellite to receive commands.  They also utilize out of band commanding 
to reduce the risk of shared frequencies.  Carrier lockup is a protocol employed to prevent 
insertion of commands from the redundant ground stations while the primary is still 
operating, uniqueness in command decoders, autonomy in case of interference, and 
diversity to allow for redundant telemetry streams (NSTAC 2009 p. 18).  
Up to this point, threats that are common for both satellites and ground stations 
have been reviewed; however there are a significant number of “vulnerabilities and 
threats of special concern to satellite systems” (NSTAC 2009 p. 18).  The greatest of 
these lies in the physical realm, where there exists the probability of collisions with 
debris and meteorites.  Though the probability of an accidental collision is extremely low, 
such collisions do occur.   
Satellites that are physically damaged can usually not be repaired.  While there is 
no publicly documented precedent to date of a malicious physical attack on another 
nation's satellites, a more intelligent threat may come in the form of recent advancements 
in anti-satellite technologies, such as missiles, cyber warfare, and jamming.   
China's ASAT launch in 2007 demonstrated ASAT capability.  It also created a 
cloud of debris that expanded to twenty times its original size in under a month.  Two 
years later, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network catalogued 2,378 pieces of debris 
exceeding 5cm that are a result of the ASAT test, as well as an estimated 150,000 pieces 
of smaller debris.  This one strike resulted in what is now “over 25 percent of all debris in 
the LEO regime” (NSTAC 2009 p. 13).  Figure 1 shows the sharp rise in tracked 
satellites, much of which is debris. 
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Figure 1:  Graph of Tracked Satellites (DoD p. 1) 
Another unique threat is that of interference. RFI is an increasing issue for 
SATCOM.  The majority of interference is unintentional, and can be caused by human 
error, equipment failure, interference from an adjacent satellite or the ground, or even 
from solar radiation.  However, each of these causes can be intentional as well.  One of 
the more common methods of causing interference is to employ jammers.   
Jamming and spoofing, the transmitting of a false signal while the original is 
hijacked, are relatively inexpensive methods for denying the capabilities of a satellite.  
However, the more protected a satellite becomes, such as by concentrating “its power in a 
small frequency band” (Wright p. 120), the more power a jammer requires to be 
effective, thus restricting its mobility.  Moreover, a jammer is seen as a legitimate target 
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during military actions, and the wider an area the jammer attempts to cover, the easier it 
is to identify (Wright p. 120).  As such, the amount of degradation provided by a jammer 
is inversely proportional to the time that the jammer would be considered effective. 
GEO satellites are, however, a slight exception to the last observation.  Because 
the distance from one footprint point on Earth is nearly identical to another, and since 
GEO satellites maintain the same footprint, it is possible to jam communications from an 
entirely different nation for an extended period of time.  This occurred in 2003 when the 
United States Telstar 12 satellite was jammed by an installation in Cuba, and again in the 
same year when China’s Shenzhou V was jammed via transmitters in Taiwan.  As such, 
jammers are considered to be more effective against GEO satellites than LEO (Wright p. 
122). 
Another method for jamming is space-based, via the use of satellites with onboard 
jamming technology.  Because the satellites can remain relatively close to the satellite 
being jammed, they require significantly less power to be effective (Wright p. 123).  The 
jamming satellite would need to be at an altitude lower than the satellite being jammed.  
Satellites must move very quickly to maintain orbit; the closer a satellite is to Earth, the 
faster it must move.  While there is a proportional difference in effectiveness based upon 
the terrestrial area covered, the time in which a jamming satellite is within range of its 
target is roughly equivalent so long as the distance between them is the same.   
 
“A jammer in orbit 1 km below a satellite whose antenna was 
designed to view the entire section of the Earth below it would cross the 
broadcast receive area in 2 to 3 hours, whether the satellite was in low 
earth orbit or geosynchronous orbit.” 
 (Wright p. 123) 
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While many commercial operators have shielding against unintentional or 
extremely low level jamming, few have protection against high powered intentional RFI.  
Even in the military, not all of the satellites are protected against this type of attack 
(NSTAC p. 20).    
A more recent method employed for denying the use of a satellite is through the 
use of a high powered microwave (HPM) (Wright p. 130).  HPM utilizes a high-powered 
microwave burst to overwhelm a target satellite’s components.  This method utilizes the 
same theory as a Nuclear Burst in that the high intensity radiation is what overwhelms the 
components.  However, an HPM is specifically aimed to the target’s receiving frequency, 
reducing the collateral damage and potentially requiring less energy. 
An HPM’s energy requirements and effectiveness are proportional to the distance 
from the weapon to the target.  As such, the ideal methods for deployment are either 
“those based in space or popped up using a suborbital missile” (Wright p. 131).  
Depending upon the strength of the pulse, as well as the protection of the satellite, an 
HPM could be classified as either a temporary effect or permanent destruction. 
HPM’s actual usefulness remains uncertain though as the technology, both for 
explosive power generation and transmission, is still progressing.  “Electronics can be 
hardened against microwave attacks of moderate levels without a great cost…a hardened 
satellite can withstand orders of magnitude higher HPM flux than an unhardened 
satellite” (Wright p. 133). 
High powered lasers also pose a growing threat for LEO satellites.  While the 
components and energy required to construct a laser of sufficient power, as well as treaty 
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agreements, have precluded their research in space-space tests, ground-based megawatt 
class lasers could damage unshielded robust satellite components in a matter of seconds.  
Kilowatt class lasers are also able to inflict damage, however, only on unshielded fragile 
parts over a longer period of time (Wright p. 134).   While these terrestrial based lasers 
pose a threat for LEO satellites, GEO satellites’ great distance have protected them thus 
far as lasers suffer exponential heat loss.  Using lasers for temporary denial of service has 
thus far been restricted to dazzling hyper spectral imagery components (Wright p. 126).   
At this time, reasonable methods of partial degradation to communication 
satellites over a period of greater than a few hours appear to be restricted to either 
jamming from a neighboring nation or otherwise restricted to imagery components.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that any goal of medium-long term effects is of the 
destructive type, which, with the exception of terrestrial nodes with multiple components 
spaced sufficiently far apart to not be simultaneously affected by a single destructive 
effort, will have a discrete kill-no kill effect.  This assumption only remains valid in the 
current state of satellite degradation technologies, and only for communication satellites.  
For example, imaging satellites may already experience a permanent, partial degradation 
when portions of their imaging devices are damaged. 
In this section, a number of threats that currently exist to terrestrial and satellite 
nodes in a space based communication network were reviewed.  The threats included 
both intelligent and unintelligent occurrences, which fell into a category of either 
temporary denial or permanent destruction.  Based upon the brief literature review, one 
may conclude that, while many methods exist for temporarily denying capabilities for a 
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particular node, a medium-long term goal would currently be ill-served with most 
methods short of destruction. 
Key Motivations for Building Resiliently 
The need for a more robust, resistant, and adaptive infrastructure has quickly 
become clear to decision makers, both within the military and in the civilian sector.  
Moreover, as outlined in the preceding Threats and Vulnerabilities section, the potential 
for a degrading event, both intentional and accidental, are already present.  What remains 
is to determine which factors are most important to stakeholders in regards to the 
development of a more resilient infrastructure. 
In this section the motivations that a stakeholder may have for constructing a 
more resilient communications infrastructure are discussed, as well as what rewards 
would most likely motivate a push for resilience.  A key paper in this section by Jennings, 
Vugrin, and Belasich focuses on the construction of resilient buildings, but many of the 
key points can be related to a generic network (Jennings p. 1). 
In 2012, Jennings et al. set out to answer three main questions (Jennings p. 4): 
1) Are stakeholders aware of what resilience is and what it means? 
2) What would motivate stakeholders to construct more resilient 
structures? 
3) “Do the stakeholders have any opinions about key program 
features that need to be included or developed?” 
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To answer these questions, Jennings et al. developed an interview questionnaire, 
and conducted interviews with subject matter experts in a variety of building stability 
related categories, to include construction, owners, insurance, and certification programs 
(Jennings p. 6).  Because of the qualitative nature of the questionnaire, highly trained 
individuals conducted the interviews, a single team member rated all of the interviews 
and answers to ensure consistency, and additional team members rated interviews to 
ensure unbiased (Jennings p. 9).  After 15 interviews, their study concluded with 7 major 
findings, which are laid out in Table 1.   
These findings were followed up with what the interviewed experts considered 
the greatest motivations for building with resilience included in the design process.  
Overwhelmingly, the greatest motivators were those directly related to cost, whether 
through decreased recovery and down time or through decreased insurance rates.  Those 
indirectly related to cost, such as being able to bring in more tenants or users and charge 
more because of the “attractiveness” of the building, were split almost evenly.  Finally, 
the lowest ranked motivator was “It is ‘the right thing to do’”, with more experts 
admitting that it provided no incentive (Jennings p. 15). 
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Table 1:  Stakeholder Interview Findings (Jennings p. 11) 
 
Jennings et al. proceed with recommendations for what should be included in a 
resilience certification program, including financial incentives, education, historical data, 
and partnerships between public and private sectors.  The most notable recommendation 
was to “develop a cohesive resilience story across the Federal government’s multiple 
resilience efforts” (Jennings p. 16).  By creating a single definition and measure, or at the 
very least a measurement process, across the entire government, separate components 
that factor into the resilience of a building, such as the resilience of the infrastructures 
they use, may be considered in calculations (Jennings p. 11). 
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Defining Costs Associated With Satellite Networks 
 
In this section, some of the common costs associated with building, maintaining, 
and operating a satellite network are defined.  When determining costs of a satellite, it is 
possible to categorize costs as either deployment or on-orbit costs (Eremenko p. 2).  
Common deployment costs are Launch and Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs.  
Common Operations and Maintenance (OM) costs are Operations and Recurring 
Engineering (RE) costs (Eremenko p. 15).   
To break these down further, an initial inspection of the costs associated with 
deployment must be completed.  Some main costs in deployment are simply the cost to 
launch the satellite, or group of satellites, into orbit, and the cost of the satellite 
(Meckling p. 2).  However, some background costs which must be completed initially are 
the development costs and the investment costs (Meckling p. 4).  Investment costs are 
considered because the different manners by which a component is paid for, such as 
upfront or regular payments, affect the present value cost of the component. 
When determining the cost of a ground terminal, a similar division can be used, 
namely the cost of constructing the station and the cost of operating and maintaining the 
station.  Common construction costs are, of course, the facility itself, along with any 
associated land, the equipment required to operate, such as antennas, satellites, and 
computers, the instillation of all equipment, and any initial fees associated with the 
required utilities and infrastructure of the facility (Meckling p. 11). 
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The OM costs of a terrestrial station are the same as those seen in most used 
facilities:  “Facility Maintenance, Equipment Maintenance and Parts, Pay and 
Allowances, Services (Utilities) and Miscellaneous” (Meckling p. 11). 
The OM costs associated with a satellite, with the preceding cost allocations, is 
then diminished.  Because the personnel and terrestrial equipment required to operate a 
satellite is considered in the costs associated with the terrestrial station, what remains is 
the cost of refueling, and repairing an on-orbit component.  Previously, doing either was 
considered impossible, however recent advancements have made both a reality.   
Since 2011, efforts have been placed on refueling and maintaining aging satellites 
with the aid of high precision robots.  As of 2013, NASA and the Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA) have a prototype robot which has successfully refueled satellites, 
performed basic fitting, cap, and screw removals, as well as the manipulation of the 
thermal blanket (SSCO RRM). With the next set of instruments set for delivery to the 
International Space Station (ISS) by early 2014, the next phase of the Robotic Refueling 
Mission is to attempt replacement and internal repairs of on-orbit satellite components 
(SSCO RRM Phase II). 
These innovations provide the answers to what the OM costs of a satellite will be:  
Component delivery, Maintenance, and Refueling.  This does imply that the Robotic 
Refueling Mission (RRM) will spawn a quantity of high precision space maintainers or, 
at the very least, a consideration for their use when the time arises.   
Based upon the NASA and CSA work, the RRM is designed to remain at the ISS 
until needed, and then return when its mission is complete.  This means that whenever 
maintenance is required for a satellite, the associated OM costs are the cost of the fuel, 
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components, fuel required by the refueler, and the cost of delivering those item to the 
ISS.  However, this technology is extremely new, and as such many of its potential 
limitations, such as which orbits it may operate within, remain unknown. 
 
Comparing Satellite Networks to Supply Networks 
In any supply network, there exist three main components:   
1. Source-where the supply is coming from,  
2. Sink-where the demand exists 
3. Relays/Transshipment- the points bridging the sources and the sinks. 
A source is the point of origination for a supply network.  This is a node where 
the product is stored and/or produced.  In a satellite network, products are transmissions 
which originate from the users of the network. 
A sink is a point where the supply chain terminates.  The set comprising the sinks 
may be larger or smaller than the set comprising the sources, but it still follows the 
general idea of "Where is this product needed?".  For a satellite network, a sink is the 
transmission's destination. 
The relay points are all those points that must be traversed in order to transport 
goods from sources to sinks.  Common relay points in supply networks are depots, sea 
ports, airports, and train stations.  Each of these relay points may also offer their own 
supply as well, or inversely may have a demand of their own which must be filled.  For a 
satellite network, a relay can be anything such as a transmission tower, satellite, gateway, 
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or even a switchboard.  While it is unlikely that a transmission tower is making any 
phone calls, it may send occasional data bursts to an offsite location detailing its status 
and use.  On the other hand, it is very likely that a terrestrial based gateway station is 
making and receiving many transmissions as they are generally operated by humans. 
A supply chain also has the possibility of degradation of product in route, more 
commonly known as losses.  For many products, this degradation is simply products that 
were lost in transit, however for items with a short life such as produce, the degradation 
must also include the products that arrived, but were unusable.  This is necessary for a 
satellite network because every transmitted signal is another potential place for the signal 
to become further degraded.  If too many relays are used, or if the relay used must 
traverse areas of high interference, the signal may be unusable when it reaches its 
destination. 
As closely related as these two networks are though, there is still a main 
difference that must be addressed.  Satellite networks and supply networks differ in that 
every source node for a transmission in a satellite network is potentially a sink node as 
well.  Furthermore, while most supply networks have relatively static node locations, 
satellites, excluding GEO, are constantly changing their relative position with respect to 
Earth.  This means that a transmission from point A to point B may traverse a set of nodes 
S at time t, but then traverse an entirely different set of nodes R at time t+1.   
In many communications networks, there are also locations known as “Gateways” 
(Werner p. 371).  In order to determine a user’s ability to utilize a network, each 
transmission device sends out a code when attempting to initiate a connection.  Before a 
transmission may be completed, it must be relayed through the network to a gateway, 
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where the code may be verified.  The gateway then relays the transmission through the 
remainder of the network to the destination.  When attempting to complete a transmission 
to a user of the network in question, the transmission still must be routed through a 
gateway to ensure that the receiver has authorization for network use (Werner p. 373).   
Hence the name “Gateway”; in order to utilize the network, whether as a sender, receiver, 
or both, every transmission must be routed through a gateway first.   
 
Comparing Satellite Networks to Power Grids 
In this section, relations between satellite networks and power grids are 
established by comparing each of the components that make up the networks.  This 
comparison is necessary for the validity of comparing work done on resilience in power 
grids, which is seen in the section, Previous Resilience Measurement Methods Used,  to 
the satellite network.  
Merriam Webster dictionary defines a power grid as "a network of electrical 
transmission lines connecting a multiplicity of generating stations to loads over a wide 
area."  Meanwhile, ATIS Telecoms defines a satellite network as "a satellite system, or 
part of a satellite system, and the cooperating Earth stations" (ATIS).   
In Defending Critical Infrastructure, the power grid consisted of buses, power 
lines, transformers, and generating units (Brown 2006).  The buses are able to distribute 
the power down a variety of paths which were defined by the power lines.  The power 
lines were able to transmit electricity in either direction.  The transformers adapted the 
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electricity for travelling long distances, and then reverted the electricity to its common 
form for every day use.  The generating units, or power plants, are where the power 
originates. 
Currently, a direct translation exists for most of these components into a satellite 
communications network.  The majority of these translations come from work done by 
The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC).  
See Figure 2 and Figure 3 for a visual comparison.  The power buses are loosely translate 
to the satellites, capable of sending and receiving a data stream to another connected bus.  
The power lines in a satellite communication network are not physical wires, but rather 
the transmissions themselves, radio frequencies being the most common, which are sent 
and received via uplinks and downlinks.  As such, the satellite "power lines" are 
determined by line-of-sight and distance.  The transformers of a satellite network are the 
assets required to encode/decode the data for transmitting, much like a power transformer 
converts the energy for long distance travel or how cargo is palletized when being 
shipped via air.   
Finally, the generating units are those nodes from which the transmissions 
originate.  Note that in this case, these generators are the people or system creating the 
transmission and the transformers are the devices used to transmit the message.  In the 
case of a phone call, the generator would be the human speaking and the transformer the 
phone.  However, for aggregation purposes, these two components are often considered 
as one in the same for the purpose of modeling, making exceptions only when a gateway 
is necessary for switching between networks operational encodings.   
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There are many close translations between a satellite network, a supply network, 
and a power grid.  However, one main difference remains, and that becomes apparent 
when operating a network handling multiple transmissions instead of only one. 
A power grid has one main product for the purposes of these studies, and that is 
electricity.  Like many networks, if the power plant requires any power itself, it supplies 
itself, thus eliminating its demand and reducing its supply.  Likewise, sink nodes such as 
homes, factories, or office buildings are supplied by these sources.  If they produce any 
power of their own through the use of technology, such as solar panels, windmills, or 
watermills, that amount is deducted from their demand before additional power is 
purchased or excess power is sold. 
The source nodes and sink nodes in the model make no distinction as to where the 
power is shipped so long as all demand is met for the lowest possible cost.  Another way 
of thinking about this is that the model does not care where the power came from or 
where it is going, only the path utilized to meet its objective. 
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Figure 2: Hybrid Satellite/ Terrestrial Communications Network (NSTAC p. 5) 
 
 
Figure 3: Example Power Grid (CIP Vigilance p. 1) 
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A satellite network follows this same principle, but only when viewed one 
transmission at a time, or when a single transmission is being broadcast to a large 
population of sinks.  Whereas a power plant may not care if the power it sends goes ten 
feet or ten miles, a businessman making a phone call to Texas may be expectedly 
unhappy if he is connected to a take-out restaurant in Maine.  It is because of the need for 
high-fidelity in transmission source and destination that any adaptation from a clear 
source-sink model needs to be modified. 
Another difference between power grids and satellite networks is the way in 
which they make transmissions.  When viewing a single instance in time, the differences 
in the methods of transmission are insignificant.  However, when viewing the two in a 
time-dependent fashion, it is clear that while power lines remain fixed, the connections in 
satellite networks are dynamic.   
For Motorola's Iridium satellite network, the average in-view time for a satellite is 
10 minutes (Pratt p. 1).  This means that every 10 minutes, a ground location essentially 
breaks one connection and forms another.  Furthermore, while each satellite in the 
Iridium network maintains a connection with the adjacent satellites in its orbital plane, 
connections are also established to satellites in adjacent co-rotating planes.  However, 
these inter-plane connections do not occur when the geodesic location is in excess of 60o 
latitude (Pratt p. 8).  While this may appear as if the satellite links are dependent upon 
location as well, the location of each satellite can be estimated using its orbital 
parameters, starting location, both of which are relatively unchanging, and time.  Thus, 
the connections are time dependent. 
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Therefore, when viewing a snapshot of single transmission in a satellite network, 
there is little difference between this network and a power grid.  However, every 
transmission is essentially an additional commodity to be sent through the network, and 
every new point in time a new network to be solved.  Any adaptations of work made must 
be able to accommodate these differences. 
 
Previous Resilience Measurement Methods Used
In this section, previous works on measuring resilience are reviewed, with an 
emphasis in the area of critical infrastructure defense and network defense.  Major case 
studies used in previous methods show a focus towards the fields of disaster planning, 
supply networks, and power grid distributions. 
One measure presented as adaptable to measuring any type of infrastructure 
comes from Argonne National Lab’s Decision and Information Systems division, whose 
definition of resilience is initially presented in Chapter I.  Carlson et al. utilize an index, 
aptly named the Resilience Index, which may be used to determine the “most important 
lower level systems” (Carlson p. 20).  In this index, four components are combined:  
Preparedness, Mitigation measures, Response capabilities, and Recovery Mechanisms 
(Carlson p. 21).   
These components were later changed to Robustness, Resourcefulness, and 
Recovery.  The output from this analysis results in numerical values, scaled 0-100 (see 
Figure 4) showing the index value of each component and the overall Resilience Index.   
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Figure 4:  Resilience Index Dashboard (Argonne) 
Like the index itself, each of these three components are measured via indices.  
These three indices are the weighted sum of multiple subcategories, which are to be 
calculated using the weighted sum of a series of survey questions aimed at analyzing 
aspects of the individual sites when taken together form a system, as well as the system 
as a whole (Carlson p. 39).  Each question itself is attributed a rank, 1 through 5, and a 
corresponding weight as determined by the average weight assigned by subject matter 
experts.  
While the resilience index constructed by Carlson et al. does have the advantage 
of being relatively easy to use, it does suffer from the potential uncertainty that comes 
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with soliciting weights and with survey-based metrics.  This effect, minor in itself, is 
compounded multiple times over, both within the four main components of the index, and 
then across the indices to construct the overarching resilience index.   
Furthermore, this resilience index, while highlighting the area of concern with 
follow-up analysis, provides relatively little information except for use as a comparison 
between systems performing identical duties.  Even with similar system duties, such as 
power distribution, weights can vary between providers in two different locations, 
resulting in identical systems having very different scores.  As such, this index may only 
be compared between networks of the same type operating in an extremely similar, or the 
same, environment. 
In addition, Argonne National Laboratory’s resilience index fails to consider the 
extreme events, which can stress a system in unseen ways, instead focusing on capturing 
the common or frequent disruptions which a network may face.  Where as an analytical 
measure may be capable of determining combinations of disruption which, together, have 
a much greater impact, and index of this type would be unable to capture the impact of 
more than a singular disruption. 
Cimellaro et al. define resilience as “a function indicating the capability to sustain 
a level of functionality or performance … over a period defined as the control time” 
(Cimellaro p. 3640).  From this definition, the reader can already see the coming 
implications of resilience as a time-dependent measure of performance.  This is 
confirmed when they later mathematically define resilience as the area under the time-
dependent functionality curve. 
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To do this, they consider the functionality curve as a piecewise function 
incorporating a time of operation before an event called the control time, the time after 
the event until function levels have stabilized, and from that point until the end of the 
graphed span of time.  An example of this function is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5:  Functionality Curve (Cimellaro p. 3642) 
Cimellaro et al. go on to describe how the recovery section of this curve can 
describe the preparedness of a community.  With a fixed time for recovery, a curve with 
more area is more prepared, and as a result of their resilience function more resilient 
(Cimellaro p. 3644).  Their resilience measure is presented as a percentage of desired 
functionality provided over the span of time in regards to a known or predicted event.  In 
their case study, they utilize an earthquake affecting a hospital (Cimellaro p. 3646), as 
well as an equal time span to compare the resilience provided by multiple construction 
options.  By doing so, the question being answered is “Which option makes me most 
resilient to event X?”. 
Zobel and Khansa, employ a similar method in which multiple scenarios are 
tested against a common event and time span (Zobel p. 83)  However, Zobel and Khansa 
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take into account that multiple degrading events may occur while the system is still 
recovering.  For a visual representation, see Figure 6.   
 
Figure 6: Multi-Event Resilience Graph (Zobel p. 84) 
Opposite of Cimellaro et al, the measure for resilience is the impact of an event, 
or how much functionality/quality was lost.  In this case, the goal is not to increase the 
resiliency measure, but to reduce it.  Zobel and Khansa also note that very different 
structures can result in an identical resulting resilience value, specifically pointing out the 
trade-off between reducing the lost quality, as they refer to it, and the time to recover 
(Zobel p. 87).  This two-dimensional tradeoff results in a series of equal-resilience 
curves, shown in Figure 6. 
Zobel and Khansa refer to these variables as effects, dependent upon the 
robustness and rapidity of a system.  Unlike the Cimellaro et al. paper, which aimed to 
determine which safe-guard or defense should be utilized to increase resilience against a 
specific threat, Zobel and Khansa strive to describe what is making the current system as 
resilient as it is (Zobel p. 92).  As a final note, Zobel and Khansa specify that it is 
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important to determine what the decision maker considers important, both as criterion for 
measuring as well as threats for being resilient against (Zobel p. 92). 
 
 
Figure 7: Resilience Curves (Zobel p. 88) 
One area that is quickly advancing in resilience models is the area of 
transportation networks.  More specifically, supply networks are a prime candidate for 
viewing the different methods available for use.  Klibi and Martel utilized stochastic 
methods in order to evaluate the resilience of their network (Klibi p. 1).  Their model 
developed a measure based upon the intensity of a disruptive event, and the time to 
recover from that event.   
Klibi and Martel extended the paradigm by modeling the time to recover as a 
continuous function of the impact.  In addition, they included a term for random error.  
Inter-arrival times, order sizes, the aforementioned error term, as well as the location and 
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size of the disruptions are all then associated with probability distributions.  Moreover, 
they included the concept of a temporary demand surge, Figure 7, which follows the 
recovery of the system (Klibi p. 6).  As the reader will note, this is the third time in as 
many graphs in which a structure utilizing a time-dependent performance measure has 
been seen as a basis for resilience. 
 
Figure 8: Recovery Function Examples (Klibi p. 6) 
Utilizing Monte Carlo simulation, Klibi and Martel use random number draws 
"first to generate multihazard [disruption] arrivals, second to generate recovery functions, 
and third to generate daily [demands and capacities]" (Klibi p. 7).  The use of simulation 
was due in part to the scale of the network they were modeling.  Were the network very 
small, a series of distribution convolutions could have provided an exact result.  
However, with even moderately sized networks, that process is cumbersome and 
computationally daunting.  Through the use of simulation, an approximate final 
distribution can be attained.  In the Klibi and Martel case, an intolerance level was set 
with the measure being product-days lost.  Figure 8 shows a histogram of their results for 
a large network. 
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Figure 9: Distribution of Product-days Lost (Klibi p8) 
After the event, a separate model following the same constraining guidelines as 
the model before the event occurred, minus the lost resources of course, determined the 
optimal manner in which to operate.  This is because their networks are built through 
intelligent design, and are able to be adapted to whatever the situation might be.  Though 
this adaptation may not be sufficient to instantly meet all demand, it does have the effect 
of lessening the lost network capability during reconstruction. 
Klibi and Martel present multiple modeling methods.  Another method is their 
development of a Risk-Neutral Design Model.  In this model, the focus is on the expected 
values of the distributions, and assumes that the modeler has no preference between 
avoiding the more frequent low-risk scenario nor the less frequent, but more damaging, 
high-risk scenarios.  In this risk-neutral model, much of the probability and intensity 
portions are lost and the model becomes deterministic at the expected value. 
A separate method for measuring resilience conducted at the Naval Post Graduate 
School by Brown et al. and Salmeron et al. is discussed next (Salmeron 2004), (Brown 
2005), (Brown 2006), (Salmeron 2009).  This research line focused primarily on 
deterministic modeling methods in order to locate a probable worst-case interdiction by 
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an intelligent adversary on a network, and the actions an operator might take in order to 
diminish the impact of the event while rebuilding the network.  The similarities between 
the underlying processes of measuring resilience are clear.   
The main difference between analyzing a “worst case” model and the "expected 
values" for an event is that, for a plausible adversary, it puts more emphasis on "how bad 
could the network performance be impacted" instead of "how bad is the network 
performance expected to be impacted" (Salmeron 2004). 
Henceforth this type of model is referred to as an extreme event scenario.  This 
method of thinking is common with high consequence, low probability events, referred to 
as the Risk of Extreme Event (Haimes p. 515).  One method that is utilized for 
accounting for these events and evaluating outcomes is to restrict the probability being 
analyzed to what is commonly referred to as the tail of a distribution (Haimes p. 483).   
In line with this action-reaction, extreme event methodology, Brown et al. utilized 
a bi-level optimization model known as Attacker-Defender Models.  Attacker-Defender 
models key in two underlying assumptions.  The first is that the defender has an objective 
they would like to be attained at an optimal level.  The second is that the attacker has an 
objective which conflicts with the defender's objective.  In Brown et al., the defender is 
minimizing the cost of the network and the attacker is attempting to maximize this 
minimal cost.  Note that cost is not necessarily monetary, but could be anything such as 
resources or time (Brown 2006).  
One example Brown et al. use is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Louisiana 
pipelines, shown in Figure 9.  In this complex network, the sources supply the petroleum 
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to demand nodes (sinks).  More often than not, this was done via transfer stations, which 
had neither demand nor supply. 
 
Figure 10: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Louisiana Pipelines (Brown 2006 p. 537) 
In this example, they are not looking for the vulnerabilities of the current system 
specifically, but instead broke their analysis into three distinct pieces, each geared around 
a separate defense plan.  It is those defense plans which were analyzed.  Thus, the analyst 
was able to say "if the system had these protections, how safe are we?"  Once again, the 
measurements of “best” were determined by which plan was least costly, or rather which 
plan, if optimally interdicted, still cost the least. 
Salmeron et al. begin by first constructing a simplified version of their network 
and its operations, and then slowly including more and more details, allowing their model 
to incrementally expand and increase in accuracy (Salmeron 2009 p. 98).  Their first 
simplification was to assume constant demands and a single repair time in order to 
eliminate variability.  The objective function they utilized was a single minimization 
problem in which the operator of a network sought the lowest possible generation and 
load shedding costs for their power grid.   
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The flow of power and placement of resources resulting in this lowest cost was 
referred to as the Optimal Power Flow model.  This model provides the baseline cost and 
establishes the values that each relay point experiences based upon the supply and 
demand of the model.  The next step determined the optimal attack.  The determined 
interdiction is the one that maximizes the operating costs of the system. 
As part of the constraints of the Salmeron et al. model, the nodes where attacks 
may or may not occur are based upon binary decision variables.  Unlike linear 
programming (LP) models, which are able to arrive relatively quickly at an optimal 
solution, or alternate optimal solutions, mixed integer programs (MIP) can take 
significantly longer to solve.  Because the latter model is often more complicated than the 
former, and is intended for an extremely large network, Salmeron et al. formulate an 
improved algorithm for Benders Partitioning, commonly used to solve large integer 
programs.  The improved method is known as Global Benders Decomposition Algorithm 
(GLBDA).   
The main improvement comes with solving bi-level models.  Salmeron et al. 
suggest whereas Benders Partitioning is only able to maximize concave functions, GLBD 
is able to maximize convex functions as well, so long as two requirements are met.  The 
first is that the function in question must be "easy" to evaluate at fixed values.  The 
second is that valid and useful cut coefficients can be defined for the MIP.  Salmeron et 
al. go on to validate these requirements for a large-scale power grid (Salmeron 2009 p. 
100).  
Salmeron et al. measure the “difference in operating cost, including penalties for 
un-served demand” between the initial state of the system and the system after the shock 
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(Salmeron 2009 p. 98).  This methodology permits the allocation or rental of new 
resources, which combined with the remaining pre-shock grid components, provides the 
baseline cost to operate the post-shock grid.  What remains are the miscellaneous costs 
associated with clean up, repair, increased security, as well as the penalty costs for 
demand not met.   
As this measure is dissected, it becomes possible to categorize these costs into the 
components of the definition.  Recall that the definition of resilience being utilized is "the 
ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization, community, region- to anticipate, resist, 
absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance"(Carlson p. vii).  In 
Salmeron et al.'s measurement method, there is no explicit accounting for anticipation 
and resistance.  If these components are present, they are absorbed in the operation costs 
before the disruptive event.  There is also no method in their paper for including the 
acquisition cost for pre-event defensive measures.  Response is included in the post-event 
costs as clean up.  Adaptation comes into effect as short term resources or new resources 
are procured to minimize the event.  Finally, recovery can be seen as the repair costs as 
well as the time to repair. 
Salmeron et al. introduces the concept of a time persistent resilience model.  This 
permits an adjustment to the model for three possible objectives:  Short, medium, and 
long term outages.  Salmeron et al. focused on the medium and long term outages, 
arguing that the effect is “likely to be much greater.”  In these methods, the time to repair 
is considered much more important because the most likely target may no longer be the 
easy-to-repair bottleneck, but rather a substation that requires a significantly longer 
period of time before being functional again (Salmeron 2009 p. 99) .  
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Based upon this approach of including varying time lengths, it can no longer be 
assumed that an intelligent adversary will utilize all resources in a single coordinated 
attack.  Instead, it is possible that the most optimal solution could be to continuously re-
strike a node such as an easy-to-repair bottleneck.  For an opponent with multiple strike 
capabilities, keeping this single node disrupted for the duration of the model time horizon 
could potentially be more beneficial than disrupting a multitude of nodes elsewhere. 
Compare and Contrast Prior Methods 
 
Many of the preceding methods exhibit existed three main similarities: 
 1)  A defense, if any, was established, the attacker strikes, and then the 
defender recovers. 
2)  Once set the nodes and paths could not move, but could only be 
operational or eliminated. 
3)  There were clear source and sink nodes. 
In networks exhibiting specific structures, such as networks consisting of only 
immobile ground nodes, GEO satellites, and operational requirements precluding the 
repositioning of GEO satellites, these similarities are expected to hold true.  However, in 
general, a satellite resilience model only follows the first of these three.  Unlike terrestrial 
infrastructure, satellites are able to be repositioned.  Each change in location potentially 
forms an entirely new network, with new arcs being added and former arcs being 
destroyed.  In many situations, such as when the ground components are highly mobile, 
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the repositioning of a satellite allows it to serve an otherwise under capacitated region, 
which leads into the violation of the third similarity of clear source/sink nodes.   
As was mentioned previously (refer to section Comparing Satellite Networks to 
Supply Networks), there are clear source and sink nodes in a satellite network only when 
viewing a single transmission at a time.  When viewing the network as a whole, however, 
each node is a potential source and sink.  A simple example of this would be a satellite 
phone.  So long as a satellite is within service range, the phone may transmit or receive a 
call.  Once the call is established, a two-way communication stream is continuously 
passed back and forth until one side or the other ends the transmission, either 
intentionally or by leaving a covered area.  Any model chosen must be adaptable to these 
unique operations in which every transmission has a specific source and destination. 
One possible way of doing this would be to assume that every end-point of the 
network be split into two, a transmitter and a receiver.  A simulation model could be 
utilized at this point.  Each node may be split into sending and receiving nodes, and each 
new transmission assigned a random number that would determine its destination.  From 
this simulation, the satellites servicing the most capacity, or acting as bottlenecks, could 
be identified.  Such an approach would require a large increase in the number of nodes. 
Unfortunately, while simulation is an excellent tool for providing insight into how 
the system operates, it can be difficult to use to accomplish large scale optimization, and 
is even more unwieldy when attempting to make a single model adaptable for multiple 
architectures or configurations.  The desired model should be easily adaptable from the 
example network to the actual operational system, because its intended purpose is to be 
used on multiple architecture alternatives to determine which is most resilient.   
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Another matter are the consideration of Black Swan events.  A Black Swan is an 
event which is highly unlikely and causes extreme impact, but an event which humans 
will investigate retrospectively, “making it explainable and predictable” (Taleb p. xxii).  
In reviewing the purpose for studying and measuring resilience, the focus falls on 
maintaining system functionality in the face of unknown and unexpected adversity.   
“Black Swan logic makes what you don’t know far more relevant than what you 
do know” (Taleb p. xxiii).  As such, seeking predictions from experts while operating in 
“environments subjected to the Black Swan” provides little information, as if the general 
population were polled (Taleb p. xxv).  Because of the inherent unpredictability of these 
types of events, a more resilient system will be better able to continue functioning in such 
an environment. 
When considering the strengths that a resilience measurement method should 
possess, five main aspects can be derived from the methods reviewed: 
1.  Adaptable:  Can it be applied to multiple systems and 
scenarios with few modifications? 
 
2.  Highlights System Vulnerabilities:  Will the measure or 
a bi-product of the method’s output alert the analyst 
to potential network vulnerabilities? 
 
3.  Intuitive Method:  Similar to adaptability, can the 
method be easily decomposed into the 
capabilities/components and recreated? 
 
4.  Inclusion of Time:  Time is seen as a key criterion in a 
resilience measure.  Can every/most events occur in 
multiple time periods? 
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5.  Consistent:  Is the measurable comparable within 
networks performing a similar function? 
 
A characterization of the most prominent methodologies, an indexing method, 
Monte Carlo Simulation, and Worst-Case Interdiction, are displayed in Table 2.  These 
strengths are based upon the methodologies and show which are preferable in regards to 
the criteria displayed.  Cells in Table 2 are marked with an “X” if the method possesses 
the respective strength. 
 
Table 2:  Method Strengths
 
Based upon the strengths, the Worst-Case Interdiction method used by Salmeron 
et al. appears to be the strongest, though the failure to include the time component is a 
drawback in measuring resilience.  Conversely, the Index method, the most prominent of 
which comes from Argonne National Labs, shows the least strength.  Still, it is 
acknowledged that this method is the simplest to calculate, with the exception of first 
requiring input from sufficiently many subject matter experts (SMEs) to arrive at an 
average weight to be used. 
Similarly, there exist a number of shortcomings of each model which may be 
compared.  Each of these shortcomings could hinder the method’s ability to achieve a 
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good resilience measure, whether by under-stating the high impact Black Swan events, 
discarding the common place disruptions, or in a cacophony of other ways. 
Shortcomings 2 and 3, Explicitly Constructed Scenario and Subjective Measure, 
are contrary to Taleb’s assertion that expert predictions provide little usable information.  
Thus any scenario or weight constructed by an expert may not serve to increase the 
system’s ability to continue operating when faced with an extreme-event.   
1. Scenario Dependent:  The most common shortcoming, a 
resilience measure dependent upon scenarios answers the 
question “Resilient against what?” 
 
2. Explicitly Constructed Scenario:  Clearly Scenario 
Dependent, this shortcoming requires the analyst to 
construct the adverse events, preventing the model from 
creating the high impact perfect storm. 
 
3. Subjective Measure:  Though mitigated with analytical 
techniques, does the model require a subjective 
estimation of relative value, component durability, or 
other system parameter? 
 
4. Focuses on Likely Disruptions:  The model fails to stress the 
impact of possible Black Swan events. 
 
5. Discrete Degradation (Kill/No Kill):  Are the degradation of 
system components discrete to the point of Kill or No Kill, 
or can it exploit synergistic partial degradations? 
 
6. Threat of Compounding Error:  Are lower level uncertainties 
compounded while striving for a network level measure? 
 
7. Deterministic:  Is the method incapable (in its current form) 
of including system reliability or risk? 
 
51
8. Provides Little Usable Information:  Does the method output 
only allow for resilience comparisons? 
Table 3:  Method Shortcomings
 
Table 3 displays whether each method possesses a shortcoming by marking an “X” 
in the respective table cell.  It can be seen that the Monte Carlo Simulation method 
utilized by Klibi and Martel has the fewest shortcomings.  Of those two shortcomings, the 
focus on likely disruptions is a direct result of utilizing probability distributions and 
random number draws.  However the cause of that shortcoming is also the same reason 
for the methods strengths elsewhere.  In addition, this is the only method which does not 
show a dependence upon scenarios.  While Klibi and Martel do utilize scenarios to 
achieve their measure, they utilize a great many number and variations, making the final 
resilience measure almost independent of the situation. 
Once again, the index method falls to the rear, possessing every short-coming 
listed.  This method is unique in that it was the only one of the three to utilize explicitly 
constructed adverse scenarios, be calculated using subjective measures, whose 
uncertainty results in compounding errors, and is the only measure which does not 
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provide greater insight into the behavior of the model.  The Resilience Index developed 
by Argonne National Laboratories is intended for use as a comparison of resilience for 
facilities performing the same function in highly similar environments.  The Resilience 
Index was constructed to be extremely simple to calculate to promote wide use for this 
reason.  As such, it does not explain system behavior, does not exemplify vulnerabilities, 
and does not explain which component of resilience is strongest or weakest in the system.   
Falling in the middle of the shortcomings was the Worst-Case Interdiction 
method.  Because of its optimization basis, the method is inherently scenario dependent 
as well as being deterministic.  However, the simplifying assumptions made by Salmeron 
et al. also limited the original form of this method to discrete degradations. 
Clearly the two main competitors of methods to be utilized are the Monte Carlo 
Simulation method developed by Klibi and Martel, and and the Worst-Case Interdiction 
method used by Salmeron et al. (Klibi), (Salmeron 2009).  While both provide valuable 
information both about the resilience of a system as well as the behavior under adverse 
conditions, Worst-Case Interdiction is more adaptable.  By modeling the Attacker and 
Defender capabilities as mathematical constraints, an entirely new system may be 
modeled with relative ease. 
This same adaptability, combined with the intuitive nature of the modeling 
process, could be exploited in order to include time-dependent Attacker capabilities, as 
well as removing the requirement of Discrete Degradation.  By making these two 
changes, Worst-Case Interdiction becomes the front-runner method, though admittedly 
still not ideal.  In the next section, solution methods, both to optimality and through the 
use of heuristics, are explored. 
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Solving Bi-Level Programs 
Bi-level and multi-level programs have been used since the early 1970s in efforts 
to model hierarchical, interrelated events, and began as an evolution of leader-follower 
game theory (Moore p. 6).  One early method was developed by J.E. Falk in 1973.  A key 
breakthrough in Falk’s work was the acknowledgement that while the leader and follower 
in a bi-level program (BLP) may have competing objectives, they each have their own 
separate resources and methods that may be employed to achieve their objective (Moore 
p. 10). 
The solution methods have continued to evolve since Falk’s initial work in 1973, 
involving both methods for converting the bi-level program to a standard mathematical 
program, as well as the development of multiple heuristics and decomposition methods.  
In 2004, Salmeron et al. begin by converting their BLP by utilizing a decomposition-
based heuristic to indirectly arrive at a result (Salmeron 2004 p. 907).   
Through iteratively solving the defender and the attacker portions of the BLP, 
Salmeron et al. permitted the defender to generate the network, and then allowed the 
attacker to strike the optimal locations to achieve their objective, followed by the 
defender’s optimal response to the event.  While their result is not guaranteed to be 
optimal, it provides a method for calculating and improving interdiction plans.  This 
method required that the original BLP be broken into two separate models, with each 
iteration including additional constraints to both models (Salmeron 2004 p. 909). 
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Figure 11: Power Flow Model (Salmeron 2004 p. 906) 
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Figure 12: Interdiction of Power Flow (Salmeron 2004 p. 907) 
The Salmeron et al. BLP model, shown in Figure 12 works off of the assumed 
objective of the attacker maximizing the minimal cost to operate the system, the interior 
optimization model from Figure 11, but is clearly incorporated in Figure 12.  By building 
the Defender’s model first, which is the main point of validation for this particular type of 
modeling method, a large portion of the work for the BLP model was completed.  In 
Figure 12, every constraint followed by (IDC.#) constructs the modified version of the 
Defender model.  Meanwhile, the remaining constraints, which directly precede the 
internal Defender constraints, are the Attacker’s restrictions. 
The heuristic utilized by Salmeron et al. relied heavily upon the Defender model, 
which modeled the behavior of the Power Flow network.  By optimizing the Defender 
objective, interdicting the most heavily used nodes, and then resolving iteratively until all 
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resources had been consumed, their heuristic arrived at a solution, and was able to plot 
the effect that increasing Attacker resources would have (Salmeron p. 909).   
In 2005, Arroyo and Galiana continued the Salmeron et al. case study by 
converting the BLP into an LP, using a two step process to achieve this conversion.   
“Step 1) the explicit characterization of the inner optimization 
problem by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions; Step 2) 
the use of integer algebra results due to Floudas’ Nonlinear and Mixed 
Integer Optimization: Fundamentals and Applications and to Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl’s A representation and economic interpretation of a 
two-level programming problem to convert the nonlinear KKT relations 
into equivalent linear forms.” 
  (Arroyo p. 790).   
What follows is the nomenclature used by Arroyo and Galiana: 
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One major drawback in Arroyo and Galliana’s method for solving the BLP from 
Salmeron et al. is the increase in size and complexity.  Adapting a simplified version of 
the model used by Salmeron et al , shown in Figure 13, they converted the linear BLP to 
a single level mixed integer non-linear program (Salmeron 2009).  Using Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions, Arroyo and Galliana then converted the nonlinear constraints into 
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equivalent linear constraints (Arroyo).  The resulting model, Figure 14, grew in 
constraints by a factor of five. 
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Figure 13: Simplified BLP (Arroyo p. 791) 
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Figure 14: Single Mixed Integer Linear Program (Arroyo p. 792) 
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Using the Lagrangian function of the inner optimization problem, the “Defender” 
or “Follower” problem, Arroyo et al. convert the inner problem to an equivalent mixed 
integer nonlinear dual.  Taking advantage of logical binary variables, all nonlinear 
constraints, of both binary variables multiplied by continuous variables, and of the 
complementary slackness conditions, are then converted into an equivalent set of linear 
constraints. 
However, it remains unclear whether or not this solution bought anything in the 
way of efficiency or results.  Whereas Salmeron et al. ran their algorithm until the 
improvements were negligible, Arroyo et al. allowed their model to stop so long as pre-
specified levels were met.  This approach, when coupled with their objective of the 
fewest nodes attacked to achieve these levels, does not guarantee selecting levels the 
model may need to select the optimal combination.  Furthermore, the conversion of the 
BLP to an MILP required a large increase in the number of constraints, which was 
accompanied by an even greater increase in the number of integer variables (Arroyo p. 
792).  As such, this single model, when coupled with the much greater pre-processing 
time than the heuristic used by Salmeron et al., may achieve very little in terms of 
computational efficiency (Salmeron 2009).  However, the model does demonstrate a 
method for converting a bi-level model to a single-level optimization model. 
A similar method to Arroyo et al.’s for solving a BLP indirectly is to utilize 
Benders’ partitioning (Brown 2006 p. 533).  In the case when the inner problem is an LP, 
taking the dual of the attacker-defender model will result in a Mixed Integer Linear 
Program (MILP).  Unfortunately, this is the most simplistic BLP case, and as Brown et 
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al. point out, when the BLP is not Attacker-Defender with Defender being modeled as an 
LP, no general transformation of this form exists (Brown 2006 p. 535). 
As one may notice, both Arroyo’s and Brown’s solution methodologies, which 
utilized the dual of the problem and incorporated KKT conditions, showed very little 
effectiveness and were restricted in terms of applicability.  This is primarily due to the 
nonconvexity that all BLP, even those who are entirely linear and continuous, exhibit.  
However, the heuristic Salmeron et al. used in 2004 showed very few restrictions and 
quickly achieved a result above what Arroyo’s proposed optimal method, which had to 
use the original objective from Salmeron et al work as a fixed constraint, could produce 
(Salmeron 2009).  “We are still only able to solve moderate size problems.  Heuristics 
and what have become known as global optimization techniques, offer additional 
possibilities”  (Bard p. 361). 
A recent publication by Alderson et al. at the Naval Postgraduate School 
continued the efforts for an exact solution, seeking to now solve a tri-level optimization 
model, the Defender-Attacker-Defender model.  With their setting as a traffic scenario 
using “The Seven Bridges of Konigsberg” (Alderson p. 38), the general outline for the 
formulation of constraints remains nearly identical to that used in previous work by 
Brown and Salmeron.  The main difference in this case study from the one utilized in 
Salmeron et al.’s work on Power Flow is size, possessing only a fraction in number of 
nodes and arcs.  Continuing with the efforts applied to the Global Benders 
Decomposition, a similar method is used in the case of a three tiered optimization model. 
This method uses a meta-heuristic, shown in Figure 14, which takes advantages of 
bounds established by the Global Benders Decomposition developed by Salmeron et al. 
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Figure 15: Algorithm DAD Decomposition (Alderson et al. p. 37) 
While Alderson et al.’s paper is a clear continuation of previous BLP efforts done at 
Naval Postgraduate School, the efforts have been focused on improving the method for 
solving discrete, linear, time independent models.   
Little work has been done thus far on solving continuous network interdiction 
models.  A continuous network interdiction is a case in which the nodes or arcs of a 
network may be partially diminished in a continuous fashion.  One of the main 
difficulties with making these variables continuous is that “we can no longer resort to 
standard linearization procedures to solve the interdiction problem by a single integer 
program” (Lim p. 20).  Lim and Smith demonstrate two distinct methods for solving 
continuous network interdiction bi-level programs, an exact approach and a heuristic.   
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Their exact method is based upon a partitioning algorithm which solves |A| sub-
problems where A is the constraint matrix of the defender’s mode, and each of these 
resulting sub-problems are mixed integer linear programs (Lim p. 21).  Their partitioning 
algorithm, laid out in page 21 of their paper, first determines if a solution exists, or rather 
if the attacker has sufficient resources to interdict any node even partially.  Next, Lim and 
Smith’s algorithm solves a model to select and interdict the most beneficial point to 
eliminate and what impact would be most beneficial for the resources required.  If the 
resulting objective function is better than the previous result, then the current settings are 
kept and another iteration is performed to find the next best node to degrade.  If no 
resources are left to be expended, or no nodes remain to be eliminated, then the algorithm 
terminates.  Note that this method is close to enumeration and may require a large amount 
of processing power. 
In their heuristic section, Lim and Smith point out that the exact solution method 
“may not be suitable for solving large-scale problems.” (Lim p. 21).  To start their 
heuristic method, Lim and Smith systematically fully eliminate a single node in the 
network and view the resulting effects.  If resources remain, then another node is 
interdicted, much like in the exact case.  However, should resources remain that are 
insufficient to fully interdict another node, then those resources are utilized to partially 
interdict the next point which “exhibits the best ratio of objective decrease to budget 
consumed when interdicted” (Lim p. 22).  This heuristic, which follows immediately, 
demonstrated an improvement in solve time by approximately 35%, with a penalty to 
optimal solution of roughly 9% (Lim p. 24).  
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 Heuristic Algorithm from Lim and Smith p. 22 
Unfortunately, Lim and Smith found that their heuristic, while operating quickly 
with an acceptable margin of optimality error, were applicable only to “grid structured 
problems” and were found to be unreliable for “general topologies generated by 
Mnetgen” (Lim p. 25). 
One heuristic method that is quickly gaining recognition is ant colony 
optimization.  Ant colony optimization is a metaheuristic that was first proposed in 1992 
by Dorigo as a method for solving the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) (Solnon p. 1).  
Based upon swarm intelligence, in a travelling salesman problem ants are sent out from 
the point of origin and probabilistically select a path to travel.  When a path is travelled, a 
“pheromone” correlating to the objective value derived from travelling that path is 
assigned to it (Solnon p. 109).  This “pheromone” then alters the probability of that 
particular path being chosen again, and every time the path is selected, the “pheromone” 
is increased (Solnon p. 110).  To ensure that premature convergence to an answer is 
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avoided, a degradation function is placed on the pheromones so that their effect does not 
explode in a short period of time and the method can converge to an overall best solution 
(Solnon p. 111).   
Ant Colony Optimization was recently used to solve a BLP by Calvete et al.  
Their method took advantage of the nature of BLP which solves first the attacker portion 
before solving the responsive defender model.  Using an adapted form of ACO, Calvete 
et al. send their ants down the many possible paths in their production-distribution case, 
solve the resulting defender model, calculate the attacker’s objectives, and finally update 
the pheromone trails based upon the attacker’s objective values (Calvete p. 324).  This 
method, which is similar in concept to that used by Salmeron et al. in 2004, explores the 
many possible combinations the attacker may exploit, and slowly converges to the area of 
a best solution.  Calvete et al. close by saying that, with modifications, more complex 
problems may be applied to the lower level defender problem (Calvete p. 327). 
While Calvete et al. have used more advanced techniques than Salmeron et al. 
used nine years prior, their method at the core is an improvement in the rate of 
convergence.  Where Salmeron et al. eliminated whole combinations when it was showed 
that a better solution existed, Calvete et al. used the nature of ACO to force their heuristic 
to trend towards the best individual options, which together created the preferred sets.  
However, the Calvete et al. paper still shows the same restriction of discrete binary 
options of where to place a supply node based upon the location of the demand nodes 
(Calvete p. 325).  As was discussed in Lim and Smith’s work, the restricted discrete case 
is significantly easier to solve due to the restricted number of options and the nature of 
the current solution methods being pursued to solve BLP. 
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Heuristics for Large Scale Set Covering Problems 
In this section, prominent works for heuristics designed to solve the Set Covering 
Problem for large scale models are reviewed.  Key works for this section are A Heuristic 
Method for the Set Covering Problem (SCP) by Caprara et al., Ant Colony Optimization 
and Constraint Programming by Christine Solnon, and A New Model for Planning 
Emergency Facilities in Shanghai by Luo et al. 
The most common heuristic method across all optimization problem types is the 
greedy algorithm.  In a SCP the greedy algorithm selects the placement which gains the 
most value, regardless of resource cost.  Being an approach commonly tested against, the 
greedy approach rarely shows as the best method, and, as in the following papers to be 
reviewed, is frequently the worst.  However, due to its simplicity, the greedy algorithm 
does serve as a fall-back when all else fails. 
In A Heuristic Method for the Set Covering Problem by Caprara et al., a 
“Langrangian-based heuristic” (Caprara p. 730) was developed to solve very large scale 
SCP.  The key points of this heuristic are that it utilizes dynamic values and column 
fixing to find “improved solutions” (Caprara p. 730).  Caprara et al. focus solely on a 
continuous linear covering problem which utilizes the dual constraints and a Benders type 
convergence method to obtain a near-optimal solution.   
While the method showed little improvement in final solution versus the 
“classical” strategies, which refer to a greedy approach, the method presented by Caprara 
et al. does converge to that solution in roughly one quarter of the iterations (Caprara p. 
733).  Furthermore, by utilizing the Lagrange of the dual, the method will always 
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converge to a good solution if allowed to run long enough. For case studies, Caprara et 
al. utilized massive sets based upon the Italian railway company.  The largest of the sets 
run on a personal computer was 507x63,009 nodes, which required 634.8 computer 
seconds.  The remaining sizes required a high-performance computer to complete 
(Caprara p. 735). 
Some restrictions to the method utilized by Caprara et al. is the need to find the 
dual, and for the dual problem and the original problem to converge to a solution.  While 
this is always true for linear problems, non-linear problems often struggle with both 
restrictions.   
Another, more recent method to solving set covering problems is through the use 
of Ant Colony Heuristics.  “The whole is more than the sum of its parts.”  (Solnon p. 
106).  The concept Solnon is conveying is known as holism and is an underlying principal 
of Swarm Intelligence, and the later evolution to Ant Colony Optimization (ACO).  
Swarm Intelligence is the “collective ability to achieve global tasks” (Solnon p. 107).  
Through basic interactions, the entities of a swarm influence each other as well as the 
objective value of the system, either directly or indirectly.  These interactions occur at an 
elementary level, such as in the example of a shortest path problem.  In such a problem, 
the elementary decision to be made is which path to proceed down next, which in many 
cases is countable.  This decision then leads to a new set of paths which may be tread. 
Many swarms operate by using pheromones to transmit paths travelled; however 
if a path has never been travelled then no pheromone exists to be followed.  The 
individual entities in a swarm begin with initially no preference of a pathway or option, 
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making the initial decision random.  As time progresses, the better paths become 
frequented more often, and an increased quantity of pheromones are deposited at a faster 
rate than the less used pathways (Solnon p. 108).   
Having been originally developed for the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) in 
1992 (Solnon p. 1), this metaheuristic shows its roots in the original formulations.  Given 
v, the currently occupied vertex, v’ the destination vertex, and finite number of feasible 
pathways J, an entity will travel between these two points via edge ei ,  i  J, with 
probability: 
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t is a function determining the strength or quantity of pheromone along edge 
ei based upon the number of entities who have selected edge ei previously, and  is the 
sensitivity of the entities to the pheromone (Solnon p. 110).   
 Since the time of its original use in TSP, ACO has become more generalized as a 
greedy heuristic with biased probabilities.  The pheromones used biasing the probability 
trend the paths towards the more desirable orders to such an extent that the heuristic may 
“learn” to more often place some object j after object i (Solnon p. 117).  This ordering 
method is frequently used in “vehicle routing problems, car sequencing problems, and job 
scheduling problems” (Solnon p. 117). 
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 At every point, the objective of the ACO is to find the best combination of objects 
to optimize the objective, beginning unbiased.  Using local searches, combinations may 
be improved much more rapidly, which may allow a greater rate of improvement and a 
stronger pheromone trail (Solnon p. 118).   
Intensification encompasses the need to increase the strength of the pheromone 
applied to a trail based upon its resulting value (Solnon p. 128). Diversification is the 
need to allow less travelled routes to be re-inspected at regular intervals, either through 
branching or through steady degradation of the pheromone to prevent an excess bias 
(Solnon p. 136).  It is important that intensification and diversification be balanced so that 
no trail becomes overpowering, as well as reducing the likelihood that a potentially better 
trail is ignored. 
In 2013, Luo et al. utilized Ant Colony Optimization techniques to determine the 
placement of first aid emergency facilities in Shanghai, China, which they modeled as an 
integer program (Luo p. 224).  With an objective function of minimizing the expected 
cost of delayed responses, as well as the cost of operating each station and vehicles, Luo 
et al. utilized a set of permissible locations and respective radii based upon equipment to 
be used at the location.  Any location that fell within that radius was considered to have 
no delay, while any location outside of the radius and not covered by any other station 
suffered a delay dependent upon the distance to the nearest station (Luo p. 225). 
To adapt the ACO algorithm to set covering problem, Luo et al. determined that 
every visited vertex was an activated supply station while any vertex not visited remained 
closed/unused (Luo p. 226).  The probability that a node would be visited was defined as: 
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In this equation, p represents the probability of being selected, y the number of 
ambulances to be located at the vertex in question,  the gained likelihood of a vertex 
being activated based upon previous iterations,  a static measure showing the deviation 
from y, and  the significance of the measures  and  (Luo p. 226).  
 The following two equations are used by Luo et al. to ensure that a 
minimal number of ambulances within an area are sufficient to permit the double 
coverage of their requirement.  Here, y’j signifies the minimal number of ambulances 
required by an area Wj. 
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The results of this heuristic show that the cost of providing care could actually be 
reduced by half increasing the number of emergency facilities from 29 to 47 (Luo p. 
227).   
In this section, heuristics designed to solve the large scale Set Covering Problems 
were reviewed.  These heuristics were based on Lagrange, Duality, and Ant Colony 
Optimization techniques.  It has been determined that, while the use of dual problems 
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guaranteed convergence in the models reviewed, it required that all constraints be linear.  
The method derived from Ant Colony Optimization, on the other hand, made no 
restriction to the type of constraints, but also is unable to guarantee convergence to a 
single best point or set of best points. 
Is an Empty Network Resilient 
In this section, a step that is often used in Fourier Transforms of functions is used, 
and that is to define the bounds.  Because the number of nodes in a satellite network can 
become large, the only bound requiring a hard definition is the lower bound of a non-
existent or empty network.  Defining this bound is important from a mathematical 
standpoint because it will create a baseline for the analysis. 
As the framework for the model developed in this thesis is constructed, there is an 
issue that remains to be discussed, and that is if a network with no nodes is considered to 
be resilient.  Recall that Salmeron et al. measure resilience as “the difference in operating 
costs, including penalties for un-served demand, after and before interdiction.” 
(Salmeron)  Consider a network where there are no nodes that can be attacked.   
This network is certainly resistant to interdictions as there is no change from 
before an event to after an event, regardless of how difficult it would be to discern an 
event on a system that does not exist.  Because there is no change in the system from 
before and after the shock, there is no change in un-served demand, and thus no change in 
penalty for un-served demand.  There is also no increased cost for clean up and repair.  
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Based upon Salmeron et al.'s measure, a network that does not exist is certainly the best 
network, an error that must be accounted for. 
Utilizing the measure for resilience presented by Cimellaro et al., in which the 
measure is the integral of the network performance over time given an event, the opposite 
occurs.  In this situation, one can see intuitively that an empty network, which is 
permanently unable to provide any performance, is the least resilient.  An exception to 
this is the situation in which there is simultaneously zero function and zero need for the 
function.  In such a situation, the network is both the least and the most resilient, as the 
desired level of performance is always achieved. 
In line with the Argonne definition followed in this work, as well as the 
components of resilience outlined by the DoD, the effects that increasing network 
capacity is viewed, whether for relaying or being a source of commodities, by examining 
the change that increasing the number of homogenous nodes has on resilience under each 
measure.  Recall from Chapter I section Defining Resilience, the four components of 
resilience are avoidance, robustness, reconstitution, and recovery. 
Increasing the number of homogenous nodes in the network will have a 
combination of two effects, acting as a spare should a primary node collapse and 
satisfying previously unsatisfied demand.  Note that it may wholly fall under a single of 
these effects.  In the situation when a node is a spare, the change in costs would be 
lessened as there is less change in un-served demand.  However, if the new node is 
satisfying a set of only previously unsatisfied demand, then after an event in which a 
node is lost, the change in un-served demand is the same as if the new node had not been 
included. 
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The effect this change would have on the measure utilized by Cimellaro et al. is 
now inspected (Cimellaro).  In case of a new node acting as a spare, the change in 
network performance would experience a lessened shock as a result of the degrading 
event.  As such the resilience measure would increase.  If the new node is satisfying a 
unique set of previously unsatisfied demand, then the network performance curve is 
translated up, though the lost performance as a result of an event remains the same.  In 
this situation, the network is still considered to be more resilient than if the new node had 
not existed. 
Clearly, including a new node should increase resilience so long as it is 
performing some function, whether as a spare or as a new primary relay/source node.  As 
such, the resilience measure should increase, though not necessarily by the same amount, 
in both situations.  The measure utilized by Cimellaro et al. measure satisfies this while 
that used by Brown et al. does not (Cimellaro), (Brown 2006). 
As no specification has been made as to the number of nodes in the network 
before the addition, this remains true for transitioning from a nonexistent network to a 
network with only one node, making exception for the obvious irrational situations in 
which a new node is useless, such as a supply network with only a relay node and no 
source.  Since a network with one node should be more resilient than a network with no 
nodes, then a nonexistent network cannot be the most resilient.  As such, the nonexistent, 
or empty, network must be the least resilient. 
In this section, the measurement methods of Brown et al. and Cimellaro et al. 
were utilized to exemplify setting an empty network as possessing the theoretical lower 
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bound on resilience.  Furthermore, the concept of increasing network size having a 
positive effect on robustness and recovery, and as a result on resilience, was presented. 
 
Measuring Resilience 
In this section, inherent measure characteristics and behaviors prescribed by the 
DoD definition, as well as those apparent in The Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 
and the Argonne National Laboratory definition, are reviewed. 
A portion of the measure guides are laid out in the DoD definition of resilience 
(Fact Sheet:  Resilience of Space Capabilities). 
Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions 
necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse 
conditions.  An architecture is “more resilient” if it can provide 
these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced 
capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and 
threats.  
   
From this definition, the DoD outlines that the measure of resilience of a system 
should improve is it can maintain its functionality in the face of a wide range of 
adversities.  The measure should also improve if recovery time is decreased or if the 
probability of failure when faced with adversity is decreased.  Note that the improvement 
may be negligible or nonexistent, but never negative. 
From The Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, which investigates robustness 
and fragility, another set of guidelines is exposed.  First, robustness, a component of 
resilience as determined by DoD and the Argonne National Laboratory definitions,  is 
improved as redundancies are included (Taleb p. 312).  By extension, the resilience 
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measure should improve as well.  Mitigating actions, actions which lower the probability 
or the impact of an event, improve resilience by improving robustness and avoidance 
(Taleb p. xxvii).  
Consider the Argonne National Laboratory resilience definition (Carlson p. 7): 
Resilience is the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization, 
community, region- to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt 
to, and recover from a disturbance.   
   Argonne National Laboratory 
 
It is clear that any action which results in reduced recovery time, increased adaptation, 
and an increase in a system’s ability to resist or absorb degrading events will also 
increase resilience.   
An obvious characteristic of the resilience measure is its ability to capture the 
performance and functionality of the system when faced with adversity.  It must also 
incorporate the probabilistic nature system survival and reliability, but must do so while 
acknowledging the possibility of a Black Swan event.  Recall the measure utilized by 
Klibi and Martel (Klibi p. 6), which was the network performance over time.  This 
measure is also utilized by Cimellaro et al. (Cimellaro p. 3642) and provided the basis for 
Zobel and Khansa’s measure of resilience (Zobel p. 84). 
Another system aspect seen to improve resilience is diversification.  Diversifying 
components of a system, be they resources, locations, or capabilities, reduces the impact 
that environment changes and degrading events may have on a system (NSTAC p. ES-2).  
Utilizing network performance as a basis, established and well known measures 
are incorporated.  Incorporating the time component, both for the duration of the 
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degrading event as well as the recovery and post-operation portions, the resilience 
measure may also capture the behavior and functionality of the system over time.   
Redundancies and mitigation efforts may be captured through the use of 
scenarios, though a level of scrutiny should be utilized in order to not over inflate their 
effect.  Including such a component or defense may serve to only shift the point of 
degradation and not actually improve resilience (Taleb p. xxvii; Salmeron 2004 p. 911).   
When constructing scenarios, it is important to capture the Black Swan events, 
which stress the system beyond its normal operational environment.  As such, explicitly 
constructed scenarios or those scenarios constructed through the use of probability 
distributions and past knowledge are less equipped than those models which are capable 
of seeking the “Worst-Case” system degradation combinations.   
Finally, a resilience measure should be at its worst for systems which do not exist, 
as was determined in the section Is An Empty Network Resilient.  As such, the measure 
should not directly rely on a change in the network or aspects of the network which do 
not alter the functionality of the network.   
Based upon this information, the following resilience measure is proposed. 
Resilience is measured as the time-averaged expected network 
performance under extreme-event degradation. 
 
 This proposed resilience measure has a number of implications.  The most 
obvious of these is that it is scenario based.  By utilizing a scenario, resilience measures 
of varying systems must be compared with the same adversary scenario.  However, this 
also allows for gauging the impact of redundancies and mitigation efforts, as well as 
viewing system behavior when faced with adversity. 
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This measure also assumes the incorporation of time.  Time is a necessary 
component of resilience, as seen in the components respond, adapt, and recover of the 
resilience definition.  However, multiple events and repetitive degradation can also occur 
across a wide range of time, further impacting an already degraded system.  Time can 
also be a hindrance though, requiring certain modeling restrictions such as a time 
horizon. 
The probabilistic nature of the system and degrading events should also be 
considered.  A common method for reducing probabilistic curves to a single measure is 
the expected value.  It is well known that reducing a curve to a single value results in a 
loss of information, but there is no requirement on the remaining information being 
entirely discarded.  Though the resilience measure is reduced to the expected value, the 
remaining output may be retained for potentially invaluable information and insight. 
In this chapter, the threats that communication satellites face were reviewed, as 
well as the similarities and differences that these satellites have when compared to other 
well known networks.  A number of previous efforts and methods used in measuring 
resilience were presented with particular emphasis on their strengths, weaknesses, and 
commonalities.  Finally, the chapter was concluded by noting desirable characteristics of 
a resilience measure based on the DoD and Argonne National Laboratory definitions 
which may be applied to not only satellite communication networks, but any system in 
which resilience is measured. 
In the following chapter, the many concepts and insights presented here are used 
to develop a methodology for measuring resilience.  The chapter will begin by adapting 
methods presented in this chapter, working to pull the many strengths of the methods 
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together.  At the end of the chapter, a measure for resilience, and a method for attaining 
the measure is developed. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
 
  In this chapter, two bi-level models are developed, one of which is used to 
optimize the effects of an attack over a single network cycle, and another which does the 
same for a much longer time span.  A heuristic based heavily upon Lim and Smith’s work 
is developed to solve the BLPs. This methodology is demonstrated with a case study, 
which utilizing two variations on an approximated network. 
Model Notation 
 
The indices, variables, and parameters utilized in this chapter are presented 
succinctly in this section, as well as in Appendix A.  Note that some parameters are 
exclusively utilized by the medium/long term model to be presented later in this chapter 
and may not appear in short term model.  In addition, a change of indices occurs with 
respect to time. 
Short-Term Model:   Primary Time is Short Term Interval (STI) 
    Secondary Time is always 1 
Medium/Long-Term Model: Primary Time is Long Term Interval (LTI) 
    Secondary Time is Short Term Interval (STI) 
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All three are to be used to denote the node.
Source node of the transmission
The network system the transmission last experienced
The security level of the transmission
Time (Primary)
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Duration of a single STI
Attack type
Active Defense node
Orbital Radius {0,1,2}
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Adapting to a Satellite Network 
Recall that in Chapter II, two major differences were discussed that differentiated 
satellite networks from other common distribution networks.  In this section, the 
methodology used to adapt previous methods to a satellite network is presented. 
The first difference to discuss is the time-dependent nature that a satellite network 
exhibits.  Because satellites are in constant motion, orbiting at different speeds, in 
different planes, and travelling in different directions as adjacent orbits, the links with 
other satellites and with terrestrial areas are brief and temporary.  This is especially true 
with LEO satellites which must move at high velocities to maintain a stable orbit due to 
their relatively closeproximity to the Earth’s surface.  While many properties determine 
when a satellite is able to establish a connection; the main three are line of sight, distance, 
and rotation of orbital plane.   
Line-of-sight is much easier to account for with inter-satellite links (ISLs) than 
with up/downlinks.  Geographical features such as mountains and valleys can have a 
significant impact on if a link is viable. Terrain can obscure large plots of land from the 
satellite's view.   
The connections between terrestrial nodes and satellites are highly dependent 
upon distance.  Using distance alone, the footprint of a satellite on a smooth surface can 
be determined.  On a perfectly smooth surface, if the terrestrial node falls inside of that 
footprint, then a connection is established.   
As discussed in Chapter II, a snapshot of a satellite network possesses the same 
stability as a common distribution network, and the location of a satellite can be 
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estimated when given a specific time.  Therefore the model views the satellite network at 
short, discrete time intervals.  Doing so, the average usage for those discrete intervals of 
time must be used in place of a higher fidelity and more accurate continuous method, 
resulting in a slight loss of accuracy. 
The second major difference between a satellite network and common distribution 
networks is the need to force transmissions from one specific node to another equally 
specific node.  Reaching back to network flow models, a transmission is forced between a 
chain of nodes if a node on one end of the chain has a supply, and the node on the other 
end has a demand.  This is why, for one transmission, a satellite network’s performance 
can be optimized the same as any other network.   
However, when combining many thousands of transmissions into a single model, 
the simple transmission can no longer be the single encompassing commodity.  The 
resolution is to not view the network as a large quantity of transmissions moving through 
the nodes, but rather a large set of transmission products defined by their origin, which 
can be handled by multi-commodity network flow. 
By making a transmission from every point of origin in the network a separate 
commodity, there is control to where it is sent, maintaining the limitations of the network 
by retaining nodal capacities.  Moreover, this high-fidelity method can be simplified, if 
needed, by translating the demands and supplies of the lowest level nodes up to the next 
level in the network, or by aggregating multiple connected origination nodes into a single 
node, adjusting the capacity of the satellites as necessary.   
For example, as with a satellite phone network, the points of origin are every 
single phone and ground station.  This network is massive to the point that any general 
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model built would likely be intractable.  If instead the satellite phones are approximated 
to grids on Earth, a very large problem is reduced to a smaller one.  However, the 
capacity of the covering satellite needs to be reduced by the number of calls whose origin 
and destination were within the same grid.  Note that this adjustment is a simple 
preprocessing of values. 
Making another step towards improving model performance, those grids may be 
eliminated and their supply and demand translated up to the satellite covering their 
respective area.  Once again, the capacity of the satellite needs to be reduced by any 
demand now served from within the covered area.  These two short steps can reduce a 
model size considerably. 
 
Approach
Brown et al. state that "For many situations, a linear program will provide an 
adequate model of the defender's system and its operations" (Brown 2005 p. 106).  Over 
the course of this section, the prescribed method for measuring resilience and all of its 
components is formulated, including assumptions as they become necessary.  This 
method results in not a singular equation, but rather a step-by-step process that presents 
multiple equations and objective functions to arrive at the final measures. 
Bi-level programs allow for optimizing the solution of directly competing 
objectives.  One general bi-level program is the max-min problem (Brown 2005 p. 106).   
In this model, the defender, interior objective function, is minimizing some measure, and 
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the attacker, outer objective function, seeks to maximize that minimum (Brown 2005 p. 
106).   
Recall Salmeron et al. define short term as the period between the time of the 
event and the time to repair a cascading failure.  In the model short term is defined as a 
single network cycle.  This provides a clear break for when a short term model may be 
terminated, as well as setting firm bounds on the model, while still being adaptive to the 
network.  With networks experiencing no cycle time, such as pure GEO networks, this 
would essentially reduce the short-term model to a single time step. 
The next issue is to address cascading failures.  Patera states that as the amount of 
debris in a satellite’s orbiting area increases, so does the probability of a collision (Patera 
p. 716).  For the purpose of this research, the following assumptions are made.  The first 
is that the capacities of the satellites cannot be exceeded, thus precluding a cascading 
overload from usage spikes, the most likely cause for a cascading failure in a power grid.   
The second assumption is that the only cascading effects possible, in regards to 
satellites, is the increased probability of collision with an orbital object, which may be 
achieved through either the raised quantity of debris, or through the elimination of 
Tracking and Control stations whose purpose is to perform maneuvers to reduce the 
probability of collisions.   
The basis of this assumption comes from the inherent defenses employed by 
satellite operators, which prevent a dangerous overload of capacity, as well as allow the 
satellites to, for a duration, autonomously maintain their orbits.  While this begins down 
the path of reliability and probabilistic effects, it is an important piece to consider as the 
probability of collision may spike dangerously high as a result of an event.  As there may 
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be collateral damage as the result of an attack, this term is restricted to referring to effects 
that come as a direct result of the primary attack, which may include time lingering 
effects, area of effect, or a combination of both. 
Unlike power grids, satellites also experience the benefit of being mobile.  It 
would seem ideal to define medium term as the time after the short term has concluded, 
and until the satellites are able to migrate in order to compensate for the losses, should 
the operators choose to do so.  Unfortunately, this method is not viable due to the 
multitude of ways in which such a period may be affected by choices made by the 
operator.  Mobilizing a satellite requires the burning of fuel for rapid repositioning, or in 
some cases the allowance of a slow drift.   
Many satellites, especially those in an elliptical orbit such as HEO and LEO 
satellites, experience a slow longitudinal drift (Kumar p. 719).  However, repositioning 
via this method requires a significant amount of time, and may only apply for relatively 
close orbital planes.  For example, Iridium used a combination of a fuel burn and drift 
method to position new spares Iridium 90, 94, and 96 in February 2002, and again in June 
2002 to reposition Iridium 98.  In addition, in 2005, Iridium 98 was maneuvered from one 
stable orbit to another via a drift-burn combination.  The trip, which moved only a third 
of the circumference of the LEO realm required the time from June 2005 till May 2007 
(Sladen).  
For a movement from spare to operational orbit burn, another precedence is found 
in Iridium, after the 2009 Iridium 33-Cosmos collision.  Immediately following the 
collision, efforts began to move the spare, Iridium 91, up to operational range.  The 
transition took approximately one month (Sladen).  To this point, Iridium has neither 
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utilized an orbit to orbit burn nor have they repositioned an operational and in-use 
satellite, instead choosing to drift spares or to position replacement satellite packages 
nearest the orbital plane most in need.  Therefore, a separate medium term model or 
definition is not included, but is instead presented as a modification of the long term 
model. 
Salmeron et al. define the long term, being the period after the satellites have been 
repositioned and until the network's performance has returned to a level at or above its 
previous state, which may include procuring replacements or repairing destroyed nodes. 
(Salmeron p. 99).  While this period seems ideal, if sufficient satellites are eliminated, 
reconstituting the network to a state equivalent to, or exceeding preceding status could 
potentially take years, at which point the advancement of technology, as well as the usage 
of newer architecture models, may create complexities unable to be properly captured by 
the model or analyst.  Moreover, the inherent complications that arise from allowing 
multiple time-dependent degrading events creates far too much chaos, greatly blurring the 
lines of periods defined in such a manner.   
As such, the long term timeline is limited to include sets of short term periods, 
starting from a predetermined time and extend up to the  point where changes in 
technology and policy is considered to be significantly great to warrant high 
unpredictability in network components that may be utilized by the conclusion of the 
model duration.  In extension, the medium term may be considered to be any period of 
significance greater than one period, but shorter than the duration described as the long 
term.  However, mathematically this results in no significant change to a long term 
model, allowing us to construct a single medium/long-term model to accommodate both.  
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While defining these partitionings is important, the true separation between 
medium and long-term is irrelevant when maintaining a worst-case scenario model.  This 
is because a worst case event may involve recurring disruptions, which blur the split 
between the two epochs.  As such, the medium and long term models remain connected 
while making the assertion that any long term model must contain a medium term model.  
If only a medium term model is desired, the model developed later in this chapter for the 
long term scenario may have the reconstitution component removed and the time duration 
adjusted accordingly. 
Due to restrictions in time and resources, the model is constructed with the 
definition simplified to:  
Resilience is measured as the time-averaged expected network 
performance under extreme-event degradation. 
 
The measure was simplified in this manner because of the choice to utilize a 
deterministic modeling approach.  As such, the resilience measure which arrives as an 
output of the yet-to-be developed model tend to be a slight overestimation of the true 
resilience of the system.   
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Building The Defender Model 
To measure network operating levels, two preexisting measures are employed: the 
percent of transmissions blocked and the percent of excess capacity.  These two are 
selected because they directly translate to measures which DISA uses to measure network 
performance, which is confirmed by Eremenko et al. in their own cost-benefit analysis 
(Eremenko p. 4).  
In DISA's Telecommunications Service Level Agreement, the main measure 
utilized to specify performance levels is Percent Management Threshold, which states the 
minimum acceptable level of performance, in their case availability, that must be ensured 
at all times (DISA 2012 p. 1).  In this thesis the means for measuring percent availability 
when the calls have dropped below 100% connected is to use the value weighted percent 
of transmissions blocked.  Since many methods exist for eliciting these weights from 
decision makers and the determination of weights is outside the scope of this research 
effort, no further detail is provided in this work as to the many methods for soliciting 
weights, nor is there any restriction on the weights to be used at this point.  Because this 
measure cannot account for any capacity in excess of all-calls-connected, this measure is 
coupled with the percent of capacity remaining in the network.  For example, if using the 
level of 90% of the capacity in the network to complete all transmissions, operational or 
otherwise, then the percent capacity remaining is 10%. 
The first step is to calculate the network operating levels for an empty set of failed 
nodes by constructing the inner Defender IP. The purpose of this step is to determine the 
network performance of the fully operational state of the network.   
92
 z=c y
Subject to:
    a y+ y=b   
    Fy U(1-x)
    0,  ={0,1}
y
j j
Min
y x
 
             Model 3.1 
In this linear programming model, which is formulated as general a fashion as 
possible, aj  is the jth row of constraints, y is the main decision variable adjusting 
commodity flow, and y is the total amount of demand not met.  Another way of 
thinking of this demand is the number of calls blocked.  Because calls can have varying 
levels of importance, the cost vector, c, is included to denote the varying levels of 
importance of those calls.  Note that if the model is pulled away from the lowest level and 
aggregated to some higher level, the cost is no longer associated with a transmission from 
a single node, but now with an area or region depending on how low or high the fidelity 
is. 
In the following model, multi-commodity flows, varying levels of security 
requirements, a supply/demand Tracking and Control commodity, and the need for a 
gateway to pass calls between nodes operating incompatible frequencies, procedures, 
authority, and so forth are included to increase model validity.  It shall be assumed that, 
in an unaltered network configuration, those operating the networks are aware of or are 
able to estimate, what connections exist at each time step, or are capable of determining 
these connections on their own, both within the network nodes as well as terrestrial 
zones.  Thus, Conni,j,d is a binary parameter denoting the connection between node i and j 
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at time interval d.  While in most cases Conni,j,d=Connj,i,d, this need not always be the 
case.   
Though the equations are much more explicit, a close read will show that the only 
major change between the following model and the general linear model presented before 
is the addition of extra subscripts.  As such, they shall be defined very carefully. 
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  Model 3.2 
 In the preceding IP, recall that xi is known, currently a zero-vector, and is 
implemented to the model in order to determine the network operating level, or the 
importance of the blocked calls.  This is different from a true Attacker-Defender bi-level 
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model which would select those degradation levels, xi.  Meanwhile, Total_Net_Value is a 
constant and actually has no effect on what the optimal configuration will be.  Excluding 
or including it in the objective function will, computational error notwithstanding, only 
serve to adjust the final answer by a predetermined scalar.  If a node is unable to transmit 
to or receive from a particular system, or if its security level is insufficient, then capi,l,s 
will prevent the flow through that node via constraint 3.2.(1).   
Constraint 3.2.(2) ensures that the total capacity of the node is not exceeded.  
Constraint 3.2.(3) allows the supply the vary, which is necessary when y begins to grow.  
Note that supply is negative, and the equations are flow-in minus flow-out.  Constraint 
3.2.(4) is the standard network flow constraint.  Constraint 3.2.(7) forces at least 1 
Tracking and Control (TC) transmission to be transmitted to every demanding node so 
long as the node is still active and an active TC station exists.  Constraints 3.2.(9) and 
3.2.(10) build the second measure, the percent excess capacity in the network.  Constraint 
3.2.(11) measures the total value of the calls being placed in the network.  Note that, as 
specified in constraint 3.2.(12), the value of supply is 0.  This is done so that 
transmissions are not double counted.  This constraint may easily be preprocessed out to 
conserve memory as the c array is a parameter and not a variable. 
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Model 3.3 
The value weighted percent of calls blocked and the value of the percent excess 
capacity associated with this network state are recorded in an array for later use.  These 
values are used in order to calculate the Attacker objective value that results from the 
current state of the system.   
At the moment, the network is currently modeled as operating under perfect 
conditions.  However, to proceed a baseline value for the impact that each node in the 
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satellite network possesses is required.  To do this, the preceding model is resolved, but 
with a single “deactivated” node each run.   
This is done because, though the method utilized here is to construct a continuous 
mixed integer non-linear bi-level program (CMINLBLP), currently the only well 
established method known for solving such problems, large or small, is to utilize 
heuristics.  As discussed in Chapter II, this is due to the non-convexity that all BLP in 
general are subject to, even when both components are linear. Determining a baseline 
importance for each node will allow the CMINLBLP heuristic to more rapidly arrive at a 
solution by establishing initial node preferences for selection. 
In this section, the inner Defender model to the CMINLBLP was developed and 
the values necessary to determine initial preferences to be used in the heuristic were 
calculated.  In the following section, this Defender model is utilized to construct the 
Attacker-Defender Model. 
 
Extreme Event Attacker-Defender Model  
In the previous section, the interior Defender model was developed.  In this 
section, a bi-level Attacker-Defender model is built around that IP in order to determine 
where the vulnerabilities in the network are and the effects of those weaknesses being 
exploited. 
At the moment, the most probable disturbance to a satellite communications 
network is a natural or accidental one, as no known malicious attack on a satellite have 
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been publically recorded to date.  However, the Attacker-Defender model employs the 
aspects of an intelligent adversary in order to determine the worst cases in which a 
disruption may occur given a fixed level of resources.  Another way of viewing this 
problem is the occurrence of a “perfect storm” against the network with a feasible level 
of severity. 
Recall from the previous section that the final integer programming model was 
Model 3.3.  To apply a bi-level program to this IP, first an objective, or set of objectives, 
for an adversary must be determined.  These objectives should be as simple as possible to 
reduce complications and specificity, which could result in unintentional restraint on the 
attacker’s actions, but broad enough to be valid.  An example of three such objectives 
which can easily encompass many more specific objectives include: 
 1.  Reduce global capacity 
 2.  Reduce coverage of a particular region of the planet 
 3.  Increase the cost of operating the network. 
Each of these objectives is simple, pertain to the network, and are reasonable 
objectives for an adversary to pursue.  To compare these objectives in the model, each of 
them is divided by their unconstrained optimal level.  This means that one must first 
know what each of the optimal solutions are.  Note that it is not necessary to utilize these 
specific objectives; a different set may be chosen. 
Cost has yet to appear in the model in any way; this includes the costs of a 
satellite, a Tracking and Control (T&C) station, or the cost of a node failing.  However, 
these costs are fundamentally the same as the values placed on transmissions and 
capacity.  If the values of transmissions are converted to units of cost, or vice versa, then 
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the cost of losing/rebuilding a node is in the same units as the value of transmissions 
unable to be accomplished. 
To proceed, the following assumptions are made.  The first is that all costs of 
operating, procuring, and repairing all nodes are known by both the defender and the 
attacker.  The second assumption is that the time for all necessary procurements and 
repairs is known by both the defender and the attacker.   
The first two assumptions, while not always true in reality, are necessary in order 
to apply a BLP.  A BLP is a deterministic optimization model; thus it is assumed that all 
information is known with certainty.  If these costs and times were permitted to be 
unknown or highly variable, then a method of modeling other than BLP would need to be 
employed.  With these assumptions in mind, GlobeMax, RegMax, and CostMax, along 
with a few cost and resource parameters, are included: 
While GlobeMax and RegMax may be quickly calculated from pre-existing data, 
CostMax is not as simple.  In order to determine this value, first a model with this as an 
attacker’s sole objective must be formulated. 
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Model 3.4 
Model 3.4 is a bi-level optimization program, specifically an Attacker-Defender 
model.  This multileveled optimization can be seen in the overarching maximization 
objective, as well as the embedded objective at constraint 3.4.[4].  Just as the whole 
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model has constraints it must satisfy, so too does the inner Defender model.  In this 
scenario, each level of the model controls a different set of decision variables, which are 
denoted below the Max/Min.  The Attacker then has perfect knowledge of the Defender’s 
responses, whereas the Defender may only act in response to the attacker. 
Note that, excluding xi changing from a parameter to an Attacker controlled 
variable, Model 3.4 required no change to the pre-existing portions.  This is because the 
Attacker’s objectives and restrictions do not affect the defender’s. In this model, the 
Attacker’s sole objective is to maximize the cost of operating the network, which is 
calculated in 3.4.[2].  Another simple way of thinking about the degradation, xi, is the 
percent of capacity remaining for usable transmissions.   
If the Attacker’s resources are extremely limited, or if the defender’s network is 
very large, then one may pursue this same method when determining the remaining two 
objectives, GlobeMax and RegMax.  Doing so reduces the amount of rounding error that 
may occur when dealing with extremely small decimals.   
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Model 3.5 
 Currently, the model is still restricted to the same base assumption from Brown et 
al., where every attack is fully successful and there is no option for partial degradation.  
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However, this assumption is becoming less and less valid as advances are made in the 
cyber realm, which holds the potential for limiting usage without entirely eliminating a 
node.  Therefore, the binary requirement of xi,a is now relaxed so as to permit the variable 
to take on a continuous bounded range. 
Let xi,a=fi,a( i,a,g), i,a,g  [0,RqRsci,a,g], be a function such that fi,a[0,RqRsci,a,g] is a 
monotonic decreasing continuous function covering [0,1].  This function must be 
decreasing simply because x=1 has been selected in this work as the node being 
operational and x=0 as the node being eliminated.  If the opposite is selected, then along 
with a few constraint modifications, the function must be made increasing. 
RqRsci,a,g specifies the resources needed to fully eliminate a node in the network, 
though less may be used to achieve a partially degraded result.   
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The basic bi-level model associated with an extreme event under the Brown et al. 
assumptions of a single coordinated, fully effective strike with one attacker objective was 
presented.  Multiple possible attacker objectives were also introduced, and the model was 
formatted for a generalized function to scale the impact of a partial attack.   
 
Including the Time Component 
 
In this section, integer programming based scheduling methods is incorporated 
into Model 3.6 so that it may select not only where and how to attack, but also when.  By 
including this time component, the model is now capable of degrading a node multiple 
times, if desired.   
With respect to introducing a time component, one approach would be to first 
view the problem as a scheduling problem.  In essence, the model attempts to schedule 
when and where the notional adversary strikes.  Along with allowing the attacker to 
choose when to strike, the model must allow the defender to respond.   
The most basic response is repair.  To begin, the following assumptions are made: 
1) The duration and cost of repair is independent of both time and the state 
of other nodes in the network.   
2)  If repair is possible, then along with the associated costs, there will also 
be a necessary time component over which the repairs occur.   
These assumptions are for simplification of parameters, though cost and time-to-
repair as a function of the current time period, which is known, would still be valid as 
105
long as appropriate minor alterations to the deterministic model are made.  To 
accomodate these time-independent repair functions, two functions must be formulated.   
Let CostRi,d(xi,a,d) be a one-to-one continuous decreasing function with 
CostRi,d(1)=0 and CostRi,d(0)=CostRpci where CostRpci is the cost of replacing node i.  
Let TimeRi,d(xi,a,d) be a one-to-one continuous decreasing function with TimeRi,d(1)=0 and 
TimeRi,d(0)=TimeRpci where TimeRpci,d is the time required to replace node i.  Once 
again, these functions must be decreasing because of the specified xi,a bounded [0,1] with 
1 being operational.  The function TimeRi,d(xi,a,d) is guaranteed to be positive, because 
TimeRi,d(xi,a,d) is decreasing, continuous, and TimeRi(max(xi,a,d)) = min(TimeRi,d(xi,a,d)) = 
TimeRi,d(1)=0.  CostRi,d(xi,a,d) is also guaranteed positive for similar reasons.   
Next, the model must be adjusted to allow for attack time selection.  To do so, the 
model must regrettably include more variables and parameters.  Let IntDur be the 
constant stating the duration of each time interval in the same units used in TimeR.  Let D 
be a sufficiently large number restricting the number of intervals the adversaries may 
strike within.  D may be set to any integer such that:  
, , , , , , ,
1 max{ ( ( )) |  }     (EQ 3.1)i a i a d i a g i a g g
i a i a
D TimeR f AdvRsc
IntDur
 
to ensure sufficient size, however it is recommended that the model be permitted to run 
for a longer duration. 
 Restricting D as set forth in EQ 3.1 permits the full time for longest recovery 
period possible in the model.  While this does permit the calculation of network 
performance over time, in many cases, namely where the repair times of nodes are 
relatively similar, such a small D could preclude the re-degrading of nodes.  In such a 
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case, there is no significant difference between this model and the one developed by 
Brown et al, which permits only a single event.  
Next, create a binary variable matrix which will specify when a node is available 
for attack and when it is not.  Assume that a node will only be interdicted via one method 
at any given time.  This assumption, while potentially invalid in reality, is used to 
simplify the model and reduce the dimensionality, as well as allowing the occurrence of 
an event to act as a trigger in later constraints.  Let Tgt be a nxD matrix where n is the 
number of nodes in the network.  For every i, ,da Tgt , if i,a,d, node i at time d by 
method a,  is targetable then i,a,d=1, otherwise i,a,d=0.   
Unless otherwise specified, each node is targetable at the initialization of the 
model.  For any node i that is deemed non-targetable at any given time, include a 
constraint in the model to the effect of , , 0i a d
a d
.  If a node is only non-targetable 
for a specific time interval or set of time intervals, NT, by attack type, a, then include 
constraints , ,
,
0i a d
a d NT
.  For example, if an anti-satellite missile has a finite footprint in 
which it may strike, and its firing location if fixed, then any satellite i may only be 
attacked by weapon a at time d if satellite i is within weapon a’s footprint. 
The time subscript, d, is now included on variable i,a,g, making this variable 
i,a,g,d so the adversary may select when to use resources.  In extension, all associated 
variables will require the same addition.  Using this, the following pseudo-constraints are 
included: 
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Model 3.7 
Constraint 3.7.(2) restricts the targeting matrix Tgt by forcing some of its 
elements to be non-targetable.  It is inside this constraint where the computer is prevented 
from continuously targeting the same node for an infinitesimally small value infinitely 
many times.  Unfortunately, 3.7.(2) is not in a form that may be confidently solved by 
most deterministic solver programs.  This is due to its if-then formatting, which is 
currently only a pseudo constraint format.  These pseudo-constraints may be reformatted 
equivalently as:
i,a ,g,d , ,
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Model 3.8 
Note that constraint 3.8.(2) allows for only one attack on a single node for the 
duration of its degradation by taking advantage of the way in which TimeRi,d was 
constructed.  When a node experiences a repair time, or is destroyed as such an event was 
built into the repair time, then the node becomes non-targetable for TimeRi,d time units.  
However, if TimeRi,d=0, then no further constraints are placed on the network.  Constraint 
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3.8.(3) is a switching constraint that triggers the binary variable , which is necessary in 
constraint 3.8.(2). 
Finally, the model must allow immediate reactionary methods the defender may 
utilize to mitigate the event, such as interception of conventional weaponry.  These 
methods is referred to as Active Defenses, not to be confused with Passive Defenses such 
as structural hardening or on-board antivirus software.  These defenses will follow much 
the same principals as the other nodes in the network in that they will have associated 
costs, repair or reload times, and a footprint in which they may operate.  If the defense is 
global, then the footprint is considered to be of sufficient size to encompass the planet. 
Let index e denote an individual Active Defense node.  Let ADFPe,a denote the 
maximum distance in which the defense e is effective against attack type a.  Let ADRCe,a 
denote the cost to operate and reload the defense.  In the case of a physical defense, this 
cost may refer to the ammunition while in a cyber event this cost may be the cost of 
personnel and resources dedicated to combating the threat.  Let ADRTe,a denote the time 
required to reload the defense e, or the time required for the defense e to have been 
effective.  In a physical scenario, this time would be associated with reloading and 
retargeting.  In a cyber event, this would be the time required for the threat to be 
eliminated.   
Let STe,a be a value denoting a minimum quantity of utilized resources of attack 
type a below which a threat is considered insufficient to allow the model to utilize Active 
Defense e.  If there is no such minimum and every threat is sufficient in magnitude, then 
let ST=1.  Lastly, let ADFirede,a,d be a binary matrix specifying if Active Defense node e 
was used against a threat type a during time step d. 
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In words, the following constraints are constructed.  If node i is within distance 
ADFPe,a of node e during an attack of type a, then allow protection of node i at the cost 
of ADRCe,a.  If node e is used against attack of type a in time step d, then force 
ADFirede,a,d=1.  If the sum of ADFirede,i,a,d over all nodes i is 1, then force 
ADFirede,i,a,d’=0 for all i and all d’ in the set [d+1,d+ADRTe,a].   
Notice that much of these constraints are similar to when the model’s attack 
constraints were formulated.  Using some initial distance calculations, it would be 
prudent to now calculate the distances from nodes to active defenses.  For each node, 
active defense combination, let ADProte,i,a be a binary matrix denoting if node I is 
protected by node e against attack type a.  These operational requirements and behaviors 
lead to the following constraints:  
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With this last addition and modification of constraints in place, along with the 
addition of usage costs to the before defined Cost variable, the following bi-level model 
is formulated. 
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Model 3.9 
In this section, an Attacker-Defender model, Model 3.9, was developed with 
which to model an extreme event intelligent adversary strike on a satellite infrastructure.  
This model is constructed to be operated for a single orbital cycle, and as such currently 
only exhibits the “short-term” scenario.  In the following section, adaptations is 
developed to account for “medium-term” and “long-term” recovery options. 
 
Increasing the Time-Span 
In this section the preceding Attacker-Defender model, Model 3.10, is adapted for 
“medium-term” and “long-term” recovery options.  Major adaptations are the inclusion of 
spares and reconstitution. 
In the preceding Model 3.10, no indication was made as to whether a node was 
actually operating, only if it could operate.  However, if on-orbit satellite spares or 
terrestrial station spares exist, then they will not be operating until after an event occurs, 
though they are able to operate at any given point there-after.  When investigating 
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adaptations to be made, the model must be able to differentiate between a terrestrial spare 
or an orbital spare, the main difference of which is the mobility of a satellite and its 
ability to be repositioned in order to eliminate major gaps in coverage. 
First, a distinction must be made between the time-intervals involved in the 
“short-term” and the “medium/long-term”.  Recall that the “short-term” time intervals 
(STI) constructed were partitioning on the time to complete a single cycle.  However, as 
shown in the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision recovery (Sladen ), a satellite may require 
many cycles in order to be repositioned.  Depending upon personnel issues, a terrestrial 
node may also require multiple cycles before being activated, though it is desired that the 
number of cycles for such is relatively low. 
As such, the “medium/long-term” time interval (LTI) is defined as a multiple of 
the network cycle, with the assumption that some initial event must occur within the first 
cycle, but that later cycles may also experience degrading events.  This assumption 
makes no actual change to the freedom of the model, but instead reduces the 
dimensionality of it by restricting the amount of memory utilized at the start of the model.  
The model also requires an upper bound on the number of cycles, one which is sufficient 
enough to capture the reconstitution of the network, but not so long that complicating 
network changes become overwhelming.  A common phrase associated with this limit is 
a Planning Horizon. 
In a perfect world with unlimited memory and computational power, one would 
now increase the dimensionality of the model to incorporate these longer time-steps, 
breaking each LTI into STI.  Unfortunately, the model is already cumbersome and 
increasing the dimensionality potentially thousands of times is impractical as well a 
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potentially intractable.  It is for this reason that the method must differentiate between the 
two very distinct types of objectives, short-term and medium/long-term.  The short-term 
model is already constructed, and unless a replacement may be included in a single cycle, 
no alterations need be made. 
For the long-term model, the nodes of a network must be considered as falling 
within two distinct categories, stationary footprint or cyclical footprint.  These categories 
require the assumption that long duration erratic satellite movements do not occur in the 
network. Erratic movements, which are corrected via on-board computers or Tracking 
and Control stations, are probabilistic in nature.  In essence, this assumption 
approximates those probabilistic positional variations to the expected path of a satellite, 
which, due to correctional movements, remain on the projected assumed paths. 
One must account for the flow of transmissions in the network, no longer viewing 
the nodes at discrete time steps as points, but instead as the cyclical paths they traverse 
over a single LTI.  As always, when aggregating constraints in order to conserve 
memory, an amount of fidelity and precision is lost.   
To tackle this problem, a common LEO orbit type is examined, the polar orbit.  
Polar LEO satellites travel from the south pole to the north pole, their latitude 
independent of the rotation of Earth.  Because of this, an orbit of satellites may visit the 
entire planet one or more times over the period of a single cycle without ever 
significantly breaking their cyclical path.  What this means is that it is no longer possible 
to examine specific transmissions and their flow through the network nodes over the 
model’s new time periods.   
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As Pratt et al. point out in their review of the Iridium constellation, the discrete 
loss of a single satellite operating in a cyclical nature exhibits a time loss of coverage for 
an area, for each area it covers in its cycle (Pratt p. 5).  For a continuous case, the time 
loss does not accurately capture the effect of partial coverage, and it also fails to align 
with the network performance measures.  The model will utilize the time-dependent user 
rates and will adjust the number of successful transmissions by the degraded operating 
capacity of the satellite.  Note that through pre-processing, if only the number of 
transmissions for an area in a cycle is available, and is not time-depended, then the 
transmissions may be approximated based upon a probability distribution of operating 
times. 
An additional sequence of preprocessing is pursued in which the number of 
transmissions attempting to be serviced by the cyclical satellite are summed.  Continuing 
with d denoting the time steps, though now for LTI, 0  xi,d  1 denoting the degradation 
level of node i at time step d, ci,t,s,d the cost or relative importance of transmission from 
node t to node i with security rating s at LTI time step d, and bi,t,s,d denoting the number 
of attempted calls from node i to node t of security rating s during LTI d.   
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Model 3.10 
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This model may be restructured for equivalent results, while requiring fewer 
calculations and slightly faster running time as follows: 
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Model 3.11 
This linear program simply allows the model to choose the most beneficial or 
most important transmissions and process those based upon priority.  Using this 
information, which is completed before the actual model long-term model has been 
executed, a great deal of information may be discerned.  Note that though xi,d, the 
degradation level of node i at time step d, is included in this model, there has been no 
allowance for any attacks.  This means that only the baseline degradation of the node, 
that which is already in place or expected to be in place during the time phases that these 
calculations are used for, is used in the preceding linear program.   
In order to account for a spare being mobile or immobile, with respect to its place 
in the network, the model requires yet another variable with which to discriminate 
between operating nodes and stand-by nodes, or spares.  Let Mobilei be a variable 
specifying the maximum distance a node i may traverse for repositioning.  The time 
required for a short term time interval is denoted as STI, and a long term time interval as 
LTI.   
116
In order to limit the inherent complexities in calculating the distance actually 
traversed by an orbiting spare to a new location in the orbit, or a new orbital plane 
entirely, the distance traversed is reduced to simply the great circle distance between its 
starting location and its desired final location at the same STI, though not the same LTI.  
While there are very few theoretical limitations on how far a satellite may move, 
especially as the satellite may utilize drift to alter position, operationally it would not be 
unreasonable to restrict the repositioning of a satellite to within n orbital planes to regain 
service faster, especially following an event on the satellite network.  If the operator has 
no such preference or limitation, then the fuel available and predicted fuel consumption 
rates may be utilized to set such a bound. 
Let Statei be an integer variable of the set {0,1,2,3} such that 0 specifies 
permanently destroyed, 1 specifies temporarily disabled, 2 specifies operating and in use, 
either degraded or fully operational, and 3 specifies an operational spare, also either 
degraded or fully operational.  Furthermore, let MobileRFBi be the fuel consumption per 
distance unit of moving node i via a burn.  Let MobileIFBi be an initial fuel consumption 
of moving node i via a burn.  Let MobileTBi be the time required per unit distance of 
moving node i via a burn. 
Similarly, let MobileTDi be the time required per unit distance of moving node i 
via a drift.  Let MobileIFDi be an initial fuel consumption of moving node i via a drift, or 
in other words to raise or lower the node to an engineering altitude to allow for the drift, 
if necessary.  The model must account for a node switching from state 1 to state 0, state 2 
to state 1, state 1 to state 2, and state 3 to state 1.  Any node, i, currently in states 2, or 3 
must be permitted to travel up to Mobilei.  Furthermore, any mobile node must be 
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allowed to utilize a combination of burn and drift, thus resulting in a trade off for fuel use 
and time operationally active. 
Based on precedence from historical satellite movements, Iridium satellites 
currently being repositioned, either from a spare state to operational state, or from one 
operational location to another, is unable to be utilized operationally for the duration of 
the transition (Sladen Website).  In such a scenario, it is unnecessary to account for a 
node moving directly from state 3 to state 2, or vice versa.  All satellites in such a 
network moving from 2 to 3 or 3 to 2 must pass through 1 first.  However, if this is not 
the case, or rather, if the satellite may continue its operational duties during the duration 
of the repositioning, then no such requirement exists.  As a result, no state switching 
would need to occur. 
The imbedding of a time-dependent covering problem into the defender model 
greatly increases the complexity of the problem.  The imbedded covering problem is 
determining the optimal location to place satellites which will utilize the least fuel and 
permit the greatest coverage.   
One method of considering fuel consumption is the quantity of units of fuel used.  
In this manner, the closest satellite is always the best option.  Another way is to instead 
view the consumption as percent of remaining fuel used, in which a close satellite with 
the largest fuel remaining is more likely to be selected.  Both are viable options, 
especially as the efforts in robotic refueling progress, and as both can be directly 
translated to different perspectives of life-time remaining.   
By viewing the amount of fuel utilized, and knowing how much fuel the satellite 
requires over a period of time, it is relatively simple to convert from fuel used to instead 
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life-time used.  Similarly, the percent of remaining fuel used may be converted to the 
percent of remaining life used, or the percent reduction in life.  As both are equally valid 
methods, the Chapter IV case study, as well as the following model formulations, will 
proceed with using the raw quantity of life-time consumed which is converted into an 
integer number of LTI.  This decision may be changed with minor alterations to the 
model and associated equations. 
It is a requirement for all orbiting satellites to have their operating frequency and 
orbit, or in the case of GEO satellites their geospatial coordinates, internationally 
registered to reduce the probability of a collision.  However, no requirement could be 
located as to exactly where these positions or orbits must be so long as the position is not 
currently occupied and the satellite’s residence is approved.  As such this problem is 
continuous.   
One common method utilized for solving continuous covering problems is to 
establish a multi-parameter grid in which the parameters are continuous and the resulting 
area of influence is a function of those parameters.  In a spherical grid, the most taxing 
problem is the need for the boundaries of the grid to be equivalent, even if the values 
when approaching from opposite directions is extreme.  To overcome the consideration 
the two parameter polar coordinate system is utilized.  The polar coordinate system is 
most commonly thought of as three parameters, however with the radius of the satellites 
being relatively constant based upon orbit type, (terrestrial, LEO, MEO, GEO), the radius 
is fixed as a property of the node in question (Wright p. 30). 
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Standard notation for polar equations are ( , )f , however those symbols have 
already been used in the formulation.  Therefore, f( , ), 0<  <  for latitudinal and 0< 
 <2  for longitudinal placement is utilized. 
As the transmissions being attempted are based upon the terrestrial and nodal 
components and not specifically related to the positioning of the nodes, the main 
tribulation is to determine what nodes fall within the satellite's footprint and at what time, 
and how many satellites or terrestrial components can serve the demand of that node at 
each respective time period.  By knowing those, one can accurately determine how many 
transmissions must enter the engineered portion of the network through that node at that 
time period. 
Determining what areas a satellite may serve at any given time is dependent upon 
the time-dependent location of the satellite and the footprint of that satellite in that 
location.  While it is well known that the terrain affects the size and shape of the 
footprint, the simplification that the footprint suffers no obstruction is made in this thesis.  
While this assumption may not be valid for high fidelity models, it does provide a 
suitable approximation.  Future efforts may be employed to increase the fidelity of the 
footprint in this analysis, if required. 
Next it is necessary to determine how many network components capable of 
transmitting the signal are in range of a given terrestrial area.  If the preceding 
calculations are already completed, then this step is trivial.  However, what is not trivial 
is determining a function which will complete all of these calculations.   
As the reader will recall, a linear model, Model 3.6, was utilized to determine how 
transmissions would flow throughout the network by taking advantage of the operator's 
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assumed knowledge of their own network.  In this thesis’ case study, an approximation of 
the time-dependent connections is assumed known or determinable via knowledge of 
footprint size and node location.  The calculations is completed by knowing first where a 
satellite is at a given time, the orbit time, OT, orbit direction, OD, cycle time, CT, and the 
number of lateral orbits completed during each cycle, CN.   
To do this, it is necessary to imbed the short-term time steps in the long-term 
model, denoted as subscript , and the duration of each short-term time step as t.  This 
blends the covering model with the long term model.  The following constraints will use 
the starting locations of the nodes as the decision variables, with the remaining orbital 
parameters acting as discrete functions. 
 
, ,0
, ,1
, , , ,
, , , ,
*1) POS *   i,
* *2) POS   i,
3)  dist (1 )*footprint   i,j,
4)  dist (1 )*footprint   i,j,
i i
i i
i j i j i
i j i j j
tOD
OT
t CN
CT
Conn
Conn
  (EQ 3.2) 
Here , ,0POSi  is the North-South position of node i at time , , ,1POSi  is the East-
West position of node i at time , disti,j is the distance from node i to node j at time , 
footprinti is the radius of the footprint of node i, and Conni,j,  is a binary variable equaling 
1 if a connection can exist between nodes i and j at time  and 0 otherwise.  In the 
preceding constraints, the distance from node i to j must be less than both footprints in 
order for a connection to exist.  However, it is not required that, if in range, a connection 
be established.  If the connection is beneficial at the time step, then the model, as a result 
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of optimizing the objective within the constraints, will activate the connection and utilize 
it as it determines to be optimal. 
The constraints in EQ 3.2 are not yet ready to be integrated into the rest of the 
model though.  At the moment, they are the generic approximation of positioning and 
connection possibility.  To determine an actual position it is necessary to take into 
account the initial positions of the nodes in the network, specifically the mobile nodes 
such as satellites.  To do this, i,0 and i,0 are indexed as thus to denote the initial 
positions of the nodes, making their counterparts in the preceding constraints 1 and 2, i,1 
and i,1 respectively.  If limited or unreliable information is available as to the exact 
positioning of each node as they currently exist or are expected to exist, then this same 
method may be employed to estimate the current positioning of the nodes.  The 
constraints in EQ 3.2 were constructed to approximate location based upon the new 
position of the nodes.   
While it is left to the user to determine the best method for computing distances, 
two limits are certain.  The first limit is a maximum distance that the satellite may be 
repositioned from its current location, maxposi, and the second is a minimum distance for 
repositioning, minposi.  The distance travelled by a node is denoted as DistPosi, the fuel 
consumed in such a move as a function of the distance, but possibly distinct for each 
node, Fueli(DistPosi), and the accompanying max fuel as maxfueli. 
Another important aspect to repositioning is the LTI when the repositioning 
occurs.  Define RepoSi to be the decision variable denoting the time step in which the 
repositioning is initiated.  RepoDi(DistPosi) is the number of time steps required for 
repositioning and is a function of the distance being traversed. 
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There is a clear need for consideration of the user’s values.  In the Fueli(DistPosi) 
and RepoDi(DistPosi) functions, a single output is determined from a single input, 
however the satellites may be repositioned through a combination of burns and drifts.  
This results in a fuel-time tradeoff, as the increased fuel usage results in a faster 
repositioning and reactivation of service.  While one could allow the model to determine 
the tradeoffs, preprocessing this function would conserve memory and allow the model to 
run faster.  In the case study, Fueli(DistPosi) and RepoDi(DistPosi) are set as 
preprocessed functions of the illusory user’s preferences and tradeoff values.  
i
i
i
:
MobileRF(B/D)   Initial fuel consumption of moving node i via a burn/drift
MobileIF(B/D)    Initial fuel consumption of moving node i via a burn/drift
MobileT(B/D)    Time required per unit d
Parameters
istance of moving node i via a burn/drift
 
i i
i i
i i
:
( )* MobileTD MobileRTD *
                                                +(1 ) MobileTB  +MobileRFB *
( )* MobileIFD MobileRFD *
  
i i i i
i i
i i i i
Functions
RepoD DistPos TO DistPos
TO DistPos
Fuel DistPos TO DistPos
i i                                              +(1 ) MobileIFB MobileRFB *i iTO DistPos
 (EQ 3.3) 
In these equations for Fueli(DistPosi) and RepoDi(DistPosi), the approximation of linear 
requirements of fuel used and tradeoffs, TOi, was used.  However, this method will work 
for any function of distance travelled.  The tradeoff is that, while increasingly nonlinear 
approximations may be more accurate, they are also computationally intractable.  One 
inherent restriction to using this preprocessed function tradeoff method is that the 
functions themselves must be injective and continuous. 
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The calculation of distances between nodes, with the specific method chosen left 
to the user, is denoted as disti,j, , the distance from node i to node j.  The subscript, , 
denotes the STI time step in which this distance is being calculated for.  Note that all of 
these connections are symmetric, meaning that disti,j, =distj,i, . 
As a note, though a distance component is provided for use between two 
terrestrial components, the maximum connection distance between two terrestrial nodes 
may be irrelevant due to land line connections.  Because of the massive land based 
communications infrastructure of many nations, as well as the submarine communication 
cables spanning the oceans, and the model only repositions mobile nodes, the vast 
majority of those connections is considered as constant.  However, capacities may be 
adjusted for the amount of data sent from one terrestrial node to another, both overall and 
for each security setting. 
When compared to the short term model, thus far there are three major 
adaptations to the medium/long term model.  The first is conversion of the STI to LTI 
and the necessity to force some event to occur within the first LTI.  The second 
adaptation is the method for approximating the value of transmissions, and as a result the 
expected lost value due to degradation of a node.  The third and most important change 
thus far is allowing the nodes of the model to be repositioned, which resulted in need for 
a systematic method in which the model may construct an entirely new network after 
each move. 
To begin formulating the medium/long term model, a potentially computationally 
cumbersome method is utilized, and that is to include every STI inside of each LTI.  
Along with showing how the number of constraints quickly grows, building the model 
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this way first aids in the adaptation to a model form capable of being performed much 
more quickly. 
As the reader will notice, the majority of the following model, Model 3.12, is very 
similar to the short term model.  This is because to accurately determine the value of 
failed transmissions, it is essential to know the optimal routing of transmissions in each 
new network created by mobilizing a node.  The majority of the new constraints begin 
with constraint 3.12.(17) which restricts the use of a node based upon the current state it 
is in.  Constraints 3.12.(18)-3.12.(21) are utilized solely for the purpose of estimating the 
new location of nodes after a move occurs. 
Constraints 3.12.(22) and 3.12.(23) calculate the distance from node i to node j at 
STI  during LTI d.  The model implements the Haversine formula for great circle 
distance around a sphere.  However, as was specified before, the analyst may utilize 
whichever distance calculation method the analyst determines to be best suited to the 
situation; for example line of sight if appropriate.  Constraints 3.12.(24)-3.12.(26) utilize 
the distance calculated in 3.12.(23) to determine if a connection can exist between any 
two nodes.   
Combined, constraints 3.12.(18)-3.12.(26) permit the model to independently 
construct new networks based upon the  = 0 position a node exists at for each d. 
Constraints 3.12.(27)-3.12.(30) model the fuel usage of a node, ensuring that only 
a mobile node may move, and that once a satellite, or other mobile node, is no longer 
fueled it may no longer be used.  For terrestrial components not requiring fuel to continue 
operations, FuelUseRi may be set to 0 and maxfueli,0 > 0.  Since the node has fuel, does 
not lose fuel over time, and is immobile preventing spikes in fuel usage, terrestrial nodes 
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will continue to operate until destroyed.  Constraint 3.12.(28) ensures simultaneously that 
only mobile nodes move and that they only move once.   
Constraints 3.12.(31)-3.12.(34) model the requirement of the node to be 
inoperable for the duration of the repositioning.  Constraints 3.12.(32) and 3.12.(33) work 
in tandem to ensure that the node is disabled for at least the duration of its move and that 
the disabling occurs at the same time that the move begins. 
Constraints 3.12.(35) and 3.12.(36) link the change of location to the LTI in 
which the change occurs, and ensures only one bounded move occurs per mobile node.  
While the model expresses this in a compact form, ( ,1),( ,| |)i i ddist is the distance from node i 
at the start of the model and the end of the model.  The decision variables used in this 
distance is ,i d and ,i d  for the respective node and times.  This method is only valid 
when a single move is allowed, but may be expanded to permit multiple moves. 
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In this section, a medium/long term bi-level program was developed which 
models the operational parameters of the network, as well as capturing the possible 
methods of degradation.  The key differences of this model, Model 3.12, versus the short 
term model, Model 3.9, are the inclusion of nodal repositioning/reconstitution, and 
network creation/destruction based upon those modification of nodes’ parameters. 
 
Reducing Model Size 
 
In the preceding sections, a short term model and a medium/long term model were 
developed.  These bi-level programs model the ways in which the network may react and 
be degraded over different spans of time, however in their current form they may be 
practically intractable, or require high performance computers to solve if every aspect is 
included.  In this section, the medium/long term model, the larger of the two, is analyzed 
and modifications are made with which to reduce its size.  Many of the modifications 
presented here may be applied to the short term model as well.  Final versions of both 
models with the improvements made in this section may be found in Appendix A. 
Though constraints in bi-level programs do not directly correlate to any constant 
multiple of constraints in single level programming, a bi-level program that can be 
converted to a single level more often requires a sharp increase in the number of 
constraints.  As such, the number of constraints serve to show a lower bound on the 
amount of memory required by using this method of imbedding the short term model in 
the long term model.   The preceding bi-level medium/long term model has: 
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 4 4 9 2 6 5 3 2i d a e j s t l t s d e a s (EQ 3.3) 
constraints. 
As an example, a constellation with:  
Network Parameters Index Max 
90 nodes and a ground fidelity of 1x1 degree ground grid i=j=t=64890 
Five security levels s=5 
Two network encodings l=2 
Time fidelity of every ten minutes on a 24-hour cycle =144 
Three years with time steps at each cycle d=1095 
Three methods of attack a=3 
Six active defense nodes e=6 
 
has at least 1.9918 1016 constraints.  Reducing the fidelity of the terrestrial grid to 2x2 
degree components, i=j=t=16290 and the number of constraints is reduced to 1.255 1015, 
which is a reduction in size of approximately 93.7%, but is still prohibitively large 
repeated for application. 
 If the short term time components, , could be removed, even without removing 
all associated terms that would be eliminated by separating the short term network 
operations from the long term mobility constraints, the number of constraints would be 
reduced to 2.345 1009.  This is a reduction of over 99.9%.  Making both changes 
simultaneously, the number of constraints is reduced to 5.889 1008.   
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 Our final change to this example is single security level, single operational 
encoding single attack method, and no active defenses.  Even with these simplifications, 
which reduce the generality of the model and fail to capture the many options available to 
both the Attacker and Defender, the minimal number of constraints is still 1.962 1008.  
As the reader can see, even in an idealized situation in regards to the model, a strict 
optimization of this bi-level problem, even if an exact method is determined, would be 
unreasonable in many, though not necessarily all, situations.   
 One exact constraint number, assuming no exploitation of special structures, is the 
constraints of the Defender model.  The Defender model, in which the operational 
options of the network exist, have 1.9918 1016  constraints in the original example, but 
only 1.249 1008 constraints in the idealized modification.  This indicates that the 
majority of the constraints exist in the Defender model, which can be seen intuitively 
when viewing the Attacker’s seven constraints versus the Defender’s thirty-six.   
Therefore, the key to reducing the dimensionality of the problem is not to reduce 
the number of nodes in the network, which is presently insignificant when compared to 
the ground grid constructed, but is instead to reduce the fidelity of ground coverage, and 
to reduce the number of time indices,  and d, whether by reducing fidelity or reducing 
the time-span.  However, reducing the STI intervals, as well as reducing the time 
modeled below a single cycle, may cause a gap in coverage modeling, making  
essentially exempt from alteration.  Reducing the ground fidelity to 4x4 grids and the LTI 
to 10 cycles, and leaving all other parameters in the example as they were originally 
specified, reduces the number of constraints to 8.108*1008.  While this value is still 
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almost eight times the idealized number of constraints, it was reached by reducing 
accuracy, but maintaining validity. 
It is important to view another example with a very different structure.  Up till 
now, no assumptions have been made upon which types of satellites are included in the 
network, meaning that the model had to be adaptive enough to handle both LEO, MEO, 
and GEO.  However, many networks involve only GEO satellites, which are much less 
mobile relative to a terrestrial location.  The question may be posed if as many constraints 
would remain.   
To answer that question, a new example is formed based only upon GEO and 
terrestrial nodes.  This example begins by setting sizes for the dimensions of the new 
network. 
Network Parameters Index Max 
6 GEO nodes, 8 terrestrial nodes, and a ground fidelity of 
1x1 degree ground grid (64800 grids) 
i=t=64814 
j=14 
Five security levels s=5 
Two network encodings l=2 
Time fidelity of every ten minutes on a 24-hour cycle =144 
Three years with time steps at each cycle d=1095 
Three methods of attack a=3 
Six active defense nodes e=6 
 
 As the reader can see, with no further adjustment to the model other than the 
alteration in network components, very little has changed in terms of size of each 
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dimension, the only change being in the number of nodes, being reduced by 76, which by 
itself is notably insignificant.  The model may be further improved for these conditions 
by removing constraints which are unnecessary due to the static nature of the nodes 
remaining. 
With these alterations in mind, the majority of STI parameters, save the time-
dependent transmissions, are irrelevant and thus may be omitted.  This is because GEO 
satellites and terrestrial nodes maintain a relatively constant footprint by design.  This 
property allows us to reasonably reduce the number of distance calculations needed.  
With satellites changing footprints as quickly as LEOs do, it was necessary to continue 
allowing the model to calculate new orbiting and connection parameters.  However with 
GEOs, calculations are only necessary when a node has been moved. 
With this reduced model, the number of constraints is now defined as:
23 (4 (13 2 (1 3 ) ) 5 )
   ( ( 1) 1)
i d a t s l s t s j
d e a i t s
            (EQ 3.4) 
where j marks only the mobile nodes.  In the example, this correlates to 9.959*1015 
constraints, compared to 1.9918*1016 from the earlier example.  A common thought 
would be that many of the remaining requirements, such as the high fidelity transmission 
constraints, are unnecessary.  Since a node may still be degraded at any LTI, d, and the 
transmissions in the network, which may be time dependent,  flow in according to the 
relay nodes available, the model must still be permitted to optimize the flow of 
transmissions through remaining nodes at each time step.  Moreover, the model allows 
the transmissions to be STI time dependent, which require the optimization of flows. 
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As for the remainder of the constraints, the satellites are still mobile, meaning that 
the model must still be able to reposition them, reduce their fuel, determine new 
connections, and adjust their states accordingly.  While the model no longer needs to map 
the movement of the satellites around the planet, the elimination of these constraints 
constituted 2.044 1010 of the original constraints.  While that number is large in and of 
itself, it is still only 0.0001% of all constraints. 
The largest reduction of the alteration occurred with the elimination of the need 
for the STI components in the bulk of the constraints and were able to be reduced to only 
the LTI component in which a move occurred.  This alteration resulted in a reduction of 
( )i j d j , which correlates to 1.43 1011, 0.0007 % of original constraints.  To show 
this visually, Figure 16 provides a visual representation of the original example. 
Figure 16:  Snapshot Projected Location of Example 1 Nodes 
In Figure 16, each circle represents an active node and its location with respect to 
Earth.  Understandably, there appear to be a number of nodes to contend with, and they 
appear to be randomly spread across the surface.  They are, however, following a 
common LEO distribution of assets, with three GEO satellites spaced evenly around the 
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Equator.  Figure 17 views this same map and network, but with the associated terrestrial 
regions. 
 
  Figure 17: Example 1 Nodes with Associated Terrestrial Connections 
 
Figure 18: Color Legend of 17 
The squares on this map each represent a 2x2 Lat-Long grid, and only one of 
every four grids is colored to maintain visibility.  Even so, the sheer number of colored 
squares is noticeably greater than the number of network nodes, which previously seemed 
large.  Here the reason behind the minor reduction in constraints in relation to the number 
of network nodes can be seen.  The changing of that relatively small number is near 
insignificant in relation to the quantity of terrestrial regions. 
The question remains as to where in the model the majority of the constraints are 
attributed to.  This is addressed in regards to the original model, Model 3.12. 
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Table 4: Long Term Model Constraints by Function 
Function Constraint Numbers Number of Constraints 
In Variable Terms 
Primary 
Example’s  
(%) of Total 
Attacker Model [1]-[7] 2+i (d (2+2 a)) 5.69 10-6 
Transmission 
Flow 
(1)-(8)&(10) d (i ( (2+3 t s+l
s)+t s)+ (t s+1)) 
99.99 
Value 
Calculations 
(9) &(11-14) 3+s (t+ d) 1 10-8 
Active Defense (15),(16) e a d (i+1) 1.28 10-5 
Position (18)-(21) 4 i d 4.10 10-4 
New Network (22)-(26) 5 i j d 7.17 10-3 
Mobility (27)-(30)&(35),(36) i (2+4 d) 2.84 10-6 
States (17)&(31)-(34) i (d ( +3)+1) 1.04 10-4 
 
Clearly, with over 99.99% of all constraints originating from the optimizing of 
transmissions through the network, this is where the focus should fall.  The model that 
follows is the set of constraints, as well as objective function, that come directly from the 
unaltered medium/long term model. 
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Model 3.12.[8] 
This model was initially formulated by utilizing common network connection 
techniques, in which each node of the network may be connected, but with parameter 
restrictions.  Those parameters could potentially limit the capacity of a flow to zero, such 
as the connection binary variable, Conn.  However, according to the operating procedures 
of the network, one can never transmit directly from one ground grid to another without 
passing through another node first, unless otherwise permitted.  This is where the first 
modification is made.  Let j, k, t define the combined set of all nodes and terrestrial grids, 
and i define the nodes in the network capable of relaying transmissions.   
 New constraint 3.13.(1.1) now transmits from any relay node to any node in the 
network, so long as transmission requirements are satisfied.  Constraint 3.13.(1.2) does 
the reverse.  The size of constraint 3.13.(5) has been reduced by summing over the 
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transmissions.  Moreover, the size of all constraints have been reduced by limiting the 
effects of the network to the nodes, excluding 3.12.[8].(3) which requires that all 
transmissions leaving a source must be less than the number originating at that source. 
, , , , , ,
( , ), , , , , , , , , , ,
,
( , ), , , , , , , , , , ,
,
1[8]   * y
_ _
    Subject To:
    (1.1)   , , , ,
    (1.2)   , , , ,
    (
i t s i t s d
y d s t i
i j t l s d i l s d i d
t j
j i t l s d i l s d i d
t j
Min z c
Total Net Value
y cap x i l s d
y cap x i l s d
( , ), , , , , , ,
( , ), , , , , , , , , , ,
( , ), , , , , ( , ), , , , , , , , , , ,s
2)   , ,
    (3) x    (Supply node t)  , , ,
    (4) 
j i t l s d i i d
l s j
t k t l s d t t s d t d
l k
j i t l s d i k t l s d i t s d i t
l j k
y cap x i d
y b t s d
y y y b , ,
, , , ( , ), , , , , , , , ,
, , ,
, , , , , , ,
,
  , , , ,
    (5)  cap 0 , ,      (6) 0  , , , ,
    (7) (( ( )) 1) ( (1 ))
                   
d
i j i d j i t l s d i t s d
j t l s
i t s d i i d i t d
t s i
i t s d
Conn y i d y i t s d
y TC x cap TC TCactive
, ,
, , ,
, ,
           ( ( (1 )))  , ,
    (8) ( )    ,
   (10) x 1  i, ,
i i d
d i i d
i
i d
cap x TCactive i d
TCactive TC x d
d
 
Model 3.13.[8] 
 The transmission flow function, which was just remodeled , now has 
( (1 ) (2 ( ) 4 ))d j s i s j l  constraints, the indices redefined as listed before.  
This results in 9.22 1012 constraints, a significant reduction from before with no loss of 
fidelity.  This change is applied to the remainder of the model, and, in terms of writing 
the model, nothing else is affected due to the selection of indices.  However, as a whole 
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the model now contains1.38 1013 constraints, again with no loss of fidelity.  Recall that 
the model began with 1.9 1016 constraints under this example, making this a reduction of 
99.9%.  These updates reallocate constraint percentages as presented in  
Table 5.  
Table 5:  Constraint Groupings of Model 3.13 
Function Constraint Numbers Number of Constraints 
In Variable Terms 
Primary 
Example’s 
(%) of 
Total 
Attacker Model [1]-[7] 2+i (d (2+2 a)) 1.08E-03
Transmission 
Flow 
(1)-(8)&(10) d (i ( (2+3 t s+l s)+t s)+ 
(t s+1)) 66.63
Value 
Calculations 
(9) &(11-14) 3+s (t+ d) 
1.37E-03
Active Defense (15),(16) e a d (i+1) 2.49E-03
Position (18)-(21) 4 i d 7.81E-02
New Network (22)-(26) 5 i j d 33.27
Mobility (27)-(30)&(35),(36) i (2+4 d) 5.41E-04
States (17)&(31)-(34) i (d ( +3)+1) 1.98E-02
 
To proceed, the medium/long-term model is reformatted in such a manner that, at 
the very least, the Defender model may be solved.  As such, the focus shall rest on the 
Defender model for the remainder of this section.   
Since it is clear that the majority of the short term constraints cannot remain 
within the model due to the large number of resulting constraints, and since the size of 
the model as well as current solving techniques suggest the development a heuristic to 
solve the bi-level program, instead the Defender model is reconstructed utilizing Goal 
Programming, which is imbedded in the bi-level program heuristic.  This is developed in 
the following section, Heuristic H-1. 
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It is assumed priorities of certain regions of the planet may vary to the extent that 
priority n areas are of much greater significance than priority n+1.  This method is known 
as Lexicographic Goal Programming, or Pre-emptive Goal Programming (Ignizio p. 5).  
While this explanation is sufficient for this research, the reader may read more on this 
method in James Ignizio’s Goal Programming and Extensions and others. One method 
for prioritizing the regions is based upon the value of the transmissions originating or 
concluding there.  With this method, varying thresholds must be set for value cutoffs such 
that if a region’s transmission values fall within the range, then the region is part of the 
priority, otherwise it is assigned to a different priority group.   
Another method for prioritizing regions is to rank the regions themselves based 
upon some weighting structure.  For example, in the military a nation at war may be of 
higher concern than the nation providing backdoor support which is higher than a neutral 
nation, and so on until a region not requiring coverage would be prioritized lowest.  In 
this method, the prioritization is based upon the importance of the possible transmissions 
and not a region’s cumulative transmission value. 
Clearly, either of the methods, as well as many more, may be appropriate in a 
variety of situations.  The Chapter IV case study will utilize the second method suggested 
here with a rating for each region, which is discuss further in the Chapter IV section, 
Case Study.  Because each region has a rating, sets In are created such that if a region, j, 
is within set In, then region j has a priority rating n, with 1 being the highest priority 
rating.  However, the lowest priority rating will continue being assigned to any region 
sending/receiving no transmissions.  While the optimization model will automatically 
place these as the lowest level internally, creating a separate priority will reduce the 
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amount of memory required with no significant change to system configuration and 
performance.  
Model 3.14 may also be referred to hereafter as the lexicographic model.  In the 
Model 3.14, the constraint numbers appear as they did in Model 3.12 solely for the 
purpose of showing how many constraints were removed.  A new binary variable, , ,j dC , 
was introduced along with new parameters, wj and , ,Req j d , which denote the time 
independent importance of a region and the time-dependent number of required satellite 
connections respectively.  Priority parameter, wj must reflect the specified importance of 
a region by varying greatly between priority levels, but only slightly within levels.  If the 
number of connections is independent of time, then the dimensionality of Req may be 
reduced to one.  
 Note that the objective function was changed from maximizing the number of 
completed transmissions to maximizing the number of priority n regions without 
meaningful connections.  In addition, recall that, as focus is only on the Defender model 
in Model 3.14, the level of degradation, x, is considered to be known. 
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Model 3.14 
The determination if at least one meaningful connection exists is completed by 
new constraint 3.14.(37), and the requirement of completing all previous optimal priority 
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settings is constraint 3.14.(38).  Note that no requirements for the higher priority node to 
always be covered have been developed, but rather to be covered optimally as the 
previous model settings allowed.  This is to reduce infeasibilities which may arise from a 
node’s connections being momentarily severed due to a malicious event.  While a node 
may not be continuously connected, the model does force it to reconnect to the network 
when possible and optimal. 
By doing this, if vn>0 for any priority excluding the last, then these alterations 
have reduced the size of the problem by all regions that the model failed to connect to 
while optimally, with respect to the priorities, connecting to all others.  With widely 
varying capacities on satellite components, it may be prudent to incorporate the 
connected capacity versus a strict connection so as to reduce the likelihood of a 
sufficiently connected region remaining under capacitated.  Formatting the problem in 
this manner, equation 3.14.(37) may be rewritten as: 
, ,s, , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, ,
 (37) x   , ,j k d j d j i d i l s d i d
k s i l s
b C Conn cap j d  
Equivalently, this change may be created by defining: 
, ,s, ,
,
, ,
, , , ,
,
Req
j k d
k s
j d
i l s d
l s
b
cap
  (EQ 3.5) 
If the transmission values reflect the priorities established through the region 
ranking, and if they follow the inherent assumption that transmissions from region n are 
greatly more important than transmission from region n+1, then this method will provide 
an optimal solution to the original objective of maximizing the cumulative value of 
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completed transmissions.  However, if the transmission values are not widely separated 
between priority settings, then this method, while providing a good network 
configuration, may not necessarily provide the optimal configuration. 
Using the resulting network configurations from the Lexicographic Goal 
Programming, one then utilizes the constraints of the Defender model that were removed.  
These constraints, which are primarily focused on the flow of the transmissions through a 
given network, are very similar to that of the Short-Term Defender Model.  This model is 
referred to hereafter as the LTI Defender model. 
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Model 3.15 
The lexicographic model contains ( ( (6 5 ) 7) 2)i d j  constraints, and the 
LTI Defender  model contains  ( (1 ) (2 ( 1) 4 ) ( 1)) 3d j s i s j l e a i  
constraints. 
 
Figure 19: Binary Land Matrix 
Figure 19 is a binary matrix such that all entries darkened sections depict either 
land or areas of water with extremely heavy usage, and all blank space is sparsely 
travelled water.  Using the previous example for comparison, and an estimated six 
priorities of equivalent size, with Figure 19 white space as the least preferred sixth 
priority, which encompasses 57.4% of the total area, Antarctica the fifth priority, which 
encompasses another 21.1% of the total area, and lowering the fidelity of regions from 
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1x1 to 2x2 grids, a reduction to 6.82 1010 constraints can be obtained.  Reducing the 
fidelity of LTI from every day to every week then results in 9.75 1009 constraints, or 975 
billion.   
As one can tell from the equation for the current example model, the number of 
constraints is linearly related to each of the parameters.  As it is relatively easy to reduce 
the size of a exceedingly large constraint than a small constraint, the majority of the focus 
should fall on i , ,  or n d .  This observation agrees with the earlier observation that the 
number of nodes in the network is insignificant in terms of number of constraints when 
compared to the terrestrial fidelity, or the time components. 
In this example, the oceans were simplified to being the lowest priority.  
However, there is no restriction on priority groupings being contiguous, which allows for 
important regions being pocketed in otherwise insignificant zones.  In this situation, if the 
path travelled is well used, then a strip may be increased in priority so as to 
accommodate.  Similarly for Antarctica, stable locations such as research facilities may 
be classified as higher priority pockets of interest.   
It is also possible to assign objects other than plots of land as terminal nodes.  For 
example, if a vessel is traversing a rarely used path, then it might be prudent to utilize a 
node that has a unique time-dependent location following the planned path of that asset.  
However, pursuing this for even moderately sized sets of nodes is ill advised as it will 
rapidly increase the size of the model.   
As the size of the model is still cumbersome, even with Lexicographic Goal 
Programming, the use of another simplification is recommended, which is the use of only 
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discrete allowable locations of placement for mobile nodes.  This will essentially restrict 
 to be integers, with corresponding constant scalars attached for higher/lower fidelity. 
Restricting the placement decision variables, decided from a move but not the 
resulting positions in orbit, to discrete locations, it is possible to utilize a multitude of 
simple and well investigated heuristics.  The heuristic chosen will reside in the same 
place in the BLP heuristic that an optimization solution would, only now optimality 
cannot be guaranteed for the Defender’s model. 
To proceed, a greedy algorithm is modified by the distance from the current 
location. Imbedded inside of this algorithm is the connection and fuel constraints from 
the Defender model, specifically 3.15.(22)-(26) and 3.15.(37), along with a new 
constraint which simply requires that the node being repositioned to satisfy a specific 
requirement actually fills that requirement. 
This heuristic, modified to account for the mobility and time dependencies of the 
network, utilizes many smaller calculations and memory storages to reduce the amount of 
memory required at any given time or used for any single model.  Step SCP.{3}, the only 
optimization model in the heuristic, utilizes 6 j  constraints.  Recall that all j in this 
model are mj I , or the regions only of the current or higher priorities.   
Steps SCP.{2} and SCP.{5.1}, while appearing large, are only minor calculations 
which pulled constraints out of the model to maintain consistency.  Step SCP.{5.2} 
utilizes the results from step SCP.{3} to prevent unnecessary recalculations of previously 
determined connections.   
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Heuristic SCP 
While SCP.{3} was focused solely on node j, meaning that initial connections 
would need to be calculated before the first run of this heuristic, though those 
connections may be accomplished trivially outside of the model, cumulating the 
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connections dependent only upon the changing node reduce the number of calculations 
and memory required by the computer.  Step SCP.{6}, while appearing as an 
optimization model, consists of only known parameters, reducing the region to be 
searched from an infinite space to a single value. 
Steps SCP.{7} and SCP.{8} allow the model to step through the various nodes 
available for repositioning, switching the focus first on each STI, and then on each LTI.  
This simple heuristic, when imbedded in the sequential inclusion of lower priorities that 
comes with the use of Lexicographic Goal Programming, provides a good solution to the 
long term model. 
While acknowledging that the greedy heuristic is often dominated by other 
methods (Capara p. 733), this type of heuristic was selected for the sole purpose of its 
simplicity and adaptability.  With the focus of this work on the development of 
methodology for measuring Resilience in satellite communication networks, the 
improvement of this time-dependent mobile network set covering heuristic is left to 
future work. 
While the model is now able to successfully reposition, and reconstitute a 
network, there is still work left to be done in the area of the Defender value model.  The 
Defender value model, which is primarily comprised by the Transmission Flow function, 
still poses a problem of having a size of 1.9*1010, even in this reduced fidelity situation.  
However, there is still a key piece of the networking operations which has yet to be 
exploited. 
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Figure 20: Time-Dependent Covering Problem Heuristic Flow Chart 
Gateways, as was discussed in Chapter II section Comparing Satellite Networks 
to Supply Networks, must be traversed for the majority of known satellite communication 
networks.  As of 1995, the only documented gateways were terrestrial based, however 
that is no longer true as gateways may exist both on Earth and in orbit aboard satellites.  
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Regardless of their position though, the basic network operating parameters hold.  The 
main function of a gateway is to permit a user to access the full network, and as a result, 
every transmission must either originate from, or be passed through a gateway. 
Since every transmission must pass through a gateway before it may be passed 
along to the destination, the gateways will now be defined as the sink nodes in the 
network, with all previous terminal nodes being source nodes.  In conjunction with this, 
every transmission which previously had a single source and a single destination will 
now be modeled as originating from the original source and destination, with the new 
destination being any gateway.  Because this change is essentially doubling 
transmissions, but reducing the transmission distance, no change need be made to the 
satellite capacities, however all transmission values must be halved.  If they were set as 
rankings, the rankings remain unaffected. 
To model this, a single node is made with unlimited capacity and complete 
demand as the sink of the network.  Furthermore, this single node will have constant, 
non-destructible connections to all gateways and only to gateways.  If all gateways are 
terrestrial based, if there are sufficiently many such that their capacity and location are 
only minor considerations, or if every orbital gateway in the network has a continuous 
connection to a terrestrial gateway or relay node, then modifications may stop here.  Note 
that only one of these three conditions need be met, and that, while a network may be 
constructed specifically to not meet any of these, many if not all of the networks operate 
within at least one of these categories. 
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Using the described alterations to the model, which preserve validity in 
transmission quantity, type and network operational behavior, following medium/long 
term model Transmission Function constraints are achieved. 
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Model 3.16 Transmissions 
The reader may note that constraints 3.15.(1.2), (6), and (7) were removed.  All 
remaining constraints were also restructured by removing the dependency on the 
origination of a transmission, which required extra effort on constraints 3.16.(3) and (4) 
so that the failed transmissions are still properly attributed to the appropriate value.  This 
new version utilizes ( (2 ) )d i s s l j s l . 
Additional insight is gained in reviewing the SCP heuristic.  In SCP.{6} of this 
heuristic, there is no direct dependency between d and , and the flow of transmissions.  
As such: 
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Model 3.17 Transmissions 
This change reduces the model size, but includes the need for * d  models, each 
of size ( (2 ) )i s s l j s l .  However, there exists a subtle change to the models 
optimization behavior precluding the substitution of Model 3.17 Transmissions in the full 
Long-Term Model.  By pulling the time components outside of the minimization as a 
summation, Model 3.17 is now attempting to optimize each time period myopically.  If 
included in the full model, such an alteration would prevent a change in the network 
which sacrificed a small amount of performance early on for a greater performance later. 
Still, Model 3.17 Transmissions is still valid and fully applicable in a situation in 
which the connections and locations are parameters and not variables, as occurs in the 
SCP heuristic.  Using the most recent example of i=90, now i=91 due to the required 
inclusion of a new sink node, s=5, l=2, j=16291, 144,  156,d this results in 22,464 
linear models, each of size 82,987 constraints.  While this may appear to be a large 
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model, because it is linear it runs fairly quickly, even on a personal computer.  If each 
linear program requires only 4 seconds to solve on a personal computer, which is a 
reasonable estimation, then the complete model will require approximately 25 hours.   
While manageable in itself, when run through the heuristic this must be solved an 
undetermined and potentially large number of times, which could require an exorbitant 
amount of time.  In the short term model, with d=1, this model only requires 72 minutes, 
just over one hour.  In the medium/long term model, the disruptive events can only occur 
in regards to the LTI, d.  This was exploited in the SCP heuristic by only analyzing the 
network at the time of the next disruptive event.  As such, a further exploitation is used to 
reduce run time.   
If this same method is utilized, then the number of LTI, d, is reduced to the 
number of distinct time periods in which degradation, repositioning, or reconstitution 
occur.  However, the same value may be retained by multiplying the cycle network value 
by the number of LTI between that event and the next network change.  For example, if 
the events occur within 6 distinct time periods and the model completes 
repositioning/reconstituting in another 12, then the time to run, under the same 
approximation of a 4 second LP duration, is 144 18 2 sec , or 2.88 hours on a personal 
computer.   
In a great many cases, considering the high costs associated with building and 
operating satellite networks, this level of time, which would be considerably less on a 
high performance computer, is certainly viable.  However, as time on high performance 
computers can be costly and results of this form of analysis could lead to changes in 
design, the Chapter IV case study will show how aggregation and small sacrifices to 
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fidelity can preserve enough memory to be accomplished on a personal computer in a 
reasonable amount of time. 
In this section, the models constructed in previous sections were improved by 
reducing the memory requirements, increasing the viability of using the models as more 
than tools for viewing a network’s operating procedures.  This was accomplished by first 
using an example to demonstrate how large the medium/long term model could become 
and why it is not always possible to solve as it was previously constructed.  After 
analyzing the constraints it was determined that, in the model’s original form, Model 
3.12, the number of components in the network were insignificant in regards to memory 
consumption, and that the true problem laid with the ground fidelity and the time 
dependencies.  This led to the decomposing of the model into its many functions, which 
showed how the Transmission Function was the true obstacle in the constraints.    
After remodeling the Transmission Function constraints to reduce memory 
consumption and the number of constraints, Lexicographic Goal Programming was then 
pursued to prioritize regions/nodes and drastically reduce the scope of the problem and 
provide a more manageable model to be solved.  Finally, the simplest known heuristic 
type, a greedy heuristic, was used to reduce the amount of memory required by an 
optimization model at the cost of increasing time through multiple out-of-model 
calculations.  This, in effect, provides a suite of modeling options which offer a trade off 
of fidelity versus computational speed. 
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Heuristic H-1 
 
In this section, the heuristic developed by Lim and Smith is adapted in order to 
account for monotonically continuous non-linear functions by including aspects of Ant 
Colony Optimization.  The reader may notice that a large portion of the heuristic comes 
from the Attacker model while the Defender model acts as a calculation stage to be 
optimized repeatedly. 
Recall from the Chapter II section Solving Bi-Level Programs, the heuristic 
developed by Lim and Smith for solving continuous linear BLP is:  
 
In addition, recall that Ant Colony Optimization effectively operates in a shortest-
path-problem by adjusting the probability that an edge is chosen based upon the value of 
the solutions achieved by selecting the edge in preceding iterations.  However, there is 
also a fading function to reduce the likelihood of premature convergence.   
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The essence of a shortest-path problem is choosing the set of edges which will 
connect two nodes with the shortest possible distance/time/cost, etc.  In Salmeron et al.’s 
model, the Attacker is selecting the set of nodes which will reduce their resource pool to 
zero with the greatest possible degradation objective.  This simple comparison is because 
of Salmeron et al.’s use of discrete binary degradation levels.   
The initial step to the heuristic follows directly from Lim and Smith’s heuristic, 
which is to first approximate the impact that each node in the network has on the 
objective function.  To do this, the heuristic initializes with calculating the defender 
model at various states, and considers each time interval, d, as a separate network.  The 
first state is fully operational, in which all applicable nodes are operating as if there is no 
negative event.  Following that, each node in the network is “turned off”, and only one 
node is eliminated for any given run.  This will provide an initial preference set that may 
be used to increase the efficiency of the heuristic by essentially aiming it at the most 
valuable nodes. 
For the initial preferences, given node i, and attacker objective value vi, the 
probability of a node being interdicted is denoted as follows: 
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  (EQ 3.6) 
where pi,d is the conditional probability of node i being interdicted given the incident will 
happen in time-step d, and i=0 is the baseline operating state where no nodes are 
degraded. 
Next, Lim and Smith’s heuristic for solving continuous linear BLP is adapted.  
Their heuristic, in essence, is to use the remaining budget at each round and apply it to 
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the node which requires the minimum budget to eliminate and improves the attacker’s 
solution.  To proceed, a random number draw is utilized to select which nodes to degrade 
based upon the derived probabilities. 
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(EQ 3.7) 
Note that EQ 3.7 fully interdicts a set of nodes, and then uses the remaining 
budget to partially interdict a final node.  This is the same method used by Lim and 
Smith, though altered such that less concern is placed on the resources required and more 
for the impact of the node.  This method still permits little freedom in regards to time 
though.   
To allow for this, one must first determine the period of time that a node is 
degraded, and thus non-targetable, based upon the intensity of the previous incident.  
Since this structure has already been developed in the Attacker-Defender model, given by 
constraints 3.12.[5], [6] and [7]: 
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one may use the same method in restricting the heuristic. 
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For a given time interval, d, pi,d=0 if , , | |i a d
a
A where |A| is the number of 
attack types, a.  This equation restricts a node from being targeted if all attack types have 
been used on the node thus far.  However, the model has yet to prevent the same attack 
type to be used repeatedly during a degraded state.  To do this, simply make the use of an 
attack type an inclusion criteria in selecting which node to degrade.  This is done by only 
selecting those nodes who have an attack method usage variable, , , 0i a d . 
Next, one must establish the terminating conditions for the initial search.  The 
termination condition is the occurrence of results within some value epsilon of the current 
best result found by the heuristic for a set number of iterations, m.  The following 
heuristic, which is referred to henceforth as Heuristic-1 (H1), is: 
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Heuristic-1 (H1) 
Though this method looks much larger than Lim and Smith’s heuristic, the 
increased size comes primarily from accounting for the multiple time steps, the inclusion 
of probability ranges based upon objective value, the more fully expanded steps, and the 
logical requirements which more precisely choose the best option among otherwise 
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equivalent attack types.  Note that the termination criterion is experiencing a change of 
less than more than m times, regardless of if the heuristic is improving or not.  At the 
point of termination, the choice exists to either reset and begin again, or to press on.  This 
decision is left to the analyst measuring resilience. 
Step 18 in H1 is the equation which determines the probabilities for the nodes in 
the next iteration.  It is broken first into two distinct pieces, which is the current 
probability and the probability gained from the most recent iteration.  In this second half, 
the gain in probability is determined through two criteria.  The first is how much value a 
particular node moved at each time step.  The second piece, however, is the opposite, 
instead providing higher probability to degraded nodes based upon how much value 
failed to even enter the network.  Either piece alone would likely lead to a premature 
convergence, either by targeting only transit nodes, or by targeting only those nodes 
degraded previously.  Together, they permit the model to locate a synergy between 
supply and transit nodes. 
Finally H1 step 19 performs a small local search around previous run iterations.  
It selects the combination which showed the greatest drop in resilience per unit time and 
cost, and then searches around that point for improvements by removing extraneous 
degradations.  In this manner, the heuristic is able to pull the Attacker-Defender model 
from overwhelming a small time span in exchange for continuous degradation, but at a 
lower level. 
Heuristic H1 is displayed in flow chart form in Appendix A.  In the flow chart, a 
rectangle refers to a process, an oval to the checking of a logical variable, and a circle 
with a single letter inside is used to bridge the flows over page breaks. 
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Note that, in H1, the majority of the complexities arise from step 9, which is the 
large equation driving the selection of nodes.  It has been broken down as such to better 
show how it may be implemented in a computer program which is unable to understand 
the compressed equation form.  Steps requiring multiple blocks have been grouped using 
a dotted box line. 
In this section, the base operating concepts of Ant Colony Optimization were 
utilized to adapt Lim and Smith’s heuristic for continuous linear bi-level programs to a 
monotonically nonlinear situation.   
Methodology for Output Analysis 
In the preceding sections, the methodology for measuring time-dependent 
network performance using multiple measures, and over varying time intervals was 
developed.  In this section, the resulting output is explained along with the process for 
developing it.  It is in this section that the suggested single-value measure for resilience is 
presented, as well as time-dependent network performance chart. 
The previous section concluded with a heuristic locating one or more degradation 
and network reaction plans.  As a consequence of these results, two measures can be 
attained, value weighted percent of blocked calls, the Defender model objective value, 
and value weighted percent of remaining capacity, model constraint 3.12.(11).   
The first step is to determine what value excess capacity provides, as well as what 
value a blocked transmission loses.  Because values were placed on the individual 
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components in the model, what remains is to do is the combining of the ending measures 
that the model returned.  As such a weight function may be applied.  However, the 
function must be piece-wise continuous and either non-decreasing or non-increasing. 
The combined value of these measures, percent blocked transmissions and percent 
excess capacity, is the resilience measure.  Note that there will actually be two values, the 
resilience of the network in regards to a short term event and a long term event.  Both 
measures are the time-dependent performance of the network under an extreme event, 
and both provide equally important information, though to slightly different questions. 
However, both results provide an answer to resilience in the face of extreme event 
network degradation.  A time-dependent network performance was also utilized because, 
based upon the definition of resilience, a network may be more resilient if it can resist an 
event which many models including ours examine, but also if it can be repaired quickly, 
or can quickly adapt to operating within the new state, which relatively few models have 
captured thus far.  Furthermore, the inherent defenses, as well as the active defenses, that 
a network may incorporate to lessen the impact of an event, if not prevent it altogether, 
were included so that their effectiveness to an extreme event could be gauged. 
This time-dependent network performance under extreme event degradation 
captures the ability of the network to resist, adapt, absorb, respond to, and recover from 
an unlikely, yet possible occurrence.  The attentive reader may notice that the model 
failed to properly address the “anticipate” portion of the definition.  Unfortunately that is 
something that is currently outside the capabilities of the presented deterministic model, 
but which may be included later with future work. 
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While single value measures are useful, there is also a great deal of data within 
the model that may aid a decision maker.  Two vastly different networks may experience 
an equivalent measure of resilience, though they may achieve this measure in very 
different ways.  For example, a fragile network which can recover rapidly can be as 
resilient as a hardened network which takes a long period of time to recover. 
To determine how a network is degraded and how it recovers, it is recommended 
the analyst utilize the variables xi,d, and vd and Excess_Valued, which combine into the 
measure of Network Performance.  By plotting each of these variables over time, the 
analyst may see what aspect of their network struggled, as well as what aspect may have 
save them.   
 
  Figure 21: Example Slow Recovery High Robustness 
For example, if a network began with a high Network Performance, but that value 
degraded over a long time period, and xi,d took a long time to recover, then the network is 
resilient because of an aspect such as its massive size, or capacity, but may become more 
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resilient if its ability to recover is improved.  Figure 16 displays a notional chart of 
network performance over time in such a situation when repair/replacement time is long. 
 
Figure 22: Example Rapid Recovery Low Robustness 
If the network experiences frequent changes in Network Performance, and those 
changes show a high correlation to changes in xi,d, then the network is resilient because of 
its ability to recover, and may become more resilient by increasing its initial capacity or 
hardening against some form of attack.  Figure 22 shows an example of network 
performance over time when a node experiences frequent degradations, but quickly 
recovers.  Note that while Figure 21 and Figure 22 examples behave very differently, 
both exhibit the same average resilience measure of approximately 0.709 over the 
bounded time period. 
Both situations may warrant a greater emphasis on defensive measures, though 
more in depth analysis into the changes of Network Performance as a result of expended 
Attacker resources would be required to make such a determination.  Finally, if a node i 
rarely or never experiences degradation, then it may imply that the node is either 
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extremely well protected, superfluous, experiences a recovery time that precludes the 
resources expended to degrade it, or a combination of the three.  Again, further efforts 
and sensitivity analysis would need to be conducted before a conclusion as to which 
situation is true.  
In this section, the resilience measure is defined as the time-dependent network 
performance under an extreme event, keeping the short term and long term measures 
separate as they provide very different information as to the behavior of the network 
under different scenarios.  The utilization of the measure of network performance and the 
degradation variables from the model were shown as a method for drawing basic 
conclusions about the network’s behavior under a degrading event.  
In this chapter, a bi-level Attacker-Defender model was formulated to capture the 
options and constraints available to the network operator and the degrader.  Once 
formulated, this model was adjusted to allow for reduced memory consumption.  
Heuristics were then employed to reduce the bi-level program to an algorithm containing 
a linear program.  Finally, the methodology for analyzing the outputs from the main 
heuristic, H-1, were presented with example graphs.  This approach offers the user a suite 
of model options with varying fidelity and precision at varying computational 
requirements. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
 
In this chapter, a notional satellite communication network of GEO satellites and 
terrestrial nodes is utilized as a case study.  Using the results of that case study and its 
variations, analysis is conducted on the behavior of the network performance over time to 
determine the approach proposed in this thesis.  By doing so, insights may be gained as to 
the changes one could expected in the network performance based upon a change to the 
network.  After the case study has been completed, the performance of the model and 
heuristic during those variations is analyzed. 
Case Study 
A notional satellite communication network constructed of GEO satellites and 
terrestrial nodes serves as the basis for a case study.  The base configuration and various 
values of the GEO satellite communications network is fully laid out in Appendix B.  The 
notional network consists of six GEO satellites, and nine terrestrial nodes which may 
communicate within, but not across, continents, and two sink nodes, both of which are 
terrestrial.   
Primary variations affect the number of nodes in the network, as well as values 
such as recovery time, attacker resources, and initial nodal placement.  These variations 
are run systematically, their network performance charts and degradation levels presented 
170
in the following section and as well as the variation data tables that may be found in 
Appendix B.1.   
Secondary variations are performed on the base settings, and involve including 
more unique changes to the network, such as the inclusion of a satellite gateway or the 
use of active defenses.  Results are fully displayed in Appendix B.2; a selection of those 
results are displayed in the following section. 
The case study COMSAT network operates six GEO satellites, all positioned 
evenly around the equator at an altitude of 35,786 km.  Each of these satellites may 
operate only as a relay in the base scenario, however that is altered in one of the 
secondary variations.   
Most equatorially based geosynchronous satellites can communicate with 
locations as far north or south as 75 degrees (Geo-orbit p. 1).  The resulting radius is 
10,348 km, which is equivalent to a footprint of 336,395,288 km2.  Secondly, a maximum 
inter-satellite link range of 90,000km is permitted, which is approximately one third of 
the total GEO orbital circumference.  
Since this resilience measure is intended for use as a key criterion in selecting a 
new satellite architecture, the use of a high performance computer is not unreasonable at 
an operational level during a design stage.  However, a base level analysis, with a 
reduction in fidelity, can still be performed on a personal computer while continuing to 
provide valuable insight. 
To attain the memory and time reduction required to implement this model on a 
personal computer in a reasonable amount of time, preprocessing aggregation of 
transmissions is conducted.  By distributing the transmissions of many regions to their 
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connected network nodes, the cumbersome effect generated by the granularity of the 
terrestrial partitioning is effectively eliminated.  However, the shortcoming of doing this 
is that the high fidelity of associating the exact regional transmission value is lost.   
To compensate, the costs of the transmissions being preprocessed to a satellite are 
averaged to arrive at a new cost-per-transmission.  For example, assume the analyst is 
presented with a situation in which six regions, {A, B, C, D, E, F}, and their associated 
transmission values, vi, and number of transmissions, ni, are connected to a single 
satellite.  Then the value of transmissions originating from that satellite, v’, in the 
aggregated model is defined as: 
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 (EQ 4.1) 
When a region is connected to multiple satellites, the transmissions are divided 
evenly across all connected satellites.  This method may be substituted to filling satellite 
capacity with high value regions first and working down, however this may leave some 
regions transmitting to satellites with no remaining capacity while other satellites have 
excess.   
To compute the distance traversed, both for transmission linkages as well as nodal 
movement, the Haversine Formula for great circle distances is used (Miller p. 134): 
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i ir
           (EQ 4.2) 
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The Haversine formula has known problems with rounding errors with extremely small 
distances or as the two points approach opposite ends of the sphere.  However, this may 
be alleviated in the model by preventing the satellites from approaching those two 
conditions.  To do this, set a minimum distance a satellite may be repositioned, minposi, 
and a max, maxposi.  In this formulation, r is the radius of the nodes from the center of 
the sphere, or in this case, the center of the Earth. 
The distance to determine connections, disti,j, , is calculated using two methods.  
First, if the two nodes are satellites, not necessarily of the same altitude, then use: 
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 (EQ 4.3) 
where Hi,j is the Haversine distance between two nodes of the same radius, r1 is the radius 
of satellite i, and r2 is the radius of satellite j.  As a note towards wording, altitude denotes 
the distance from the surface of the Earth, and radius denotes the distance from the center 
of the Earth.  For simplification, if the satellites are at approximately the same altitude, 
then the Haversine Formula alone may suffice. 
Along with the six homogenous GEO satellites, nine terrestrial locations are 
included.  Seven of these locations act solely as relay points, while the other two are the 
gateways through which all transmissions must flow.  The terrestrial locations may 
communicate with satellites in range; however they may only communicate directly with 
another terrestrial location if both sites are on the same continent.  This is simply an 
assumption of the case study which encourages use of the satellite network by reducing 
intercontinental transmissions via another method, and may be altered to suit the 
network’s operational abilities. 
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For simplicity, it is assumed in this case study that the cost to attack and time to 
repair all terrestrial nodes is the same.  In the base scenario, the cost to fully destroy a 
terrestrial node is $1.41M, and the time to rebuild after destruction is 42 days, or 6 weeks.  
All terrestrial relays will follow degradation function D=x5 where I is the percent of 
permanent destruction resources used.  Meanwhile all gateways will follow degradation 
function D=(1/3) (5 x2-2 x5).  All terrestrial nodes will follow a linear repair function. 
The GEOs in this notional scenario require an estimated $180M to be fully 
destroyed, and will follow degradation function D=3 (x)2-2 (x)3 which simulates an 
early high return on even a small allocation of resources towards degradation.  Unlike 
terrestrial nodes, GEOs always require the full time to recover, which is assumed to be 26 
weeks in this notional case study.  Note that this six month period is likely an 
underestimation of the time required.  The different degradation and repair functions 
were utilized to demonstrate that the nodes may be degraded in a variety of ways, and 
that those degradations may be modeled via a mathematical function.   
Each variation of this baseline case study is processed in the long term for a 
duration of three years, the short term for one week, and is placed against three 
magnitudes of attacks.  The smallest attack has a resource capacity of $1.44B, with the 
medium set at $2.16B and the largest set at $2.88B.  These values were derived from a 
run with three GEO satellites with the smallest resource capacity being the minimal 
approximated adversity level required to reduce that scenario measure to 0 Resilience.   
To reduce the size and runtime of the model, the time-dependent transmissions 
are averaged to a single time-independent set, and their value determined by the location 
from which they originate.  Furthermore, the defender’s value model will only be run 
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each time a change occurs in the network, such as a new degradation, repair, or 
repositioning. 
In this notional example, gateways, which are acting as the sink nodes are not 
targetable.  When permitted as targetable, and even bolstering the cost of eliminating 
them to equivalent with GEOs, the model, as constrained, always strikes them.   
This is because with only two gateways, the cost to the Attacker to reduce flow 
within the network is extremely small, making any other targets, be they terrestrial or 
orbital, less desirable targets.  Therefore, it is clear that the first step to improving any 
satellite network is to increase the number of gateways, or nodes which may act as 
gateways, and for their defense.  This could, however, present other security and 
operational difficulties that need to be considered. 
If the network is one in which many structures exist which were not required to 
access a gateway to proceed, such as is the case when the source or destination of a 
transmission may act as gateways as well or are permitted to bypass that restriction, then 
making the sinks in the network non-targetable is a valid alteration.  This alteration is a 
valid approximation because transmissions are still flowing around the network, but are 
required to pass through a set of nodes that must always exist.  As always, special and 
rare situations may be constructed which would call into question the validity of the 
method after alteration. 
In such an uncommon scenario, other adaptations to the heuristic may be made, 
or the original model, Model 3.12, still remains valid and may be optimized as is.  Both 
methods are valid, though the memory requirements for both are vast, and are 
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recommended only in extremely high cost situations.  As it happens, constructing satellite 
networks is often an extremely high cost endeavor. 
The majority of the focus on the case study is on processing the long-term 
model.  Due to time and resource restrictions, the array of options available to short term 
degradations is not coded.  Instead, both time periods will rely on physical events in the 
case study.  However, the model and heuristic constructed in Chapter III are capable of 
operating under a conglomerate of options. 
The node HQ (Bethesda, MD), which may act only as a terrestrial relay, was also 
labeled as a non-targetable node.  This was done to exemplify that some nodes may be of 
such importance that the network operator will have taken sufficient steps to assure that 
the site would be extremely difficult to eliminate.  This was the only non-gateway node 
permitted this “perfect defense”. 
Table 2 shows the major baseline parameters.  Table 3 lists the aspect of the 
model to be altered, as well as the corresponding name associated with each variation.  In 
Table 3, “Satellites Redistributed” denotes that the remaining satellites in the network 
were repositioned at equivalent intervals around the equator with at least one satellite 
positioned at 0o Longitude.  This position being filled is simply part of the case study and 
is in no way a requirement of the model, as seen in variation Shifted, which has no 
satellites positioned at 0o Longitude.  In this notional model, it is assumed that the orbital 
positions of each satellite has receives the necessary approvals. 
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Another point of interest is how the values of the transmissions are set.  As the 
model is running on a basis of Lexicographic Goal Programming, it is important to know 
where the priorities are in order to assign the transmissions from those locations 
appropriate values. 
Figure 23:  Location Transmission Priority 
Figure 23 shows the priority of transmissions originating from the surface.  In this 
notional case study, the greatest value is placed on those areas colored purple.  Two or 
more separate and geographically diverse locations were used in most of the priority 
levels to demonstrate that the priorities need not be continuous.   
Another variation of interest is the inclusion of Active Defense nodes in the 
network.  Active Defense nodes are stations which may be used to protect other nodes 
and prevent degradation.  While they are operational and ready for use, an attack made by 
the Attacker which the active defense is prepared to defend would be rendered inert, 
though resources are consumed.  As a result of using one of these nodes, a “reload” time 
is incurred, leaving the nearby nodes vulnerable for the duration.  The Attacker has 
perfect knowledge of these sites, but still may pursue to strike protected nodes. 
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The inclusion of Active Defense nodes is processed as a secondary variation, and 
as such, is only processed against the Attacker budget of $2.16B resources, and only with 
the original baseline case study parameters.  This variation utilizes three Active Defense 
nodes spread relatively evenly around the world.  In this notional case, the nodes are 
located in Australia, Djibouti, and Montana. 
Case Study Output Analysis 
 
The previous section presented the case study and its variations, establishing a 
base to perform the demonstrative resilience analysis.  In this section, the outputs from 
the baseline case study and variations are presented and analyzed. 
The baseline GEO SATCOM network consisted of six satellites, seven terrestrial 
relays, and two terrestrial gateways, which acted as the sink nodes.  Recall from Chapter 
III that the output from the model would consist of a single value, which was the average 
network performance for the duration of the model, but that the graph of that network 
performance over time could be of equal or greater importance than the final number. 
Figure 24 shows the resilience with the baseline case study parameters as well as 
the four primary variations made to the case study.  The values graphed in Figure 24 are 
the single values under a long term model, with the vertical axis displaying the resilience 
measure, and the horizontal axis showing the change in attacker resource capacity, 
presented in millions of dollars. 
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As expected, the level of resilience drops in response to the increased level of 
adversity.  This shows the inescapable nature of a resilience measure based upon 
extreme-event or worst-case.  When utilizing a method such as this, the probability of 
events is eliminated, allowing exposure of events that may rarely, if ever, occur.  As such, 
this resilience measure, like other measures developed in a similar fashion, is dependent 
upon the scenario, which in this case is represented by the level of resources the attacker 
may implement.  It is for this reason that a spread of adversity magnitudes is utilized in 
this case study, and recommended for use in future analysis of this type. 
 
Figure 24: Resilience of Case Study and Primary Variations 
Along with the drop of resilience in response to increased adversity, another trend 
can be seen, that of diminishing returns on the part of the attacker.  Though the increase 
of resources is the same, the decrease in resilience from $2.16B-$2.88B is less than 
$1.44B-$2.16B.   
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These diminishing returns are expected as eliminating a smaller set of scattered 
transmissions is more difficult than eliminating the large dense pockets.  Knowing this, 
the variations Reduced 4, Baseline 6, and Increased 8 may be viewed together.  Recall the 
varied parameters and names of the variations are outlined in Table 6. 
Having the greatest difference in the change of resilience, Reduced 4 goes from a 
0.24 drop to a 0.04 drop in resilience.  This is because the scenario exaggerates the 
situation with high value targets being eliminated, having relatively few high value 
targets to destroy thereafter.  With the increase to $2.16B, the high value assets remain 
mostly destroyed for the duration of the model.  Increasing the resources further to 
$2.88B allows the model to strike at the significantly lower value assets, further 
decreasing resilience. 
Figure 26 displays the time-dependent network performance of variation Reduced 
4 under each of the three resource capacities.  The legend for this resilience overlay, as 
well as all that follow, is shown in Figure 25.   
As predicted from the Resilience chart in Figure 24, the majority of the network 
performance was already eliminated in 2160, leaving very little to be eliminated in 2880.  
Moreover, it is clear that the degradations were carried out for the entirety of the time 
period. For reference, all Network Performance charts (such as Figure 26) begin with a 
two period warm-up of no degradation.  This is so that, in a scenario such as Reduced 4, 
one can determine if the network performance is low because of degradation or if the 
network experienced imperfect network performance even before degradation.  This two-
step warm-up is not utilized in the resilience measure calculations though. 
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Figure 25: Attacker Budget ($M) 
 
Figure 26: Reduced 4 Resilience Overlay 
Increased 8 has the theoretical lowest drop, with no change in the drop of 
resilience from 1440-2160 to 2160-2880.  This suggests that at the first two initial levels, 
and possibly the third, the model was still using all of its resources to eliminate the high 
value nodes in the notional communications network. 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97 10
3
10
9
11
5
12
1
12
7
13
3
13
9
14
5
15
1
15
7
N
et
w
or
k
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
Week
Reduced 4 Resilience Overlay
182
 
Figure 27: Increased 8 Resilience Overlay 
To examine if this is the case, Figure 27 is presented.  In Figure 27, it is clear that 
the model is degrading one or more nodes because of the sharp drop in performance.  
However, because of the large cost to degrade a GEO satellite, and the inherent 
construction of the network which, more often than not, places a GEO as a high value 
target, the attacker has insufficient resources to keep the degradation for the duration seen 
in the Reduced 4 scenario with the notional repair time.   
For comparison, it is valuable to also view the connections occurring before and 
after a degradation, to inspect the topological effects of an event.  The before and after 
coverage for Increased 8 are shown in Figure 28 and Figure 29 respectively.  A green 
circle represents an active node while a red circle represents a destroyed node.  The 
remaining colors follow the same legend as used in Figure 18, though simply put follow a 
basic stoplight chart. 
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Figure 28:  Pre-Event Coverage 
 
Figure 29:  Post Event Coverage 
Using these two maps, further insight is gained about the network.  The first thing 
one might notice is the green dot located north of Europe.  This point represents a 
terrestrial location, and is clearly outside of the reach of any other point in the network.  
A review of parameters may remove that node, or may find that it was incorrectly placed.  
In this case, the former is true.   
Another insight gained from these two maps is the manner in which the 
“Attacker” behaves.  Even with eight GEO satellites, each of which is very costly to 
remove, the model has selected the four nodes best suited to cover northern Africa and 
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western Asia, which include the largest plot of land associated with Priority 1 as well as 
roughly half of Priority 2.  While the model is going after high-value areas, it is focusing 
on the nodes directly serving demand.  The question may be asked if it would be better to 
eliminate the nodes servicing the gateways instead. 
In Figure 28, this notion is addressed by the coverage of the gateway in Hawaii, 
which also is in range of four GEO satellites.  The second gateway, located in Arizona, is 
serviced by three of those four, and so removing those GEO satellites appears to be a 
promising strategy.  However, intra-continental terrestrial connections were permitted.   
This information, coupled with the terrestrial nodes in Virginia and Maryland 
being covered by another satellite, which serves neither of the gateways, striking the 
relays or downlink nodes would require the striking of minimum five satellites to achieve 
equivalent or greater degradation within a single time epoch.  Even if the Maryland node 
was not assumed indestructible in the example, the cost would still require destroying two 
additional terrestrial nodes, and keeping them destroyed for the duration. 
Doing so, the model could achieve a greater raw impact, however the cost of 
doing so is prohibitive.  Instead, the model selected four GEOs which provided a greater 
reduction per dollar expended for this notional data set. 
Baseline 6 and its Shifted variation fall in the middle of this change in resilience 
drops.  Losing 0.28 and then 0.16 for the increase of $1.44B to $2.16B and $2.16B to 
$2.88B attacker resources respectively, both are able to remove a material amount of the 
high value network assets and move on to lower valued assets; however, the trend 
suggests that there was still room for improvement event at the $2.88B level.  
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Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the Baseline 6 and Shifted network performance 
over time respectively.  Analyzing any one of them independently shows something 
slightly different than what was predicted from the resilience measures alone.  Based on 
those measures and trends seen in Figure 24: Resilience of Case Study and Primary 
Variations Figure 24, it was thought that the high value assets may have been degraded 
already and that the model had moved onto some lesser nodes.  However, as can be seen 
in the specified figures, this is not the case.   
Instead, there exist time steps in which high value nodes may continue to be 
degraded.  The most enlightening portion of this graph to a first time viewer is the change 
that occurs in $1.44B at approximately time step 55.  Before that jump, more than 90% of 
the network performance is eliminated, and yet afterwards less than one quarter is.  To 
examine why, the degradations are inspected.  
In Baseline 6, three GEOs, those located at -60o, 0o, and 60o latitude, are fully 
degraded from timestep 1 and until timestep  54.  At timestep 55, the -60o GEO is 
reactivated and remains so, leaving the other two degraded until timestep 82.  In Shifted, 
a similar event occurs, only now with GEOs shifted +30o latitude.  This change aligns 
with the jumps in network performance seen in Figure 30 and Figure 31 respectively. 
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Figure 30: Baseline 6 Resilience Overlay 
 
Figure 31: Shifted Resilience Overlay 
If the effects of degradation were simply additive, then one might expect the time 
period spanning from 55-82 to have a more significant loss of performance as two nodes 
remain destroyed.  Especially when compared to the time period preceding this when 
only one more was destroyed. 
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However, this is a common phenomenon in networks known as synergy.  From 
the point of view of the defender, keeping any one of the three GEO satellites operational 
provides a safety net in case of unseen events.  The attacker may attack any one, leaving 
two to fill the gap and maintaining roughly 0.95 of the network performance.  Given the 
resources to eliminate two nodes, the network value plummets to 0.78.  After eliminating 
three, this drops even further to 0.06.   
This synergy is exemplified in the variation Repair, whose network performance 
over time is shown in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32: Repair Resilience Overlay 
In the variation, Repair, the time to repair the nodes was cut in half, all else 
remaining equivalent to Baseline 6.  Intuitively, one might believe that the degradations 
would simply be left shifted, the resilience doubled.  However, it can be seen that the 
model and heuristic focused on drawing out the triplet of degraded nodes for as long as 
possible. 
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Viewing the Repair variation resource capacities of 1440 and 2880 together, four 
distinct plateaus are seen.  The lowest occurs in the majority of the scenarios involving 
six GEOs, and occurs when three are simultaneously eliminated.  The second lowest was 
seen in Baseline 6 and Shifted, and occurs when only two are eliminated.  The third 
lowest only occurs in Repair when a single GEO is destroyed, and the fourth is the ever 
present baseline that the network restores itself to.  The levels are shown in Table 8. 
GEOs Simultaneously Eliminated Resulting Network Performance 
0 1 
1 0.956 
2 0.780 
3 0.065 
Table 8:  Repair Variation Network Performance Under Adversity 
From 0.045, to 0.176, to 0.715, the change in loss of performance is clearly not 
linear.  The synergistic effects can be best seen in expanding the number of 
simultaneously degraded nodes.  However, notice that the Attacker never pushed beyond 
degrading three nodes in the baseline case study.  Synergy is common in many 
distribution networks.  The fact that the model was able to locate and exploit this effect 
increases the validity of the method. 
As the heuristic tested degradation combinations, it was common for the model to 
strike six or seven nodes simultaneously.  In the best case though, the one which provided 
the most degradation over the model duration, the Attacker stopped at three nodes.  This 
is because of diminishing returns of the resilience measure as previously discussed and 
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the time-dependent nature the model is allowed to pursue.  Were the model only 
permitted to strike once, then there would be no reason to consider the efficiency of the 
strike and it may have continued pursuing a full assault on the network.  Instead, it was 
better to only degrade up to the maximal return vs cost, and then save the remaining 
resources until the next time the node or nodes were activated again. 
The Figure 32 shows the state of the Repair network under these three plateaus, 
beginning with the greatest loss of performance. 
The inclusion of Active Defense nodes is also a point of interest for many 
network operators.  As the reader will recall, these special nodes may be used to protect 
other network components, but at the cost of a reload time, during which those 
components are once again vulnerable. 
This secondary variation on the case study resulted in a resilience of 0.52.  Recall 
that the same network against the same level of adversity without these Active Defense 
nodes had a resilience of 0.36 (see Figure 24).  Including Active Defense increased the 
resilience of the notional network by 45%. 
To view how Active Defenses influenced the Attacker, consider Figure 34.  
Originally, the attacker could keep the network at a degraded level of performance for 
108 weeks (see Figure 30).  However, because the Attacker needed to force the Active 
Defenses to fire before taking advantage of the short window of vulnerability, this 
degradation could only be continued for 82 weeks.   
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Figure 33:  Degradation Progression of Repair 1440 
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Figure 34:  Active Defense vs. $2.16B 
Therefore, for the case of the pure geosynchronous satellite communications 
network used in this example, the inclusion of Active Defenses did increase resilience.  In 
this case study, and with only three such nodes, the increase was material.   
For a numeric comparison of resilience measures, the same assumption of one 
single strike which Salmeron et al. made in their “long term models” is utilized against 
the Baseline case in the study.  In this situation, with all else equivalent, the model is 
capable of eliminating all attackable nodes, reducing the network performance to nearly 
0.  However, the terrestrial nodes are rebuilt after six time steps and the GEOs in 36 time 
steps. 
In this situation, the attacker required only $1089.87M to eliminate the network, 
but it is not capable of utilizing the remaining funds.  The resulting network performance 
chart appears in Figure 35.  The resulting resilience measure is an impressive 0.822.   
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While this number may encourage a network operator, the reader is reminded that 
the Attacker is seeking to minimize the network performance.  Comparing models when 
that with the Single-Event assumption is incapable of effectively utilizing the full 
resources may not be a fair match though, so a test is run with $1090M.  The results of 
the baseline case study without the single-attack assumption are shown alone in Figure 
36, and alongside in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 35: Single Attack Network Performance Over Time 
 
Figure 36: Baseline 6 Against $1090M Attacker
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Figure 37: Comparison of Models 
From the start of the model and until the GEO nodes are first able to be rebuilt 
and operational at time step 28, Multiple Attacks performs worse Single Attack at a 
comparison of 0.06-0.00.  For the next 28 time steps, when the Single Attack model 
shows the network fully operational once more, the comparison changes to 0.06-1.  After 
time step 55, they are equivalent.   
While higher network performance is desirable, attaining such a value due to 
inadequacies in the model is not desirable.  The purpose of the model is to degrade the 
network performance as far as possible.  Thus a lower, feasible value, with no change to 
the system, is preferable and more accurate.  With a simplifying Single Event 
assumption, the model is incapable of locating a much more significant impact, thereby 
inflating the resilience measure. 
Already it can be seen that repetitive strikes, even under equivalent conditions, 
may prove to be more troublesome than a one-hit attack.  To determine how much more 
troublesome, the resilience under each condition is calculated.  Recall that the 
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assumptions made by the model developed by Salmeron et al. model would have reported 
a resilience of 0.822 under the measure used here (Salmeron).  Instead, the true resilience 
is closer to 0.684, and could be even lower than that.  This is an improvement of model 
performance, and by extension accuracy of the calculated resilience measure to that 
proposed, of at least 77.5%.   
To calculate the improvement, the simplest way is to calculate the percent 
difference in the calculated measure and the actual measure.  Because of the simplifying 
assumption of only physical attacks, as well as the removal of network reliability from 
the modeled measure, the true resilience is expected to be lower than that calculated.  The 
lowest the resilience can be is 0.  Thus, the lowest possible increase in accuracy is: 
1 'Accuracy Improvement = 100%
1
R
R
  (EQ 4.4) 
In EQ 4.4, R is the model with the simplifying Single Event assumption and R’ is the 
resilience of the model without the simplifying assumption. 
Due to the restrictions placed on the case study short term attacks, the only 
method available to the Attacker model was the use of physical degradation.  With 
relatively large resources, it would be expected that the model would strike the 
synergistic nodes, and then continue with the remaining nodes, either locating lesser 
combinations, or single high value assets. 
This effect was seen on the short term model runs, which were conducted on the 
baseline case study.  The highest level of adversity was set to $800M  Against this level 
of adversity, the resulting resilience measure was 0.0589.  Note that this is only a drop of 
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0.0061 compared to when only the three best nodes are degraded, exemplifying the 
diminishing returns the Attacker must cope with. 
The next short term attacker level run was $500M.  This value is low enough to 
preclude a full degradation of the desired triplet, but high enough that it may still pursue a 
two GEO combination and either partially degrade another, or select terrestrial nodes 
instead.  Another option theoretically available is to partially interdict each node of the 
triplet, however the heuristic developed by Lim and Smith forces the full degradation of 
the preferred nodes first and utilizes the remainder to partially interdict the last. 
With $500M resources, the best combination the model was able to locate was to 
fully degrade GEOSATs 3 and 4, which were two of the triplet, refer to Table 2 for 
locations.  For the partial degradation, the node selected was GEOSAT 6, which was not 
part of the commonly hit triplet.  This plan resulted in a short term resilience of 0.448.  
To determine if GEOSAT 6 was a throwaway node or actually of value, the reader is 
referred to Table 8, in which the best 2-node resilience of 0.78 is listed.  This means that 
even partially degrading GEOSAT 6 provides an additional 0.34 impact when used in 
junction with GEOSATs 3 and 4.   
Because these models were run with physical degradations and at the short term 
level on a GEO network, there is no need for a network performance chart as it is a single 
plateau, making it equivalent to the resilience measure.  However, in a network with 
time-dependent locations or transmissions over the course of a single cycle, this chart 
may still show multiple plateaus and valleys and provide valuable insight. 
In this section, the output from the case study and its variations were analyzed.  
The results showed a 77.5% in attacker performance due to recurring attacks over the 
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same method under previous works’ assumption of single event.  Moreover, the Attacker 
was capable of exploiting synergistic degradations, both in the long term and short term 
models, increasing the validity of utilizing a modified heuristic based upon Lim and 
Smith’s. 
 
Analyzing Costs 
 
In this section, the costs associated with the results of the Case Study and its 
variations are analyzed. 
One major parameter which was not altered in this study was that of the resources 
required to degrade or destroy nodes.  Recall from Table 7 that the cost of destroying a 
GEO satellite is set at $180M.  This value is constructed primarily from the cost required 
to launch a satellite into GEO orbit.   
… the Atlas 5 and Delta 4's potential, with the launchers selling 
for more than $160 million in the last two years to government customers 
like the Air Force and NASA. 
     Clark 
However, this cost was increased for the inclusion of a missile borne into orbit on 
the rocket.  The costs were estimated based upon the Standard Missile 3 unit cost of 
$13.4M (Eshel p. 1), bringing the total cost to roughly $173.4M.  This number was 
rounded up to an even figure, $180M. 
For the destruction a terrestrial node, the cost of a Tomahawk cruise missile was 
utilized.  The total cost of each missile is reported to be $1.41M (Weinberger p. 1).  
However, these missiles are highly accurate, having a hit rate of 85% during the Gulf 
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War, and carrying a payload strong enough to strike even heavily defended targets 
(Weinberger p. 1). 
Though not used as decision variables in the case study, there were also costs 
associated with the Defender’s responses.  The largest of these was the cost to build and 
launch replacement GEOs.  Looking to the most recent DoD GEO satellites developed, 
the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), the cost to simply build a replacement 
is $975M (Lockheed p. 1).  It then must be launched into orbit, the current method being 
to deliver it with an Atlas V (Lockheed p. 1), which has already shown a cost of over 
$160M.  For this demonstration, each AEHF that must be replaced is estimated to cost 
$1135M. 
Furthermore, the cost of Active Defenses must be inspected.  Utilizing the US 
missile which was used in an ASAT capacity, the Standard Missile 3 is the clear choice 
to intercept a physical attack aimed at an orbital component.  As previously stated, the 
cost of one such missile is $13.4M (Eshel p. 1). 
Recall Figure 34, in which the time-dependent network performance for the 
Active Defense variation was presented.  In this setting, Active Defenses were utilized 
three times, each one stopping an Attacker strike costing $180M in the demonstration.  
Each of these uses was modeled at a cost to the Defender of $13.3M.   
However, under the same resources without Active Defense, the Attacker was 
able to strike an additional three GEOs.  As the cost of replacing a GEO is estimated at 
$1135M, this means in the scenario that expending $40M allowed the Defender to waste 
$540M of the Attacker’s resources while simultaneously saving $3405M.  In this section, 
the costs associated with the case study were presented and explained.  The cost effect of 
198
the inclusion of Active Defenses for both the Attacker and the Defender were calculated, 
showing that the rewards of using such defenses far outweigh the costs.  It should be 
noted, however, replacement costs do not represent the potential value of the lost 
communications.  These could be added if they are quantified. 
 
Heuristic Performance 
In this section, the performance of H-1, the heuristic developed in Chapter III and 
based upon Lim and Smith’s heuristic, is analyzed.  Along with its running efficiency, its 
strengths and weaknesses are reviewed, as well as interesting aspects discovered while 
processing the case study. 
To begin, the computer and programs which all of the scenarios were modeled on 
have the following specifications: 
Model:     Windows 7 x86 AFIT LAB Image v1.2 
Processor:     AMD Athlon™ II x2 215 Processor 2.70 GHz 
Installed Memory (RAM): 4.00 GB 
System Type:    64-bit Operating System 
Solver Software:  Lingo 11© 2008 Lindo Systems Inc. 
Coded In:   Microsoft Office Excel 2007 VBA © Microsoft 
The average time to run a long term pure GEO model was 35.18 minutes with a 
standard deviation of 10.28 minutes.  The minimum time across all long term runs was 
15.8 minutes, which occurred on Reduced 4 against 2880 Attacker resources.  The 
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longest run time was 51.25 minutes, which occurred on Increased 8 against 2880 
Attacker resources.  With all of the other variations of the case study falling between 
these two values, it is possible that the run time is correlated to the number of nodes in 
the network.  This observation is in-line with the method in which the heuristic selects its 
targets, as well as the increased memory requirements for larger models discussed in 
Chapter III. 
The average number of iterations requiring processing for the long term model, 
which would be modeled over10 runs, was 7.167, with the mode being 8 runs.  This 
means that most of the runs exhibited 8 degradation variations which differed from the 
preceding iteration in some manner.  However, this in no way guarantees that the 8 runs 
were unique.  On average, the best degradation method was located in 4.167 iterations, 
with the mode being 4. 
The average run time per iteration was 5.00 minutes.  This number does not take 
into account the increased time requirements for performing the local search which 
occurred every twice in every run.  It should be noted that, in the long term models, the 
best value was always returned by one of these searches, though it did not always occur 
on the first one. 
In the two short term model runs, the average time to complete a pure GEO one 
attack method model was 6.09 minutes.  Interestingly, the half resources, $500M versus 
$1000M, required almost double the time.  This is likely due to the reduction of options 
which $1000M permitted.  With a resource capacity so close to the amount required for 
full interdiction, the focus changed to what not to attack instead of what to attack. In the 
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$500M case, the resource capacity was fairly restrictive, forcing the model to determine 
what the best combinations were.   
The amount of time required per iteration was fairly close though, with the 
average time at 0.79 minutes, the max occurring in the $500M case at 0.89 minutes.  It 
was determined unnecessary to perform a local search on the short term scenario in a case 
of physical interdiction as any event of that type would be preferred front loaded.  
Surprisingly the $1000M variation’s best combination was located on the initializing 
iteration, while the $500M best option was located on the 7th iteration. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the gateways were denoted as non-targetable.  
When targeting of gateways was permitted, the model selected them for destruction every 
time, even without the local search. 
With the gateways unable to be targeted, the focus primarily stayed with the 
satellites in the network.  However, when excess resources were available, the terrestrial 
node most commonly attacked was TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK).  This node was selected for 
interdiction so often because it was commonly used as a relay point, being on the same 
continent as a gateway and thus having a connection to the sink nodes.  However, 
because the satellite servicing this station also directly serviced Commercial Gateway 
(Tempe, Arizona), destroying the node had little to no impact in the notional case. 
Destroying the servicing GEO also had little impact because of the four relay 
nodes, TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada), TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada), Sat Network Ops 
Center (Leesburg, Virginia), and HQ (Bethesda, MD), and the large amount of overlap 
able to cover said nodes in the demonstration.  As such, the model commonly chose to 
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instead focus on the satellites showing the highest uplink value, always finding its best 
value in such a situation. 
An inherent weakness to the heuristic, H-1, comes from the heuristic it was based 
upon.  H-1 was not structured to overcome the basic operational behavior of allocating 
full resource requirements to degrading nodes in the order they were selected.  As such, it 
may suffer a disadvantage when the optimal solution is to partially degrade a set of 
nodes. 
The heuristic also shows a preference for front-loading the degradations instead of 
spreading the degradation more uniformly over a period of time.  This was the motivation 
for the inclusion of a small local efficiency search in the heuristic, which in the case 
study was processed every fourth iteration.  With the inclusion of this efficiency search, 
the performance of the heuristic is greatly improved, however it comes at a sacrifice in 
run time. 
One strength of this heuristic is its ability to locate the combinations of nodes 
which provide the greatest drop in network performance.  This result was observed many 
times over, being greatest exemplified in the variation Repair and in the short term model 
run against $500M.  Both in the situation of a set containing full degradation, and a set 
with one partial degradation, the model exploited the redundancy of network nodes to 
yield a synergistic attack plan. 
Other strengths of this heuristic are its ability to be run on a personal computer for 
relatively small networks as well as its ability to locate the strengths and weaknesses of a 
network.  Though the runs commonly required a half hour or more, the time requirement 
to run a model is far outweighed by its ability to locate the strengths or weaknesses of an 
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extremely costly network.  In the case study, the network’s weakness was its small 
number of GEO satellites, which could be destroyed and kept destroyed for a long time 
span.  However, it showed the strength of a network which had, in most of the variations, 
anywhere between two and five satellites covering a high value location.  In that 
situation, losing any single or pair of satellites had a relatively small impact. 
The greatest strength of the heuristic, though, is its adaptability.  From its original 
version as developed by Lim and Smith, to the version developed in this thesis based 
upon the bi-level model, and even for the addition of imbedded local searches to improve 
its performance, the heuristic is capable of being altered to suit the situation. 
In this chapter, a notional GEO SATCOM network was created to utilize as in a 
case study to demonstrate the model developed in this thesis.  In calculating the resilience 
of this notional network, it was determined that the relatively few gateways within the 
network created a key point of concern for transmission flows in adverse operational 
conditions.  After assuming these points to be non-targetable, multiple variations and 
levels of adversity were employed so as to view the behavior of the model and the 
heuristic developed in Chapter III.   
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V.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
Contributions
In this chapter, the contributions made by this thesis to the area of resilience 
research are summarized.  The contributions include the measure itself, which is time-
averaged network performance under an extreme-event situation, the Attacker-Defender 
model, which accurately models the majority of options available to the operator of a 
satellite communications network, as well as an intelligent adversary seeking to degrade 
said network for one or more reasons, and the heuristic used to solve the bi-level 
program. 
At the beginning of this research, it became clear that selecting a definition for 
resilience, from the many that exist, was required if a measure was to be attained.  After a 
review of many definitions and their underlying components, the definition developed by 
Argonne National Laboratories was selected: 
Resilience is the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization, 
community, region- to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt 
to, and recover from a disturbance.   
   Argonne National Laboratory (Carlson p. 7) 
With this definition of resilience in mind, previous measures utilized in 
distribution and transportation networks were analyzed.  As a result, two key methods 
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came to the forefront.  The first was that of “Worst-Case Interdiction”, with major works 
conducted by Salmeron et al. and Brown et al. (Salmeron 2004), (Brown 2005), (Brown 
2006), (Salmeron 2009).  The second was the inclusion of probability and risk in a time-
dependent situation, which was seen in the work of Klibi and Martel (Klibi).   
Both of these methodologies provided a valuable component to the extreme-event 
time-dependent network performance developed in this work; however, each still had 
weaknesses.  The work performed by Klibi and Martel, which focused on the probability 
and severity of events, underplayed the potentially disastrous situations, while the work 
performed by Salmeron et al. was lacking in the handling of a time component which 
underpins resilience (Klibi), (Salmeron 2009).  Building on key elements of both works, 
it was determined that any degradation must capture the worst-case scenario, but must do 
so in a manner which exemplifies the role of time in a measurable fashion.   
As such, the measure developed in this work is the time-averaged expected 
network performance under extreme-event degradation.  To capture the worst case event 
and the best case response, a bi-level mathematical program known as an Attacker-
Defender model was constructed.  As the measure is being applied to a satellite 
communications network, the nuances and vulnerabilities of a satellite network were 
included in the model, increasing its validity.  To reduce the model’s size, minor optional 
sacrifices were made to its fidelity and accuracy, such as aggregation of transmissions.   
From review of the previously developed measures, as well as long term and short 
term vulnerabilities, it was clear that along with the time component, there was a distinct 
difference between objectives existing in each time span.  As such, a second model was 
developed, extending the first.  This resulted in two variant bi-level programs, one which 
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models the short-term Attacker and Defender options, and a second which does the same 
for a prolonged period of time. 
Finally, a heuristic developed by Lim and Smith to solve bi-level models was 
modified for use with this model (Lim).  The models and the heuristic are presented in 
Appendix A. 
Methods for analyzing the outputs of the model, which include a time-dependent 
measure of network performance, were presented.  Using the time-dependent network 
performance, the reader was shown how the strengths and weaknesses of the network 
could be located and presented.  Furthermore, the synergies available to the attacker and 
redundancies existing in the network are highlighted by the outputs, allowing the analyst 
and network operator to focus their attention to these commonly less-visible 
combinations. 
To show the performance of both the model and the heuristic, a case study 
consisting of a notional global satellite communications network was analyzed.  In this 
case study, variations and sensitivity analysis were performed on the major parameters of 
the network.  This method showed how processing multiple scenarios under identical 
threats allows a comparison of the resilience of differing networks, as well as showing 
which network configuration is the most or least resilient. 
Furthermore, a secondary variation on the Baseline case study in which Active 
Defense nodes were included was performed.  The review of the literature did not reveal 
any previous measure of resilience which includes such a network component; previous 
efforts restricted themselves to passive or continuous defenses.  The inclusion of Active 
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Defenses showed an improvement to the long term resilience of approximately 45% for 
the specific example case, suggesting the effect may be generalized to other settings.   
Along with the outputs from the case study, the performance of the heuristic was 
analyzed, increasing the understanding of the operation of the network, the model 
formulation, and the behavior of the heuristic.  It was noted that the key strengths of the 
heuristic were its adaptability, its ability to locate synergistic degradation combinations, 
and its exploitation of network weaknesses. 
 
Future Research 
 
Throughout this thesis, strengths and weaknesses were presented and addressed, 
followed by improvements and compromises made where necessary to provide an 
operational model.  Any compromise suggested, especially in regards to accuracy, may 
be optional, depending upon the availability of a high performance computer.  However, 
as with any modeling efforts, improvements are possible.  As such, major areas of future 
research are presented in this section. 
The heuristic used in this thesis operates on a basis of linear constraints.  Since 
this is an approximation, it may be improved upon to better handle the non-linear satellite 
communications network.  Research may be conducted into modifying this heuristic for a 
non-linear situation, or to develop a follow-up local search to do the same.  One possible 
method for permitting such an improvement can originate from utilizing low-adversity 
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scenarios, extending the degradations and adversity levels together.  Such a search may 
provide a different set of nodes than seen with higher levels of adversity. 
Another potential improvement to the model may come in the form of Dynamic 
Programming.  Dynamic Programming permits successive decision making, which is 
essentially what the model is striving to optimize.  By converting the model into a 
Dynamic Programming representation, it may be possible to locate an optimal solution, 
which currently is not possible with the prescribed Attacker-Defender model and known 
BLP solution methods.  In addition, the use of Dynamic Programming would allow for 
locally optimal policies at different points in time, which could be used for network 
planning purposes. 
The resilience measure calculated in this thesis is currently a deterministic value, 
but note the measure itself was proposed as: 
Resilience is measured as the time-averaged expected network 
performance under extreme-event degradation. 
 
The inclusion of probability into this measure exemplifies the need for inclusion within 
the modeling methodology itself.  A simple addendum may include the reliability of the 
final degradation combination based upon the time, location, and type of attack.  
However, a more in depth continuation may consider how reliability analysis may be 
included into the model itself to improve accuracy and validity.  Such reliability-based 
modeling is used in other areas of design and analysis, such as aerospace and structural 
design. 
Another aspect of resilience measuring which is of interest to many operators is 
deciding how to improve the resilience of their network.  In this thesis, a simple analysis 
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of the outputs was presented which could provide minor insight into the weaknesses of 
the model.  Further research into evaluating options to improve their network would be of 
value.  This may include the adaptation to a tri-level model, or a method for testing a 
variety of situations for improvement under a cost constraint.  The model proposed here 
could be used to identify potential weaknesses while a second model might locate options 
available to mitigate the vulnerabilities.  This also indicates the potential for Dynamic 
Programming, since as the levels of modeling increase, so does the complexity of multi-
level solution approaches. 
The coding which processed the heuristic and the model may also benefit from 
increased attention.  Improving the coding for reduced memory consumption, eliminating 
redundant commands, or containing the analysis within one program instead of three 
could reduce the run time required to process a network.  Many of these improvements 
could potentially be achieved by converting the coding to a new, more robust language. 
Due to the size and time required to calculate the resilience for a small 
geostationary satellite system, the LEO scenario was not run, even though the model, 
heuristic, and coding are capable of analyzing a larger system.  Based upon current case 
study variations, it is believed that a LEO system would require in excess of 12 hours per 
iteration on a personal computer.  This time requirement is likely acceptable for  network 
operators and architects of  multimillion dollar satellite systems.  However, due to time 
restrictions, such a scenario was not processed in this work.  Future research could 
analyze a LEO satellite network, making improvements to the code or heuristic where 
necessary, just as improvements were made to the code to improve GEO run time. 
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The potential future research stemming off of this thesis will serve to advance 
aspects of theory and application.  Various topics include heuristics analysis and 
construction, multi-level mathematical programming, reliability theory, risk analysis, and 
computer programming.  Other questions, topics, and methods for improvement exist in 
dealing with resilience.  This suggests a rich area for future work.
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All three are to be used to denote the node.
Source node of the transmission
The network system the transmission last experienced
The security level of the transmission
Time (Primary)
Time (Secondary)
Duration of a single STI
Attack type
Active Defense node
Orbital Radius {0,1,2}
Appendix A:  Models and Heuristics 
 
 
Model Index Change 
Short-Term Model:   Primary Time is Short Term Interval (STI) 
    Secondary Time is always 1 
Medium/Long-Term Model: Primary Time is Long Term Interval (LTI) 
    Secondary Time is Short Term Interval (STI) 
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M x i d
,
,
, ,
( ,1),( ,| |)
, ( , 1),( , ) ,
, , ,
  ,
   (33) R RepoD ( )  
   (34) State 3 2   ,
   (35) DistPos   
   (36) minpos D maxpos D   ,
   (37) Rep   ,
i d
i d i i
d
i d i d
i i i d
i i d i d i d i i d
i d i d i d
D i d
DistPos i
R i d
dist i
dist i d
x x i ,   (38) Rep {0,1}  ,i dd i d
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Time Dependent Set Covering Problem Heuristic 
, ', '
, ', ' , ', ' , , ', ' , ', '
{1}  then 
     Select | Req * *x ,  
     Select j| min dist(j,i)-footprint 0 ,  and J=J+{j}
{2}Calculate expected position of al
m
i d m
i I
i d i d j i d j d m
j
j j
If C I
i C Conn i I
j J
, , ' ,0, '
, , '
2
, , , ' , , ' , , '
l mobile nodes except for j
     [Constraints (18) (20)]
{3}max | ( , )
     Subject to:  
     (22) HA [(POS POS ) 0.5]
                   
m
k k d j d
k I d
i j d i d j d
w C POS
Sin
, , , ,
2
, , ' , , ' , , ' , , '
, , , ' , , , ' , , , '
, , , ' ,
        + [POS ] [POS ] [(POS POS ) 0.5]  i,
     (23) Atan2 1 HA , HA    ,
     (24) footprint (1
j i j d i
i d j d i d j d
i j d i j d i j d
i j d i r
Cos Cos Sin
dist i
dist ChckI M ChckI
, , '
, , , , , ,
, , , ' , , , ', , , '
, , , ' , '
, , ' , , ' , , , ' , , '
)  i,
     (25) footprint (1 )  i,
     (26) Conn 0.5 ( )  i,
     (37) Req x
j d
i i j d i j d
i j d i j di j d
i j d j r
i d i d j i d j d
j
dist ChckJ M ChckJ
ChckI ChckJ
C Conn
, , ',
, max
  ,
     (new)  Conn 1
{4}  dist(j,( )) maxfuel ( ')
       Then J=J-{j}, J'=J'+{j}, and return to {1}
{5} Calculate time for movement subject to constraints and 
i j d
j j d j
i
If Fuel FuelUseR d d
,
Record Connections from {3}
   constraints (32) (34)  simplify to
   set State 1 for all d' d <d'+RepoD ( )
   constraints (22)  (26) 
j d j jDistPos
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, , , , ,
( , ), , , , , , , , , , ,
,
( ,
{6} alculate Value function  subject to linear program:
1  y
_ _
    Subject To:
    (1.1)   , , , ,
    (1.2) 
d
d
d i t s i t sy s t i
i j t l s d i l s d i d
t j
j i
C z
Min z c
Total Net Value
y cap x i l s d
y ), , , , , , , , , , ,
,
( , ), , , , , , ,
( , ), , , , , , , , , ,
( , ), , , , , (
  , , , ,
    (2)   , ,
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    (4) 
t l s d i l s d i d
t j
j i t l s d i i d
l s j
t k t l s d t t s t d
l k
j i t l s d i
j
cap x i l s d
y cap x i d
y b t s d
y y , ), , , , , , , , , , ,s, ,
, , , ( , ), , , , , , , , ,
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  , , , ,
    (5)  cap 0 , ,      (6) 0  , , , ,
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l k
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y b i t s d
Conn y i d y i t s d
, , , , , , ,
,
, ,
, , ,
, ,
    (7) (( ( )) 1) ( (1 ))
                              ( ( (1 )))  , ,
    (8) ( )    ,
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t s i
i i d
d i i d
i
i d
y TC x cap TC TCactive
cap x TCactive i d
TCactive TC x d
max , ', max
,
i, ,
{7}  <  and ',  J'  contains all mobile nodes or * ,  
         then set '= '+1 and return to step {1}
{8}  '  contains all mobile nodes, then set J=J'=  and p
m
i d m
i I d
d
If J J C d I
If J J
, ' , ' 1
max
roceed to next d' such that
         there exists a node i where x x 0
    Return to step {1}
     Repeat until d'=d
m mi I d i I d
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Heuristic One 
, '
1)  Set B to the amount of resources, z=0,  be an arbitrarily small number, 
          m be a sufficiently large integer, and v'= ( )
2)  For every i,d combination, set x 0,  
          (or expec
max i
i
i d
v
,
, , , , ,
,
,
,
0
ted with no incident) for all d' d, 
          and record resulting Attacker objective as value v '
3)  Reset all x  to initial values and set x ' ,  x ' 0
4)  Set    and 
i d
i d i d i d i a d
i d
i d n
i d
i
x
v
p p
v
, ,
,
,
,
0
'  for each i,d
5)  Set 
i d i d
i d
i d n
i d
i
p
p
p
p
 
, , ,
, ,
, ,
6)  If | |,  then set p 0 and return to step 5.
7)  If x ' 1, then set p 0 and return to step 5.
8)  Select a random number x [0,1]
0                      if p 0 or p
9)  Set  
max
i a d i d
a
i d i d
i d i d
d
A
,
1 1
, , , , , , , ,
1 1
1
, , , , , , , ,
0, , | 
{ }
{ (1) (x ')} ,  if [ , )
0                      Otherwise
10) ( (x
min
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i i
i a d i a d i d j d i d j d
d j j
i a d i a d i a d i a d i
i a da
p
f f B x p p p
x f f
Min
0 0
0
, , , ,
, ,
,
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 |  | 
 | 
')) for each a
11)  If  and no other , ' ,  exists,
          then set ' .  If there exists , '
max max
max
i a d i a d
i a d
d
i a d i a d i a d i a d
i a d i a d i a d i a d i a d
a a
a
x x x x a a
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,
          then set '  such that ( ) ( ) ,
           and set 1.
maxi a d i a d i d i a d i d i a d
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a
a
x x TimeR x TimeR x
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, , , ,12)  Set x ' ', , 0
13)  If B>0, then return to step 5, else continue
14)  Calculate resulting Attacker objective value and denote value as v.
15)  If 1 1  then  z=z+1
'
16)  If v>v
i d i a d i d
a
x B B p
v
v
, , , ,
, ,
,
, ,
0 1
, , ,
', then set v'=v and X '   , , .
17)  If z>m then terminate, else continue
' '
18)  Set 0.5 0.5
' '
19)  Set '  for each i,d, reset all x  to initial va
i a d i a d
i d i d
i d n n
i d i d
i i
i d i d i d
x i a d
p x
p
p x
p p
, , , ,
lues,
            and set x ' ,  x ' 0 and return to step 6.i d i d i a dx
 
  
221
Heuristic One Flow Chart 
B=Resource Cap 
and p,A ' = p,A for each i,d x;,.o-=x ;,.o for e ve ry (i, d ' '>d ) 
1+-----1,;,6.;;,7_, setp,.~ = 0 
x,,, ' = 1 
E A F 
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E 
E 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ··---
Che:klf 
X.o e {x._.. x,_.. • ma.'t {x..,.}} . """ .. 
• • 
re r~::>,..,P ...... ~:>, .• > 
j • l j • l 
Set <p = Mini[ min u;:~,(l)-J..: .. <x ... ')}).B) 
' a l 61;p,d=() 
--------j 
l{x;.,. l x;,,. = max {x;_... ]-}!=1 ........... 
set x. ... 1 ' - x ..• .~ 
Check if 
TimeR;..(x,,,,) =max {TimeR;,.(x,.,,)} 
• 
' ' ' ' ' 
~----------------------··------------------·-·-··-·------·-··---·----
F 
223
set~, ' s X.... ·.-
set GJ~~ -1 
( " 1+ £ > - > 1- £ II ' 
F 
I 
set v'=v 3ld X,.., • x •. ~• ' "'t, a,d 
F 
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F 
p. ' X. ' 
p . .l = 0.5*--'·'- +0.5*--'"'-
No . f,p,.~ ' i:,x,_,' 
Save Result and 
Terminate 
Current Itteration Mod ~=0 
Utilize previous ( degradation, and corresponding 
resilience, cost, and repair times, to determine 
the current best resilience per unit time per unit cost . 
Denote this degradation combination as BIN., . 
For each i from 2 to the number of degraded nodes in BIN._,, 
let BIN ... = BIN •. , except for the ith degraded node, which 
\vill be set equal to 1. 
SetBIN' •. 1 equal to the degradation vector of the best resilience 
per unit time per unit costcost from all BIN .... 
p,.~ ' = p,.~ for each i,d 
reset all x,.~ to initial value 
set X ;,1 ' = x..,~ 
X ;,=.,/ I = 0 
Set p,_. ={1- BIN,, } 
BIN' •. 1 ,. BIN., 
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Appendix B:  Case Study and Variation Parameters 
 
 
Node Name Satellite 
(Y/N) 
Operating 
(Y/N) 
Spare 
(Y/N) 
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) N Y N 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) N Y N 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) N Y N 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) N Y N 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) N Y N 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia) N Y N 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) N Y N 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) N Y N 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) N Y N 
GEOSAT1 Y Y N 
GEOSAT2 Y Y N 
GEOSAT3 Y Y N 
GEOSAT4 Y Y N 
GEOSAT5 Y Y N 
GEOSAT6 Y Y N 
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Node Name Target 
(Y/N) 
InterSat 
Link (km)  
Up/Downlink 
Radius(km) 
Telemetry Tracking and C/C (TTAC)-1 
(Svalbard, Norway) 
Y N/A 12000 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) Y N/A 12000 
TTAC-3 (est Vancouver, Canada) Y N/A 12000 
TTAC-4 (est Toronto, Canada) Y N/A 12000 
TTAC-5 (est Reykjavik, Iceland) Y N/A 12000 
Sat Network Ops Center (SNOC) 
(Leesburg, Virginia) 
Y N/A 12000 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) N N/A 12000 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) N N/A 12000 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) N N/A 12000 
GEOSAT1 Y 90000 7768 
GEOSAT2 Y 90000 7768 
GEOSAT3 Y 90000 7768 
GEOSAT4 Y 90000 7768 
GEOSAT5 Y 90000 7768 
GEOSAT6 Y 90000 7768 
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 Location at Time=0 (in degrees) 
Node Name Latitude (NS) Longitude (EW) 
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 80.238166 12.447236 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 66.8350185 -149.65307 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 51.25 -126.1 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 45.652527 -82.381961 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 66.1333 -24.9333 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia) 41.252181 -80.744541 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 35.414842 -114.909319 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 23.502574 -161.022938 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 40.98472 -80.09472 
GEOSAT1 0 0 
GEOSAT2 0 120 
GEOSAT3 0 -120 
GEOSAT4 0 60 
GEOSAT5 0 180 
GEOSAT6 0 -60 
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Node Name Resources Needed to Permanently 
Interdict Node ($US Thousands) 
Sink 
(Y/N) 
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 1410 N 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 1410 N 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 1410 N 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 1410 N 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 1410 N 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, 
Virginia) 
1410 N 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 1410 Y 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 1410 Y 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 1410 N 
GEOSAT1 180000 N 
GEOSAT2 180000 N 
GEOSAT3 180000 N 
GEOSAT4 180000 N 
GEOSAT5 180000 N 
GEOSAT6 180000 N 
Degradation Function 
Function1:  Sharp Spike at End     D=(x)15 
Function2:  Gentle Spike at End     D= (x)5 
Function3:  S Curve with Early High    D=3*(x)2-2*(x)3 
Function4:  S Curve with Right Translated Point of Inversion D= (1/3)*(5*x2-2*x5) 
Function5:  Linear       D=x 
Repair Function 
Function 1:  Full Rebuild Time Always 
Function 2:  Recovery Time Linearly Related to Degradation 
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Node Name Degradation 
Function 
Capacity
(Users) 
Repair 
Function  
Rebuild 
(Cycles)
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 2 172000 2 42 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 2 172000 2 42 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 2 172000 2 42 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 2 172000 2 42 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 2 172000 2 42 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, 
Virginia) 
2 172000 2 42 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 2 172000 2 42 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 4 172000 2 42 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 2 172000 2 42 
GEOSAT1 3 20000 1 182 
GEOSAT2 3 20000 1 182 
GEOSAT3 3 20000 1 182 
GEOSAT4 3 20000 1 182 
GEOSAT5 3 20000 1 182 
GEOSAT6 3 20000 1 182 
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Node Name Mobile 
(Y/N) 
Max Fuel Fuel Used per 
Deg. Shift  
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) N 1 1 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) N 1 1 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) N 1 1 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) N 1 1 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) N 1 1 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia) N 1 1 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) N 1 1 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) N 1 1 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) N 1 1 
GEOSAT1 Y 5113 340 
GEOSAT2 Y 5113 340 
GEOSAT3 Y 5113 340 
GEOSAT4 Y 5113 340 
GEOSAT5 Y 5113 340 
GEOSAT6 Y 5113 340 
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Node Name Fuel Used per 
Cycle  
Reposition 
Deg per 
Cycle  
Min Cycles 
Operational 
Post Move 
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 0 1 1 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 0 1 1 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 0 1 1 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 0 1 1 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 0 1 1 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, 
Virginia) 
0 1 1 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 0 1 1 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 0 1 1 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 0 1 1 
GEOSAT1 1 2.4 42 
GEOSAT2 1 2.4 42 
GEOSAT3 1 2.4 42 
GEOSAT4 1 2.4 42 
GEOSAT5 1 2.4 42 
GEOSAT6 1 2.4 42 
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Variation Changes 
Baseline 6 Degrees  
Node Name Latitude  
(NS) 
Longitude 
(EW) 
Rebuild
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 80.238166 12.447236 42 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 66.8350185 -149.65307 42 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 51.25 -126.1 42 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 45.652527 -82.381961 42 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 66.1333 -24.9333 42 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia) 41.252181 -80.744541 42 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 35.414842 -114.909319 42 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 23.502574 -161.022938 42 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 40.98472 -80.09472 42 
GEOSAT1 0 -120 182 
GEOSAT2 0 -60 182 
GEOSAT3 0 0 182 
GEOSAT4 0 60 182 
GEOSAT5 0 120 182 
GEOSAT6 0 180 182 
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Shifted  Degrees  
Node Name Latitude  
(NS) 
Longitude 
(EW) 
Rebuild
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 80.238166 12.447236 42 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 66.8350185 -149.65307 42 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 51.25 -126.1 42 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 45.652527 -82.381961 42 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 66.1333 -24.9333 42 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia) 41.252181 -80.744541 42 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 35.414842 -114.909319 42 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 23.502574 -161.022938 42 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 40.98472 -80.09472 42 
GEOSAT1 0 -150 182 
GEOSAT2 0 -90 182 
GEOSAT3 0 -30 182 
GEOSAT4 0 30 182 
GEOSAT5 0 90 182 
GEOSAT6 0 150 182 
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Repair Degrees  
Node Name Latitude 
(NS) 
Longitude 
(EW) 
Rebuild
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 80.238166 12.447236 21 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 66.8350185 -149.65307 21 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 51.25 -126.1 21 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 45.652527 -82.381961 21 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 66.1333 -24.9333 21 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, 
Virginia) 
41.252181 -80.744541 21 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 35.414842 -114.909319 21 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 23.502574 -161.022938 21 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 40.98472 -80.09472 21 
GEOSAT1 0 -120 91 
GEOSAT2 0 -60 91 
GEOSAT3 0 0 91 
GEOSAT4 0 60 91 
GEOSAT5 0 120 91 
GEOSAT6 0 180 91 
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Reduced 4 Degrees  
Node Name Latitude 
(NS) 
Longitude 
(EW) 
Rebuild
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 80.238166 12.447236 42 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 66.8350185 -149.65307 42 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 51.25 -126.1 42 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 45.652527 -82.381961 42 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 66.1333 -24.9333 42 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, 
Virginia) 
41.252181 -80.744541 42 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 35.414842 -114.909319 42 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 23.502574 -161.022938 42 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 40.98472 -80.09472 42 
GEOSAT1 0 -180 182 
GEOSAT2 0 -90 182 
GEOSAT3 0 0 182 
GEOSAT4 0 90 182 
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Increased 8 Degrees  
Node Name Latitude 
(NS) 
Longitude 
(EW) 
Rebuild
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway) 80.238166 12.447236 42 
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK) 66.8350185 -149.65307 42 
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada) 51.25 -126.1 42 
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada) 45.652527 -82.381961 42 
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland) 66.1333 -24.9333 42 
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, 
Virginia) 
41.252181 -80.744541 42 
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona) 35.414842 -114.909319 42 
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI) 23.502574 -161.022938 42 
HQ (Bethesda, MD) 40.98472 -80.09472 42 
GEOSAT1 0 -180 182 
GEOSAT2 0 -135 182 
GEOSAT3 0 -90 182 
GEOSAT4 0 -45 182 
GEOSAT5 0 0 182 
GEOSAT6 0 45 182 
GEOSAT7 0 90 182 
GEOSAT8 0 135 182 
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